THE HIBBERT JOURNAL

A QUARTERLY REVIEW OF RELIGION, THEOLOGY AND PHILOSOPHY, EDITED BY L. A. GARRARD

CONTRIBUTORS INCLUDE

THE REV. DR. DUNCAN HOWLETT

The Theologian's God

R. V. LENNARD

Mill—and others—on Liberty

THE REV. PROFESSOR S. G. F. BRANDON

The Origin of Religion

WILLIAM GERBER

The Significance of Disagreement among Philosophers

ALSO SURVEYS OF RECENT LITERATURE, REVIEWS ETC.

VOL LVII JULY 1959

LONDON ALLEN AND UNWIN BOSTON MASS U.S.A. BEACON PRESS

5s. net - $1.25 net

Subscription Seventeen Shillings and Sixpence net per annum post free

U.S.A. and Canada Yearly Subscription $4.50

42nd Annual Conference of Modern Churchmen

Chairman: The Rev. Professor S. G. F. Brandon, D.D.

Conference Theme: "Life and Death"

Immortality and Ethics: THE REV. A. J. DREWETT, M.A., M.SC.
Immortality and the Non-Christian Religions: THE REV. DR. PARRINDER
Contemporary Attitudes to Death: THE REV. J. D. PEARCE-HIGGINS, M.A.
Humanism and Immortality: THE REV. J. H. THOMAS, B.A., B.D.
Natural Intimations of Immortality: LESLIE PAUL
The Christian View: W. M. P. FREND, M.A., PH.D.
Immortality and Purpose: THE REV. F. H. CLESBURY, M.A., PH.D.
Eschatology and Its Validity Today: THE REV. C. O. RHODES, M.A.
The Logic of Eschatology: THE REV. H. E. ROOT, M.A.
The Relevance of the Christian Conception of God: THE REV. S. G. F. BRANDON, D.D.

Particulars from the Secretary: 10a Bardwell Road, Oxford

THE INQUIRER

FOUNDED 1842

The Weekly Organ of the Unitarian and Free Christian Churches

A Journal of Faith and Inquiry.

The oldest dissenting weekly paper in Britain

FROM ANY NEWSAGENT 3½d. WEEKLY

Yearly subscription **£1-3-10** post free, from

THE INQUIRER, 14 GORDON SQUARE, LONDON, W.C.1

Positivist Thought in France during the Second Empire 1852-1870

D. G. CHARLTON

The author examines the fortunes of positivist thought during the period of its greatest influence in nineteenth-century France. After sketching the wider philosophical scene, he analyses the systems of the leading positivists of the age, and seeks to clarify their relation to positivism properly defined.

35*s net*

The English Utilitarians and India

ERIC STOKES

'. . . in 1818 . . . India became the battle-ground for rival philosophies of government. The substance of Mr Stokes's book is the interplay of these philosophies . . . and the way they worked out in Indian law and fiscal policy. It is a story . . . as significant for the development of English political thinking as it is for Indian history; and it is treated with an admirable breadth of perception.' Geoffrey Barraclough in the SPECTATOR

45*s net*

The Importance of being Human

E. L. MASCALL

Student of Christ Church and Lecturer in the Philosophy of Religion in the University of Oxford

This work gives a characteristically lively and well-presented statement of the Christian view of man, as the author sees it, stressing the importance of neither underrating man, as merely a highly developed animal, nor overrating him by ascribing 'angelic' qualities to humanity. (COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY PRESS)

10*s 6d net*

OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS

HEFFER'S



BOOKS ON
RELIGION
PHILOSOPHY
PSYCHOLOGY
BRITISH &
FOREIGN

*

W. HEFFER & SONS Ltd.
PETTY CURY, CAMBRIDGE

An Analytical Philosophy of Religion

DR. WILHELM F. ZUURDEEG

The purpose of this original study is to introduce students of Philosophy and of Theology to a treatment of religion based upon the methods of modern philosophy—particularly logical empiricism and existentialism. It forms an important contribution to the attempts to start a discussion between the representatives of modern philosophies and those of modern theology.

30*s.*

GEORGE ALLEN & UNWIN LTD

HOLY WRIT
or HOLY CHURCH

George H. Tavard

Learning, charity and deep concern for Christian unity characterise this fresh examination of the causes of the theological iron curtain which has separated Catholics and Protestants for four centuries.

30s.

BURNS & OATES

MIND

A Quarterly Review of Psychology and Philosophy

Edited by Professor G. Ryle

with the co-operation of Prof. Sir F. C. Bartlett and Prof. C. D. Broad

CONTENTS OF ISSUE FOR JULY, 1959

Innovation and Philosophy	J. P. Corbett
Birth, Suicide and the Doctrine of Creation: An Exploration of Analogies	W. H. Poteat
The Paradox of the Liar	R. C. Skinner
De Somniis	F. B. Ebersole
Ascriptive and Prescriptive Responsibility	S. Stoljar
On the Elimination of Singular Terms	Manley Thompson
Discussions:	
Determinism and Rational Behaviour	A. G. N. Flew
On Explanation in History	C. B. Joynt and N. Rescher
The Necessity of Kant	G. H. Bird
On a Recent Account of Entailment	J. Bennett
Mr. Warnock on Ordinary Language	C. H. Whiteley
Prior's 'Time after Time', Further Considerations	J. Gibbs
Mr. Danto on Expressions of the Referring Sort	R. Ammerman
Mr. Copi on Objects, Properties and Relations in the *Tractatus*	G. E. M. Anscombe
New Books	
Notes	

Annual Subscription 21s *post free*
Single copy 6s

Published for the MIND ASSOCIATION by
THOMAS NELSON & SONS LIMITED
PARKSIDE WORKS EDINBURGH 9

THE HIBBERT JOURNAL

A QUARTERLY REVIEW OF RELIGION, THEOLOGY AND PHILOSOPHY

Edited by

L. A. GARRARD

JULY
1959

VOL. LVII
No. 4

London

GEORGE ALLEN & UNWIN LTD

BOSTON MASS U.S.A. THE BEACON PRESS INC.

NEW EPWORTH BOOKS

JESUS AND THE FUTURE LIFE

By WILLIAM STRAWSON, M.Th. 30*s. net*

This subject is clearly of vital interest to every living person. It is not true to say, as is sometimes asserted, that we can learn practically nothing about the future life from the teachings of Jesus. The author contends that there is a surprisingly large amount of material available—to witness to the undeniable reality of life hereafter. (*The Fernley-Hartley Lecture*, 1959).

MAN IN COMMUNITY

By DR. RUSSELL P. SHEDD 30*s. net*

This study of the meanings and implications of the Pauline doctrine of human solidarity has been prompted by current interest in the New Testament teaching about Church unity. No earlier work has treated the subject so comprehensively.

THE POLITICS OF ENGLISH DISSENT

By RAYMOND G. COWHERD 21*s. net*

The more than three decades from the end of the Napoleonic Wars to the European revolutions of 1848 comprised the greatest age of social and political reform in England. The author views those reforms primarily in terms of their religious advocates, the Dissenters, as he provides a thoughtful and definitive study of the period.

FAITH FOR PERSONAL CRISES

By CARL MICHALSON, Ph.D. 15*s. net*

The author deals with the seven following situations: Anxiety, Guilt, Doubt, Vocation, Marriage, Suffering and Death. He starts with Anxiety because that is basic to all situations and is the ingredient most likely to contribute to crises. Guidance is often needed and that is what this book supplies.

THE EPWORTH PRESS, 25-35 CITY ROAD, LONDON, E.C.1

JUNG AND ST. PAUL

David Cox

A study of the doctrine of Justification by faith and its relation to the concept of Individuation.

"At last: we have a really first-class book on the relation between recent psychological investigation and Christian theology."

—Rev. C. O. Rhodes, Church of England Newspaper

32*s net*

COMMENTARY ON THE SUNDAY LESSONS Year I

Eric W. Heaton

"The very nature of the work guarantees that a large and inclusive field is covered, but it is covered here by means of such well-thought-out exposition and such apt quotations, culled from a wide range of reading, that the task is fulfilled with outstanding adequacy."

". . . the present Chancellor of Salisbury Cathedral has done far more than write a book. He has set an example, and not least an example of altruistic industry."

—Theology

25*s net*

THE MAN-WOMAN RELATION IN CHRISTIAN THOUGHT

D. Sherwin Bailey

A scholarly and critical history of Christian doctrines and debates on relations between the sexes from the beginnings to the present day.

30*s net*

LONGMANS GREEN & CO. LTD.

CONTENTS OF NUMBER 227

The Theologian's God
by THE REV. DR. DUNCAN HOWLETT 319

The Lambeth Conference Report
by THE REV. J. S. BEZZANT 338

Mill—and others—on 'Liberty'
by R. V. LENNARD 342

Renan and Arnold: Two Saddened Searchers
by DR. JOAN N. HARDING 361

The Significance of Disagreement among Philosophers
by WILLIAM GERBER 368

The Origin of Religion
by THE REV. PROFESSOR S. G. F. BRANDON 349

The Supposed Dogma of the Mosaic Authorship of the Pentateuch
by DR. JAKOB J. PETUCHOWSKI 356

The Validity of Faith
by SETON POLLOCK 330

Credo of an Empiricist
by B. MAGEE 375

The Idea of Destiny
by DR. PAUL W. PRUYSER 378

Cruelty
by M. H. K. KANE 386

Survey of Recent Philosophical and Theological Literature
by DR. F. H. HEINEMANN and THE REV. H. L. SHORT 393

REVIEWS

CHARLTON, *Positivist Thought in France during the Second Empire.* DR. PHILIP SPENCER 401

WELCH, *The Parting of the Way.* PROFESSOR HOMER H. DUBS 402

BOUQUET, *The Christian Faith and Non-Christian Religions.* WACH, *The Comparative Study of Religions.* THE REV. PROFESSOR S. G. F. BRANDON 403

LOVELL, *The Individual and the Universe.* PROFESSOR F. J. M. STRATTON 405

ETTELDORF, *The Catholic Church in the Middle East.* THE REV. ERIC BISHOP 407

PERRY, *The Easter Enigma.* THE REV. L. A. GARRARD 408

The Cultural Heritage of India. DR. E. J. D. CONZE 410

NOTH, *The History of Israel.* THOMAS (ed.) *Documents from Old Testament Times.* THE REV. PROFESSOR H. F. D. SPARKS 411

NIKHILANANDA, *Hinduism, Its Meaning for the Liberation of the Spirit.* THE REV. DR. W. S. URQUHART 412

COX, *Jung and St. Paul.* THE REV. DR. G. STEPHENS SPINKS 414

RAVEN, *Science, Medicine and Morals.* THE REV. JOHN ROWLAND 416

HIRST, *The Problems of Perception.* DR. J. R. SMYTHIES 418

SHASTRI (tr.), *The Ramayana of Valmiki.* DR. BETTY HEIMANN 419

KELLY, *Early Christian Doctrines.* THE REV. D. E. JENKINS 420

BAGBY, *Culture and History.* DR. R. J. ZWI WERBLOWSKY 421

Editorial communications to be addressed to the Editor, **MANCHESTER COLLEGE, OXFORD,** or to the **Rev. Dr. Duncan Howlett, All Souls' Church, 16th & Harvard Streets, Washington, D.C., U.S.A.** Stamped addressed envelope (or international reply coupon) for return of MSS should be enclosed. All communications concerning subscriptions to the publishers, Messrs. George Allen & Unwin Ltd, 40 Museum Street, London, W.C.1, or the American agent, Beacon Press Inc., 25 Beacon Street, Boston 8, Mass.

THE DEAD SEA COMMUNITY
ITS ORIGIN AND TEACHINGS

KURT SCHUBERT

The first practical guide of unimpeachable quality to the characteristics and history of the Qumran sect with whom the Dead Sea Scrolls originated. It is virtually a little encyclopaedia on many and diverse aspects of the ideas and concepts implicit in the Scrolls. Professor Schubert of Vienna is a leader of the few European scholars who have specialized in the religion and thought of the sect. *12s. 6d. net*

A COMMENTARY ON
THE EPISTLE TO THE PHILIPPIANS

F. W. BEARE, PH.D.

Professor of New Testament, Trinity College, Toronto

A study of St. Paul's most moving Epistle as a prime source at once of devotional and doctrinal inspiration. A new enlivening translation of the text is preceded by an introduction which examines the authenticity and integrity of the Epistle, contemporary Philippi and its church, the character and construction of the letter, and its theology and spirituality.
Just published. 16*s. net*

Already published in *Black's New Testament Commentaries*, edited by Professor H. Chadwick: ROMANS by C. K. Barrett; ACTS by C. S. C. Williams; ST LUKE by A. R. C. Leaney. *Each* 25*s. net*

EARLY CHRISTIAN DOCTRINES

J. N. D. KELLY, D.D.

Principal of St. Edmund Hall, Oxford

"The student needs guidance through the doctrinal complexities of the patristic period if he is to avoid missing the wood for the trees. He needs help which is both learned and lucid. This I believe he will now get to his great satisfaction from Early Christian Doctrines . . . My guess is that this book will quickly become the student's indispensable guide in the study of early Christian doctrine." *The Archbishop of York.* 30*s. net*

A LIBRARY OF MODERN RELIGIOUS THOUGHT

General Editor: HENRY CHADWICK, D.D.

Reprinted writings of the greatest theological and historical interest from the last three centuries, each with important introductions.

KIERKEGAARD'S 'JOHANNES CLIMACUS'. Translated into English for the first time and edited with an assessment by T. H. Croxall, D.D. 16*s. net*

JOHN LOCKE: THE REASONABLENESS OF CHRISTIANITY and A DISCOURSE OF MIRACLES. Edited and abridged by I. T. Ramsey. 12*s. 6d. net*

S. T. COLERIDGE: CONFESSIONS OF AN INQUIRING SPIRIT. Edited by H. St. J. Hart. 8*s. 6d. net*

LESSING'S THEOLOGICAL WRITINGS. Selected and translated by H. Chadwick, D.D. 8*s. 6d. net*

DAVID HUME: THE NATURAL HISTORY OF RELIGION. Edited by H. E. Root. 6*s. 6d. net*

EXISTENTIALISM AND THE MODERN PREDICAMENT

F. H. HEINEMANN, PH.D.

This third edition has been revised by the author who has also added an important new preface.

"Perhaps the best account of existentialism that has yet appeared in English." *The Spectator* reviewing the first edition. 18*s. net*

ADAM & CHARLES BLACK

THE THEOLOGIAN'S GOD[1]

By

THE REV. DUNCAN HOWLETT

LL.D., S.T.B., D.D.

Minister of All Souls' Church, Washington, D.C.

"O senceless man who cannot possibly make a worme and yet will make Gods by dozens."—*Montaigne*

It would not be profitable to attempt a summary of the uncounted objections that men in various times have raised against the central dogmas of orthodox Christianity. In order to make clear the strength of the case against fixed dogmas, however, at least one aspect of the matter ought to be considered at some length. For this purpose I have chosen belief in God, it being the most fundamental of all man's religious convictions.

We say that we do not think of God as an old man with a beard, yet a large part of the language we use in church implies that he is just that. Clergymen carefully explain to their people that the purpose of prayer is not to change God. He is all-wise and all-perfect and needs no advice from us. Furthermore, they say, he is all-powerful, and we couldn't change him if we wanted to. Nevertheless, most of the prayers heard in most of the churches today plainly imply that God is a great celestial monarch listening to our petitions, weighing them, and granting or withholding them in accordance with his infinite wisdom. It is the same with the Psalms we read, the hymns we sing, the stories from the Bible which form the basis of most of the preaching we hear, and all of the religious painting of all the artists throughout Christian history.

An instance of old and familiar words which have grown precious through long use, but which we cannot take literally, is the prayer of General Confession used in many Protestant churches at the present time. It is found in many variations, but all stem from the following form which is found in the Prayer Book of the Church of England: "Almighty and most merciful Father: we have erred and strayed from thy ways like lost sheep. We have followed too much the devices and desires of our own hearts. We have offended against thy holy laws. We have left undone those things which we ought to have done, and we have done those things which we ought not to have

[1] This article is part of a forthcoming book by Dr. Howlett on *Faith and the Creeds*.

done, and there is no health in us. But thou, O Lord, have mercy upon us miserable offenders. Spare thou them, O God, which confess their faults. Restore thou them which are penitent, according to thy promises declared unto mankind in Christ Jesu, our Lord. And grant, O most merciful Father, for His sake, that we may hereafter live a godly, righteous, and sober life to the glory of thy holy Name. Amen."

Only the most insufferably self-righteous think of themselves as so free from sin that such a prayer would be out of place on their lips. Almost anyone, provided he is not alienated by the theological overtones in the word "sin," will agree that he has erred and strayed from the path of highest virtue. This is our lot as human beings. Even the best of us is endowed with neither the will nor the ability always to achieve the ideal, although all of us know individuals here and there who seem to come pretty close to it. This we readily acknowledge.

But when it comes to plunging headlong to the other extreme and groaning that "there is no health in us" and calling ourselves "miserable offenders", a good many people rebel, even those whose religious affiliations require them to say this prayer aloud every Sunday morning in church. There is plenty of health in them, moral and spiritual health, and they know it. To say this is not to say that they are inflated with pride and self-satisfaction in well-doing as some theologians allege. It is only to state the fact that a great many people have achieved the modicum of moral and spiritual character which is theirs by dint of no little effort. Their hopes and desires in this respect are among the motives that bring them to the churches which require this prayer of them. Their moral and spiritual health is a source of strength to those churches, to the community and to every one who comes in contact with them.

Perhaps this prayer, when it was written, was relevant to the true state of affairs then prevailing. Perhaps the general run of worshipper found himself each Sunday morning in the state of mind of the prodigal who suffers conversion and is truly repentant. But it is a jarring, discordant, false note to the worshipper who today prays his prayers thoughtfully and in earnest.

If, however, the worshipper is not troubled by the niceties of word meaning and is ready to admit that he has fallen short of the ideal which God lays upon all men and to let it go at that, the greatest stumbling-block of all awaits him at the conclusion of the prayer, if he is thinking hard enough about what he is saying to notice what the words mean. He is asked to conclude with the line: "And grant . . . that we may hereafter live a godly, righteous and sober life . . ."

This line too contains a prayer which any high-minded man or woman would find most congenial. Who would ask for more than to be able continuously to lead a godly, righteous and sober life? Indeed, what is prayer for, but to ask the aid of the Almighty in pursuing this

ideal? Yet there is a jarring false note in it that enters with the word "hereafter". The worshipper seven days hence will confess again that he is a miserable sinner and that there is no health in him. If he pays attention to what he is saying in his prayer, and many a worshipper does pay such attention, he will note the fact that his prayer even while he utters it is all in vain. He enlists God's help in noble living while knowing in his heart that he will be back in the same place a week hence penitently saying that both he and God have failed. He is still a miserable sinner and there is still no health in him. Yet again the week after he will ask God all over again to help him toward a way of living, the failure of which he will again confess the week after that.

There are millions of people who are not troubled by such thoughts. They are impatient at them. They don't like to be so literal-minded. The clergy have told them to take the prayer for what is meant rather than what is said, and their doubts and difficulties, if they had any, have long since been laid to rest. They quite properly think of themselves as confessing on Sunday morning that they have not done all they ought to have done and have left undone what they ought to have done. Their prayer is that they may do better in the future. So say we all. Of such is the essence of true prayer.

But must we, in religion, forever struggle with words that say something we do not mean? Are we doomed always to interpret? An ever-increasing number of men are unwilling to do so because such statements become obstacles to the very faith they are supposed to elicit. It is so whenever beliefs are stated that the worshipper does not believe in his heart. It is conspicuously true with regard to belief in God. The effort to express belief in God in ancient formulae has come to such a pass that today it often brings about disbelief in God instead. The unbelievable beliefs are rejected while nothing is offered the would-be believer to take its place.

The problem is a very real one for those people whose habits of more or less exact thought have taught them to take words for what they mean, and who simply cannot bring themselves to say in the course of a prayer that they are miserable sinners when they know in their hearts they are not. When a man or a woman is at prayer, he is honest—completely so—or he is not at prayer. To say this is not to rule out poetic imagery, the use of simile and metaphor or any device of literary style. It is only to point out the importance of providing men and women who want to pray with prayers which are real prayers for them, prayers which will release their moral and spiritual aspirations.

We do not and we cannot maintain belief in the deity whose nature is implied in the Prayer of General Confession, no matter how hard we try. We recognize the value of the idea for an earlier generation, but then sadly confess that it is not for us.

It is all very flattering to man and certainly answers a deep spiritual yearning within him, to bring God down out of the skies and make him responsible for the mundane world of men. How comforting like Joshua to think that God will make the sun stand still while we slay our enemies. And how shall we puff ourselves up more than to call *ours* the church of Christ, to say that *our* church is the very body of Christ and then to say that Christ was God incarnate? What more outrageous vanity can we conceive than this? How shall the sin of pride more completely possess us? What laws of power and privilege shall we not then be able to devise? Indeed, are there any claims of power and privilege that churchmen at one time or another have not asserted over their fellowmen because they dared to claim that the church they served was the very agency of God himself here upon earth?

Students of Utopia, the fabulous land of hope and dreams which was given its name by Sir Thomas More, have recently begun to observe that Utopia is always a dictatorship. From Plato's Republic to the latest blueprints of the social planners, all of the lands of eternal happiness, peace and plenty are ruled by autocrats, benevolent in the extreme, to be sure, but autocratic nevertheless. It seems not to have occurred to the dreamers among men that man's affairs could be handled successfully in any other way.

This discovery about our utopian mentality exactly matches our discoveries about man's thought of God. God is the utopian above all others. His realm is utopia, either in heaven or upon earth, depending on your theology. He orders all things in accordance with eternal goodness, although we may not be able always to understand quite how this is so. We invariably think of God as a universal dictator, a cosmic high-minded superman. Most religious thinkers disclaim the holding of such a view. Yet their books are filled with statements about God doing this or that, putting man here or there, creating this or withholding that. It is the familiar doctrine of omnipotence.

If, however, you voluntarily limit your conception of God, you have an ultimate dualism with God contending against the Devil or against inert matter which he cannot bend to his own desires. Thus God becomes a sort of petty cosmic prince, doing the best he can with man in this world—but really unable to accomplish much against the forces of evil against which he and man contend. What a sorry deity is this, and how utterly unworthy of worship!

Most of us seem to want the luxury of thinking that we are not merely a special concern of the Almighty, but that he has a plan for us which explains all our misfortunes, and makes our present suffering into the building-stones of a happy future. We want to count in the eyes of God, and we want to count here and now while we are living upon earth as well as later on in heaven. Yet we cannot do so without

making ourselves into puppets; actors in a scenario written out in advance which we are to play out upon the world's stage.

The churches which foster such beliefs are quick to explain that we cannot understand God's will and indeed we should not expect to. Then they add that suffering is always purgative and it cleanses the sufferer who endures it manfully. Often they intimate, if they do not say it plainly, that the suffering may well have been deserved, an idea which lies behind most of the Old Testament. For some this is satisfactory, but for a great many more it is not. Consequently, when tragedy strikes, many people "lose their religion".

This was the great weakness of polite well-to-do Protestantism in the early twentieth century. It gave a fine account of the relatively contented lives most of its people lived, but it had no adequate explanation of tragedy. It did not need any, for the trials and hazards of life had been pretty well screened out of the lives of these people. When wars and hard times came, however, new answers had to be found which the old religion did not contain.

The church has never suffered much from the seeming inconsistency between its teachings about God's love and mercy and the palpable injustice of life. Job's problem has not been a problem for the church. It has made and continues today to make two answers to the age-old problem of evil. The first is the teaching that life here on earth is a vale of tears and that happiness awaits us in the life to come, as a reward for long-suffering and virtue practised here upon earth. A Heidelberg Catechism, written early in the Reformation period, included these words, ". . . whatever evil He sends upon me in this vale of tears, He will turn to my good; for He is able to do it . . ."

Now in a time of more enlightenment, when a far happier lot has fallen to most men, the notion that life is to be enjoyed, always popular in the upper classes, has spread throughout society. The vale of tears is a theory which men are more and more coming to reject. An ever-widening circle of humanity is demanding and is securing for itself the good things of life. This, in its turn, has sharpened the theological problem, how now to explain human suffering which seems to have no relation to justice. Here we come to the second of the explanations of evil and suffering employed by the church; the inscrutable will of God. Men are told that if they could see the whole picture, they would understand. This assurance carries less and less weight however. There is no evidence whatever to support the doctrine, and more and more people are beginning to suspect that it is no more than a gigantic projection of ages of wishful thinking.

It is a very primitive and very persistent idea that behind all great events, particularly those that are disastrous, lies the inscrutable will of God. It pervaded the thought of Europe down to recent times. When a great earthquake destroyed Lisbon in 1755, killing thousands of people and destroying untold property, the clergy of Europe and

America, according to the standard Christian philosophy of justice, uniformly attributed the disaster to the avenging hand of the Lord. Only a handful of the most daring suggested what all men now believe, that earthquakes " cannot possibly have a moral significance ", as one courageous and clear-headed writer affirmed.

How persistent the belief is that God intervenes in human history can be seen in an incident of the most trivial and personal nature, recounted in a recent book on preaching. The author, dealing with the absurdities that can creep into a sermon, recounts the manner in which a particular ineptitude got into a sermon of his own. " Fortunately," he says, " the Spirit pointed out to me what a monstrosity that was. I was able to rewrite it . . ." and he continues with sensible and practical advice on sermon writing.

But consider the implications of his language. He is saying in effect that God himself intervened to help him write a good sermon! It is a very flattering thought for clergymen to entertain, but not all laymen who hear their sermons would agree. Any layman, describing his own labours in writing a discourse, even when intended for delivery as a sermon on " Layman's Sunday," would be content to say that on rereading what he had written, he discovered a blunder that had crept in and eliminated it. He would not feel that the intervention of the Holy Spirit was needed to account for the discovery. In the absence of theological prompting, most ministers look upon sermon writing from the same point of view.

We puny, quarrelsome, arrogant, short-sighted, timid men! We yearn so after God. We need him so much in the trials of life that we strive to involve him in things that are far from divine. We try to enlist him on our side when we are no more worthy of his help than our opponents. We manœuvre about, hoping somehow to implicate him where he has no concern. And sometimes we seem to succeed in the eyes of men. Sometimes we are able to persuade them for a time that a particular church is God's church, while others are the churches of men groping in outer darkness and still striving to find God.

But men never succeed at this for very long. They may try as they will to bring God down out of the heavens and to fasten him to earth within one of their temples or one of their temple systems. They may declare with a loud voice, with the clanging of cymbals, with the roar of loudspeakers, or in tons upon tons of newsprint, that *this* is God's church, *this* is where he dwells, *this* is where he is to be worshipped, and that the men who serve *this* church are to be honoured as his special representatives upon earth. But always he escapes in the end. Always there comes a time when the exaggerated claims of men are seen to be what they are and God is rediscovered as the Spiritual Reality men have always known him to be.

The ancient Israelites sought to enclose him in a box, the Ark of the

Covenant. Their more primitive neighbours tried to confine him to an image, as the Baals or as Dagon. Christianity tried to reduce him to a formula in the Nicene Creed. None of these attempts has succeeded. None ever can. As the nature of God is spirit, so it is the nature of spirit not to be confinable within anything that falls in the purview of finite minds. God is infinite. We are finite. Yet we never tire of speaking to God as if we knew him better than we shall ever be able to. We never seem to tire of devising prayers, the clear import of which is to make of God a kind of celestial servant doing our bidding. We are always careful to save ourselves from the anomaly implicit in such prayers by adding from time to time that we expect our petitions to be granted only if God thinks it wise to do so. But this, of course, robs all we have previously said of its meaning.

Christianity traditionally has held that God created man in his own image. Now we are beginning to see that we have got it backwards. The real truth is that man creates God in man's image. Down the ages, in both primitive and highly developed cultures, the gods men have worshipped have reflected much more of the culture of their worshippers than they have of the nature of the cosmos. This is a truth which men are very slow to grasp.

The notion that man creates God in his own image is almost as old as our civilization. The first record of such a suggestion dates back to the Sixth Century B.C. in Greece. Xenophanes, who lived so long ago that only fragments of his thought quoted by writers of a later time have come down to us, is reported to have said once, "Mortals think that the gods are born and have clothing, voice and body like theirs." Elsewhere he made his views more explicit. "Homer and Hesiod," he wrote, "have ascribed to the gods all things which among men are a reproach and shame—stealing, adultery and deceiving one another. If oxen and horses or lions had hands and could draw and produce works such as men do, horses would have depicted the forms of gods like horses, oxen like oxen, and each would have given them bodies in form such as they themselves had. The Ethiopians say their gods are flat-nosed and black; the Thracians that theirs are blue-eyed and red-haired."

The Old Testament, written in many different ages and under widely different circumstances, well illustrates Xenophanes' observation. In the earliest passages Jahweh is a God of blood-lust. He has all the qualities one might expect to find in the god of primitive nomadic tribes making their way down out of the hills of Judea into the fertile plains of Canaan and who are driving out the older, more civilized peoples who dwell there. He is thought to command the slaughter of the enemy, even causing the sun to stand still in order that it might be accomplished.

Later, when the children of Israel have been carried off captive to Babylon, Jahweh becomes a god who visits suffering upon men as a

America, according to the standard Christian philosophy of justice, uniformly attributed the disaster to the avenging hand of the Lord. Only a handful of the most daring suggested what all men now believe, that earthquakes " cannot possibly have a moral significance ", as one courageous and clear-headed writer affirmed.

How persistent the belief is that God intervenes in human history can be seen in an incident of the most trivial and personal nature, recounted in a recent book on preaching. The author, dealing with the absurdities that can creep into a sermon, recounts the manner in which a particular ineptitude got into a sermon of his own. " Fortunately," he says, " the Spirit pointed out to me what a monstrosity that was. I was able to rewrite it . . ." and he continues with sensible and practical advice on sermon writing.

But consider the implications of his language. He is saying in effect that God himself intervened to help him write a good sermon! It is a very flattering thought for clergymen to entertain, but not all laymen who hear their sermons would agree. Any layman, describing his own labours in writing a discourse, even when intended for delivery as a sermon on " Layman's Sunday," would be content to say that on rereading what he had written, he discovered a blunder that had crept in and eliminated it. He would not feel that the intervention of the Holy Spirit was needed to account for the discovery. In the absence of theological prompting, most ministers look upon sermon writing from the same point of view.

We puny, quarrelsome, arrogant, short-sighted, timid men! We yearn so after God. We need him so much in the trials of life that we strive to involve him in things that are far from divine. We try to enlist him on our side when we are no more worthy of his help than our opponents. We manoeuvre about, hoping somehow to implicate him where he has no concern. And sometimes we seem to succeed in the eyes of men. Sometimes we are able to persuade them for a time that a particular church is God's church, while others are the churches of men groping in outer darkness and still striving to find God.

But men never succeed at this for very long. They may try as they will to bring God down out of the heavens and to fasten him to earth within one of their temples or one of their temple systems. They may declare with a loud voice, with the clanging of cymbals, with the roar of loudspeakers, or in tons upon tons of newsprint, that *this* is God's church, *this* is where he dwells, *this* is where he is to be worshipped, and that the men who serve *this* church are to be honoured as his special representatives upon earth. But always he escapes in the end. Always there comes a time when the exaggerated claims of men are seen to be what they are and God is rediscovered as the Spiritual Reality men have always known him to be.

The ancient Israelites sought to enclose him in a box, the Ark of the

Covenant. Their more primitive neighbours tried to confine him to an image, as the Baals or as Dagon. Christianity tried to reduce him to a formula in the Nicene Creed. None of these attempts has succeeded. None ever can. As the nature of God is spirit, so it is the nature of spirit not to be confinable within anything that falls in the purview of finite minds. God is infinite. We are finite. Yet we never tire of speaking to God as if we knew him better than we shall ever be able to. We never seem to tire of devising prayers, the clear import of which is to make of God a kind of celestial servant doing our bidding. We are always careful to save ourselves from the anomaly implicit in such prayers by adding from time to time that we expect our petitions to be granted only if God thinks it wise to do so. But this, of course, robs all we have previously said of its meaning.

Christianity traditionally has held that God created man in his own image. Now we are beginning to see that we have got it backwards. The real truth is that man creates God in man's image. Down the ages, in both primitive and highly developed cultures, the gods men have worshipped have reflected much more of the culture of their worshippers than they have of the nature of the cosmos. This is a truth which men are very slow to grasp.

The notion that man creates God in his own image is almost as old as our civilization. The first record of such a suggestion dates back to the Sixth Century B.C. in Greece. Xenophanes, who lived so long ago that only fragments of his thought quoted by writers of a later time have come down to us, is reported to have said once, "Mortals think that the gods are born and have clothing, voice and body like theirs." Elsewhere he made his views more explicit. "Homer and Hesiod," he wrote, "have ascribed to the gods all things which among men are a reproach and shame—stealing, adultery and deceiving one another. If oxen and horses or lions had hands and could draw and produce works such as men do, horses would have depicted the forms of gods like horses, oxen like oxen, and each would have given them bodies in form such as they themselves had. The Ethiopians say their gods are flat-nosed and black; the Thracians that theirs are blue-eyed and red-haired."

The Old Testament, written in many different ages and under widely different circumstances, well illustrates Xenophanes' observation. In the earliest passages Jahweh is a God of blood-lust. He has all the qualities one might expect to find in the god of primitive nomadic tribes making their way down out of the hills of Judea into the fertile plains of Canaan and who are driving out the older, more civilized peoples who dwell there. He is thought to command the slaughter of the enemy, even causing the sun to stand still in order that it might be accomplished.

Later, when the children of Israel have been carried off captive to Babylon, Jahweh becomes a god who visits suffering upon men as a

punishment for their sins. He is also a god who redeems the repentant and promises to restore them to their homeland again. Among the Christians who suffered persecution under the might of Rome, God, in the person of Christ, becomes a suffering God as the Christians themselves are suffering. He is also the redeemer who brings the promise of future felicity when the sufferings of this life are over. Could we be objective enough about our own time, we should doubtless be able to see in what sense the God in whom we now believe is a cosmic projection of our hopes and fears. But it is not given to men to see their own times in such perspective.

The problems that envelope men who are seeking belief in God are enormous. Gods enough are offered them. Beliefs in plenty confront them. But where are the beliefs that are truly believable? Where is the God that lives in a man's heart because he is unable to disbelieve in the Divine? One way to go about stating such a belief is candidly to rid ourselves of many of the beliefs in God that the theologians still lay before us. Let me offer my own personal convictions in this connection.

1. I believe in God because I don't believe in miracles. This is stating the matter backwards for many people, but I can put it in no other way. I do not believe in miracles. Consequently, to try to believe in a miracle-performing God is to give up belief in God altogether. Yet to give up belief in God is not merely erroneous, it is foolish.

The attitude of most men on this matter is the same as their attitude toward stories of visitors from other planets. It is conceivable, but not likely and altogether lacking in persuasive evidence. Hence they remain unconvinced. They are not skeptics. They are not doubters. They are 'unbelievers' only in the sense that the believers brand everyone as an unbeliever who does not join in their faith. It is simply that miracles, Martians, sea serpents and ectoplasm fall into the category of things lying outside the purview of their knowledge and thought.

The believer who supports his belief in God with miracles ends by robbing a great many men of belief in God altogether. He fails to realize that miracles simply do not fall within the thought-system by which countless men and women now live and work. If belief in miracles is a prerequisite to belief in God, then for them belief in God must go. Belief under such circumstances could not be real. It would have to be a sham, the formal acceptance of something the heart denied. This would be profanity of a very real and a very serious sort.

2. I believe in God because I don't believe in Providence—which is really another aspect of the doctrine of miracles. Providence means that God intervenes to bring matters about in accordance with the special desires of men. As we have seen, it is all very nice and all very

flattering while things turn out as you want them to. When misfortune is your lot, however, then you are face to face with the old, old problem of evil, and you want to know why God has singled you out for ill fortune, sorrow or disgrace. If he brings you good fortune, he must also be held accountable for its opposite. How blind we are! As a minister I have been asked over and over when tragedy struck, "Why did God do this to me?" On the contrary, I have never been asked by anyone when good fortune came, why God singled him out for special favours. The nearest approach to the expression of such an opinion has been the pious and sometimes smug counting of our blessings at Thanksgiving time.

3. I believe in God because I don't believe in the devil. To me, the idea of a celestial war between God and the devil is either monstrous or it is laughable or both. It is laughable if it is a cat and mouse game in which God the omniscient and omnipotent lets Satan go only so far in his evil ways, causing suffering and misery among men, but only up to a certain point. Such a contest is not a fair fight. The issue is determined in advance. The devil can never hope to win. All he can do is to cause trouble for a while.

Why? So that God can amuse himself? Impossible! To teach man a lesson? What lesson that God could not teach them better if he chose to and in some better way? Then again, like so many other theological doctrines, this one makes of me a pawn in a cosmic game between God and the devil, each contending to make me sinful or sinless. If I yield to sin, it is the devil's victory. If I attain virtue, it is God's victory. And I? I am but the actor who plays out the part that heaven writes for me. I am the creature of divine warfare, like the heroes of the *Iliad* who fought out on earth the battles decreed for them by the gods on Mount Olympus.

4. I believe in God because I don't believe in the Trinity. The history books of the orthodox make it clear how the doctrine was evolved. It was the result of nearly 300 years of theological controversy. It was an attempt on the part of Fourth Century theologians to bring together in a single statement their faith in God, their faith in that divine quality which they found in Jesus Christ, and their faith that the Spirit of God somehow lived and was felt in their midst. The doctrine of the Trinity was the best that the ablest and most devout minds of the time could do in welding together the various elements of their faith. Those who profess the doctrine agree that it is not stated in the New Testament, but is derived from it.

It served its unifying purpose, well backed by the political authority of the Roman Empire. The doctrine has continued to serve its purpose since that time, backed by the authority of the Roman Church, and since the Reformation by the Protestant Churches also. It is, however, a moot question how successfully the doctrine of the Trinity would have served to resolve theological questions if it had not had the

authority of church and state constantly to back it up, by force when necessary. Controversy on the question was continuous down to the Council of Nicaea. It continued on long after that. As soon as the Reformation made independent thinking possible again, new questions about the Trinity arose.

Melanchthon, one of the early Reformers, wrote, "Surely there is no reason why we should spend such pains on those sublime matters; God, unity, trinity, the mystery of creation, or the mode of incarnation. Why, what have the scholastic theologians gained in all these centuries by their handling of such themes? . . . How many of them indeed, seem to tend to heresy rather than to the Catholic Doctrine. . . . Paul did not philosophize . . . on the mystery of the Trinity, or the mode of incarnation, or active or passive creation, did he? He too, had to meet the charge of Arianism. Viret, minister at Lausanne, in 1543 presented a confession accepted as perfectly orthodox, without using the dogmatic expressions, Trinity, substance, person, etc."

Even among the orthodox who stoutly maintain their full and literal belief in the doctrine of the Trinity, there is today great soul-searching and great puzzlement. A characteristic contemporary interpretation runs, "We must do the Father's will . . . with the companionship of the Son, by the guidance and strength of the Spirit." Most of us could use language like that, but the real question is, why should we? Whom does it help? Elsewhere the same writer exclaims, "How many clergy, as Trinity Sunday draws near, groan within themselves at the thought that it will be their duty to try to expound this dry and abstract doctrine to congregations for whom they anticipate that it will have but little interest?" Here he is at one with the rank and file of lay Christianity.

I believe in God because I am unable to take the doctrine of the Trinity as the literal or as the figurative truth about divinity. Were I compelled to believe this in order to believe in God, I should be compelled to give up belief in God. Happily there is no compulsion on anyone to believe that God exists in three persons. Whoever finds the idea useful may accept it. Those who do not may understand it for what it is historically and then ignore it as far as their own religion is concerned, seeking elsewhere a conception of deity that will be more meaningful if not more understandable.

5. I believe in God because I do not believe the Bible is the Word of God. The Bible is as precious to me perhaps as it is to anyone. It contains the story of the religious pilgrimage of the culture in which I was reared and of which I am a part. It contains some of the most exalted passages to be found in any literature. It presents the story of Jesus in whose life we can see what is meant by the divine expressing itself in the human.

But the Bible is a compilation of many books written in widely different times, in widely separated places, under quite different

circumstances, for a great many different purposes. Mixed in with passages of the noblest qualities are others that could not be read aloud in polite society. Others are simply barbaric. I could not believe in a God whose literal word the whole Bible is.

6. Finally, I believe in God because I don't believe in the Incarnation, the Atonement and all the other doctrines which have been developed in connection with the figure of Jesus of Nazareth and his relationship to God. To me they are simply incredible. As a theological system which grew up out of the intellectual and political struggles of the past millennium and a half, they are comprehensible. As an effort of men to hammer out into a theological system a tremendous religious experience, again this theology is quite understandable. But as a statement of things that happened, and of the meaning that those things are supposed still to hold, these doctrines are to me incredible. If I am to accept them in order to believe in God, then my belief in him must go. I believe in God because I do not have to accept them.

The God I do believe in ought to be apparent from the foregoing. But it is not my purpose to carry the discussion further at this point. Our concern is with the problems raised by Christian theology. Suffice it to say that many of the beliefs about God still advanced by the theologians have a negative effect upon the would-be believer. In the face of them he is apt to become an unbeliever instead.

authority of church and state constantly to back it up, by force when necessary. Controversy on the question was continuous down to the Council of Nicaea. It continued on long after that. As soon as the Reformation made independent thinking possible again, new questions about the Trinity arose.

Melanchthon, one of the early Reformers, wrote, "Surely there is no reason why we should spend such pains on those sublime matters; God, unity, trinity, the mystery of creation, or the mode of incarnation. Why, what have the scholastic theologians gained in all these centuries by their handling of such themes? . . . How many of them indeed, seem to tend to heresy rather than to the Catholic Doctrine. . . . Paul did not philosophize . . . on the mystery of the Trinity, or the mode of incarnation, or active or passive creation, did he? He too, had to meet the charge of Arianism. Viret, minister at Lausanne, in 1543 presented a confession accepted as perfectly orthodox, without using the dogmatic expressions, Trinity, substance, person, etc."

Even among the orthodox who stoutly maintain their full and literal belief in the doctrine of the Trinity, there is today great soul-searching and great puzzlement. A characteristic contemporary interpretation runs, "We must do the Father's will . . . with the companionship of the Son, by the guidance and strength of the Spirit." Most of us could use language like that, but the real question is, why should we? Whom does it help? Elsewhere the same writer exclaims, "How many clergy, as Trinity Sunday draws near, groan within themselves at the thought that it will be their duty to try to expound this dry and abstract doctrine to congregations for whom they anticipate that it will have but little interest?" Here he is at one with the rank and file of lay Christianity.

I believe in God because I am unable to take the doctrine of the Trinity as the literal or as the figurative truth about divinity. Were I compelled to believe this in order to believe in God, I should be compelled to give up belief in God. Happily there is no compulsion on anyone to believe that God exists in three persons. Whoever finds the idea useful may accept it. Those who do not may understand it for what it is historically and then ignore it as far as their own religion is concerned, seeking elsewhere a conception of deity that will be more meaningful if not more understandable.

5. I believe in God because I do not believe the Bible is the Word of God. The Bible is as precious to me perhaps as it is to anyone. It contains the story of the religious pilgrimage of the culture in which I was reared and of which I am a part. It contains some of the most exalted passages to be found in any literature. It presents the story of Jesus in whose life we can see what is meant by the divine expressing itself in the human.

But the Bible is a compilation of many books written in widely different times, in widely separated places, under quite different

circumstances, for a great many different purposes. Mixed in with passages of the noblest qualities are others that could not be read aloud in polite society. Others are simply barbaric. I could not believe in a God whose literal word the whole Bible is.

6. Finally, I believe in God because I don't believe in the Incarnation, the Atonement and all the other doctrines which have been developed in connection with the figure of Jesus of Nazareth and his relationship to God. To me they are simply incredible. As a theological system which grew up out of the intellectual and political struggles of the past millennium and a half, they are comprehensible. As an effort of men to hammer out into a theological system a tremendous religious experience, again this theology is quite understandable. But as a statement of things that happened, and of the meaning that those things are supposed still to hold, these doctrines are to me incredible. If I am to accept them in order to believe in God, then my belief in him must go. I believe in God because I do not have to accept them.

The God I do believe in ought to be apparent from the foregoing. But it is not my purpose to carry the discussion further at this point. Our concern is with the problems raised by Christian theology. Suffice it to say that many of the beliefs about God still advanced by the theologians have a negative effect upon the would-be believer. In the face of them he is apt to become an unbeliever instead.

THE VALIDITY OF FAITH

By

SETON POLLOCK

THE IMPRESSIVE and terrifying advances in knowledge and technical achievement which characterize our present age are apt to give the impression that the shape of the world itself has changed, and that our problems are totally different from those of earlier and simpler ages. But on closer consideration we find that this is an illusion. Our advance from stones to arrows, and from arrows to high-explosives and atomic fission, has served not to alter, but to emphasize, our problems; to warn us that the time for solution grows shorter and the hope of solution more remote.

It is important that, at the outset of our inquiry into the credentials of faith, we should firmly grasp this sense of the continuity of the age-long human drama, for, unless we do, the more obviously dramatic patterns of our times will conceal from us the more significant total pattern. We are not facing something new. The hard surface of appearance may deceive us into thinking that our problems and perils are unlike those of any other age, but when we, like our fathers before us, begin to pierce that surface in the attempt to discern the meanings that lie beneath it we find ourselves engaged upon a task that is universal and familiar. In former days the probe men chose for their exploration was faith; and it is the purpose of this article to establish what that faith was, and to consider whether it ever was a valid means in the discovery of truth and, more important still, whether it is valid to-day.

Before we undertake this task, however, we must first investigate a curious and persistent error of thought that has fastened itself upon us and which, by creating a host of illusory difficulties and unreal dilemmas, has distorted our whole approach to the matter.

This error is a constant theme in our discordant human symphony, appearing in many variations, and attaining its superb and fatal finale in the European outlook. Its characteristic root is to be found in the mis-use of the faculty of abstraction—or *imagination*. The power to make abstractions is clearly fundamental to our humanity and our civilization. Most modern psychological tests of intelligence are expressly directed to ascertain the facility with which the subject can use it. Language itself, without which our progress would indeed have been small, is a primary product of it. When we tell a child to

fetch a chair, and then watch him run into the next room and return with the nearest chair at hand, we do not often stop to consider the implications of what we have seen. For this is already stage two in the ability to abstract; not only has the child learned to make a mental image of a particular chair, but he has succeeded in creating, out of the qualities and functions of innumerable chairs, a general abstraction which can be passed from mind to mind under the symbol of a word. This useful trick is astonishing enough, but it is in the third stage that we encounter the supremely important (and dangerous) step in this process. From a set of facts, a sequence of events, or the trend of a man's life (as discerned in a thousand trivial details) we have contrived to create the most far-reaching abstractions—truth, beauty, love, loyalty, hate, courage and the rest. Armed with this remarkable faculty we are able to break free of the fog of detail and seize hold of the essential, and by it we can communicate our most subtle thoughts and discoveries to our fellows so that all may share the gains of each.

The process of abstraction has not stopped even there, but we need pursue it no further. This ever-developing use of the power of imagination is indeed man's supreme intellectual asset; but it has become an intricate tool, and, if misused, is apt to go wrong. An adding-machine which has been mishandled may continue to produce answers—but they are the wrong answers, and if we have learned to rely upon the machine our confusion is complete. This is just what has happened in our misuse of the tool of abstraction. In our elation at having isolated some principle or quality out of the living, dancing reality of life we are apt to halt in our mental stride and mistake the image we have made for something real in itself; and this is the road to illusion. We are not likely to make such an error when the abstraction is taken from a simple material object like a chair; even the child will not think of trying to sit on an abstract chair—but it is otherwise with the more subtle forms of abstraction. We are desperately prone to sever our mental images from their roots in the real world and to attribute to them a value which they do not possess, and in so doing we rob them of their true value as tools of thought. By withdrawing them from the currency of our ever-moving thought-life and fixating them in a word, we may easily turn them into frozen assets.

It may, perhaps, seem that this discussion is remote and academic, but this is not so; and when we apply the principle we have laid bare to a concrete situation in history its immediate practical importance becomes clear beyond doubt. The ancients termed this error of thought "vain imagination," or "idolatry," and these descriptions of it have the merit of being far more vivid than the terms we might coin for ourselves, such as "sterile abstraction," or "fixated imagination"; but they are identical.

The phenomenon of idolatry is not a relic of savagery; it is a

by-product of an arrested movement towards civilization. It is as characteristic of our own times as of ancient times. True, we now prefer paper and print to wood and stone, and slogans to incantations. Our most superb idols are words of deceptive lucidity which we have torn away from their context in life—"Humanity," "Democracy," "Science," "Religion." It is not that these words are bad in themselves; on the contrary, they are impressive evidences of the dignity man has achieved in the world of thought. But when these conceptions are regarded as real entities, with some virtue or power in themselves, then we have fallen into an idolatry no less disastrous than the worship of Baal or Rimmon. In the service of "Humanity" the *neighbour* is apt to die with a bullet in his neck; the democrat, serving a doctrine, is deceived into thinking that he can redeem the world by a system; the scientist, groping through the labyrinth of biology, forgets to ask the more urgent questions about life; the religionist, spelling faith with a capital letter, imprisons faith itself within the four bare walls of a static creed.

Idolatry in this wider sense is a primary factor in our present uneasy situation. It is the de-personalizing and disruptive baal-aspect of civilization which creates many, if not all, of our problems. We have abandoned the proper pursuit of wealth under the spell of its abstraction, money; we have lost the power to enter into living relationships with our neighbours because we have lost the neighbour in a national abstraction. The world is fractionalized, and all our talk of "humanity" and "brotherhood" turns out to be only another flight into abstraction. But above all (for it comprehends all) we have lost the reality of faith in our preoccupation with fixated and fractionalized forms of faith—which are no faith at all. It is small wonder that men say: "We do not believe in the Christian Faith"; for by that they mean to say: "We do not believe the account of truth given by a certain body of Christians at a certain time, in a certain place." It is not faith they reject, nor even Christian faith. Flowers plucked thus from their roots in the soil of history soon wither and die, and must needs be thrown away. But when men go further and say: "We do not believe in flowers," it is time to call a halt and ask exactly what they mean.

Faith eludes definition, just as life does—and for the same reason; for faith is the response of the living personality to life as a whole. It is life answering to Life. Faith cannot be held in the hand while we examine it, for if we once arrest its living process it is faith no more. It is true that faith is liable to be supplanted by the fatal lapse into idolatry where men, tiring of a search that is never done, turn aside to admire the gains they have made; it is equally true that it may be sullied by the admixture of superstition where men, losing courage to reach out to life as a whole, retreat for false comfort into a reliance upon symbols which once served as a channel of illumination in their

search. But these distortions do not invalidate faith itself. We can no more reject faith than we can reject life.

At this point the reader may be disposed to say that if faith is to be described in such diffuse and general terms it is obviously acceptable to all without question; and he may wonder why we have made such heavy weather over establishing the validity of something that no reasonable man would ever doubt. But that would be an inappropriate criticism, for our task has expressly been to dispose of the confusion of thought which has led people to mistake a fraudulent masquerade of faith for faith itself, and, if we have succeeded in showing that faith, properly understood, is self-evidencing, our preliminary and essential vantage-point has been gained.

The real debate begins when we set off from this common ground to investigate the validity of the various manifestations of faith which characterize human experience. Some having shaken off the shackles of outworn creed and "fixated faith" will claim freedom for each man to develop his own framework of faith. Others, who are aware of the perils which beset a society in which "every man does that which is right in his own eyes," will plead for a more solid and universal framework for the faith of mankind. They will advocate a new religion (not so called) which is founded upon the best scientific principles available, and incorporating a system of politics, sociology and ethics upon which all men of goodwill can agree. Both these propositions, however, ignore the true nature of faith. The first, with incredible spiritual arrogance, denies the continuities and relationships in which alone faith can express itself, claiming a self-sufficiency in the life of faith which no one but a madman would claim in relation to any other aspect of life—whether physical, social or psychological. When men can govern their own birth and beget children in solitude, then perhaps they will know, too, how to live a life of faith in isolation. The second proposition is hardly less arrogant. It assumes that we (who can hardly claim to have distinguished ourselves recently for our wisdom or ability to co-operate) can direct and manipulate the dynamic power of faith by the adroit use of the intellect. This would be to create a new antithesis between faith and reason which would quickly rival, in its excesses and follies, the former barren controversies between "Science" and "Religion."

Faith is not interested in a "fresh start." Why should it be? Because civilization is in a mess we are not so stupid as to propose a return to the tent of the nomad to begin all over again. If the body of faith has grown sick we cannot deal with it as we would with a worn-out machine—we cannot scrap it and build another. We are dealing with something living—not with machinery.

We must therefore go further, and make a sober study of the relationship between faith and its historic "body" which has been, and still is, its authentic and only vehicle in the world of actual

experience. Though faith is deeper than creed, deeper than belief or disbelief, it is only to be discerned through the body which it has created for itself. There is an indissoluble unity in which faith is bound to its own historic body—its store of beliefs and disbeliefs gathered through countless centuries of experiment, heroism and discovery. Faith and the body of faith live and achieve meaning only through each other, each drawing from and in turn ministering to, the other in the constant interaction, which is the feature of all living things. Hence a man's creed is the true expression of his faith—provided it truly springs out of that faith and grows with it. The Christian Faith (notwithstanding its accretions of superstition and its recurrent errors and failures) is the authentic product of Christian *faith*.

This analogy of the body into which we have fallen, and which has fascinated so many minds, is of exceptional value. The body of a man moves and grows, absorbs and eliminates, is subject to disease and decay, and procreates. So, too, faith moves along the line of its own tradition, extends and modifies it, ingests and absorbs alien traditions, and makes its own original discoveries in the rich world of experience. Always its credentials are to be found in its restless activity, its ability to absorb and reject, and in its own serene balance between the gains of the past and the adventures of the future; for these are evidences of life and health.

Nor is the analogy exhausted on the level of the physical, and, if we extend it to the psychological experience of growth, we find that it throws an invaluable light upon the processive nature of true faith. Let us approach this extension of our analogy from our original starting-point—the error of the arrested abstraction.

It is our habit to speak of "the child," "the adolescent" and "the grown-up"—useful abstractions, indeed—but we tend to fixate these abstractions so as to create the impression that the human personality is to be fragmented into separate entities, which, however, are quite illusory. We know perfectly well that childhood, adolescence and maturity are three phases in the growth of one integral life; they are aspects of life in process. Yet despite this, and despite our own intimate familiarity with the process of growing-up, we are extremely prone to break up even our own lives into distinct "persons" who are foreign to each other. We think in terms of "me before the war," "me in the 20's," "me before I embraced or rejected religious faith," "me as a schoolboy" (dimly remembered), "me as a child" (forgotten). With some "me now" is all-important, and we repudiate our former "selves." We are ashamed that we prayed as children, for we have discovered that prayer is nonsense; we dismiss our ardent adolescence with the contempt it deserves, for we no longer read Masefield and Rupert Brooke. In behaving so we become, at one and the same time, more sophisticated and less civilized. With

others "me now" is rejected in favour of a vanished and idealized childhood, a mechanism which leads to neurosis and breakdown.

This same principle operates in history. The passion for the repudiation of the past which, for example, led people to despise everything Victorian is a case in point; but this unnatural demand for a breach with the past and a "new deal" failed to usher in the expected millennium of enlightenment, and brought us instead to the edge of the abyss of disillusionment and cynicism. So, too, when men cling to the familiar past for safety, resenting every new development as a threat to the established order, they invite the very destruction they feared—saving their lives they lose them. The onward flow of life cannot be dammed up for long, and when it breaks loose it is apt to do so in its *alter ego* of violent revolution which sweeps away the old, not sparing its treasured gains and mature grace. Such movements in history are a sign that the silent and healthful process of growth has been inhibited.

All this holds good in the realm of faith. If we repudiate the living, growing pattern which the active shuttle of faith has woven upon the loom of history, and look for a "new deal," we shall find ourselves upon a road that leads to cynicism and despair. If, conversely, we arrest the shuttle, and cling blindly to the half-woven pattern bequeathed to us by our fathers, we shall invite the destructive *alter ego* of faith to invade our quiet sanctuary and shatter the idols we have turned aside to worship. God has his own iconoclasts.

Within the limitations of an article of this sort it is not possible to launch out upon an examination of the current doctrines of the Christian faith, nor to consider how they appear to a man of faith to-day; but this study would be seriously defective if we failed to go forward to consider the question of the validity of faith in God. It is plain that the validity of faith is wholly dependent upon the validity of the object of faith. We believe—but what do we believe? We seek—but what are we seeking? Religious faith answers those questions by postulating God as the object.

But does God exist? And, if he exists, what is he like? This formulation of the problem is the one which appeals to the European mind, and it appears to derive from the philosophical approach of the Greeks. The Hebrews, on the contrary, never asked the first of the two questions. They did not ask: "Does God exist?" but proceeded at once to the second: "What is God like?" It might be thought that this curious oversight must totally invalidate their contribution to the debate; but, on further reflection, their intuitive approach betrays a wisdom that is seldom noticed. When a man is actively engaged upon the examination of an object it does not occur to him to ask whether it exists. Scientists, for instance, do not ask whether gravitation exists, they proceed at once to ask what it is. The results of their inquiry may lead them to realize the inadequacies of the findings of a Newton, but that by no means invalidates their method. Even where

the object examined turns out to have no trace of the kind of reality attributed to it when we set out on our examination, the method still holds good. A child may misconceive the nature of his own shadow and may try to catch hold of it, but, after a few abortive attempts, he becomes aware of an unsuspected peculiarity in the shadow, and he is set upon the road to the discovery of the relationship between the shadow, himself, and the light.

I would hesitate to set the Hebrew (and, be it said, primitive) approach to truth over against the Greek (and philosophical); indeed, it is significant that in the development of Christian doctrine there has been a determined attempt to bring them into satisfactory marriage. But I am convinced that the Hebrew mode has a certain creative value which does not lie in the Greek, and that neither mode alone can bring us to the rich balance of truth.

The Hebrews were in love with life, and their thinkers did not retreat from it into thoughts about life. Moreover, they had an intuition that life was something whole, and, dimly perceiving this totality, they called it God. It is true that they groped their way through many crudities towards that belief, and that they constantly lost it. But they moved towards it with footsteps that, in retrospect, seem almost to have been firm and confident. Always they asked: "What is God like?" We may laugh at their early anthropomorphic ideas if we will, but to do so is to betray a singular lack of understanding. When they became aware of the dignity and power of man, they felt that their God could be no less in dignity and power, and, as their insight into their own nature became more keen, their apprehension of him became more rich.

It is a modern affectation to decry the notion of a "Personal God"; but if such a conception is wrong, it is wrong only because it is inadequate. Always the error lies not in saying too much, but in saying too little, and the modern tendency to draw back at the least suspicion of crudity into some refined abstraction is a meaningless gesture in the face of the sublime and self-evidencing fact of life. We have been too ready to consider our own intellectual respectability and to take refuge in polite but sterile abstractions—"First Cause," "Science" (personified!) or "Nature"—drawing back in alarm to the safe, hither side of life. The Hebrew adventurer would have scorned such pusillanimous devices, even if they had occurred to him. Let God have arms and legs—at least that is something, and God knows where it will lead.

There is something intensely moving in the thought of men grappling with the disorderly, tragedy-ridden world of real experience, and seeking to wrest out of it the total meaning which can satisfy heart and mind alike. Even where the interim meanings turn out to be defective and distorted we stand convinced that this is man's true task. Here is the road of faith, and it is denied only to those who withdraw

into the safety of their own well-ordered intellectual processes. But the striking thing about it is that those who allow themselves to be drawn into this arena of faith become conscious that, when life responds to Life, there is a converse process at work—Life evoking life. This has been a universal spiritual experience which cannot be disposed of by saying that we do not believe in it. If in their experience of a reactive God men have spoken of him as "personal" or have claimed the reality of divine guidance and communion, this is not to be derided, but explored. It is a field into which many subjective factors may intrude to nullify the foolish and glib claims of unbalanced minds. Those most experienced in the life of faith are the most critical, and we shall not accept what we have not proved for ourselves.

In our descriptions of our findings we must never stop and say: "This is God," for, if we do, we find that we have lost the Living God and have embraced an Idol. All we can ever say is: "God is this and more, and the little I can say of him serves only to falsify him." The world is too big and too rich for any smaller view. Life is too astonishing to be explained by the pedestrianisms of either "Science" or "Religion," for it transcends both.

There are times in history when it is legitimate to sit on a milestone for a while to rest, but when we are refreshed we must go on, and if we fail to do so we fall into the error of mistaking the milestone for our goal. When, under the lash of historical event, we learn our mistake and are forced to take the road again, we are apt to find we have lost our sense of direction and to plunge madly in ways that lead us into peril and delay. There *is* a true way—it is the road of faith, and if we fail to take it because we are too proud or too preoccupied with our immediate problems to open our minds to the wisdom of the past and so regain our sense of direction, we shall fall by the way and others in due course will take our vacant place upon the road.

That, it seems to me, is the modern situation; and faith, I believe, is the key to it.

THE LAMBETH CONFERENCE REPORT

By

THE REV. J. S. BEZZANT

B.D., M.A.

Dean of St. John's College, Cambridge.

READERS OF this *Journal* will be fully aware that Lambeth Conferences have purposes and values other than those of the published Report of the bishops' resolutions and the various committees' proceedings. Much of these is of interest mainly, some of it only, to Anglicans. Even for them the Conference is not a legislative body, nor does it define Christian doctrine. It is often concerned with theology, but its resolutions, which alone have whatever authority attaches to the Conferences, are still what they were declared to be on the occasion of the first of them, *i.e.*, "safe guides to future action." As the assembled bishops are, though not popes, the generally accepted spokesmen for Anglicans throughout the world, the results of their deliberations have a weight not lightly to be ignored, even though this respect much too widely, even in England, does not include the reading of them, even by clergymen.

The report of last year's Conference has had, as it deserved, 'a good Press.' There has been considerable criticism of its clichés and platitudes, and indeed these abound in it. But it should in fairness be remembered (a) that these are the phrases which bishops and others are accustomed to employ; (b) that large numbers of their pious readers *look* for such language rather than for precise meanings in episcopal utterances and, if they did not find them, would be disposed to regard the bishops as setters forth of strange gods, and (c) that the Report has to be produced, agreed as to its resolutions by the whole body and by its committees as to their contributions, in a very short time before the bishops disperse to the ends of the earth. To get a book of some 200 pages, thus agreed, published in so short a time is a major achievement.

Of the many, too many, matters discussed, those of widest interest are the resolutions and committee's report on "The Family in Contemporary Society." This plainly represents an advance, wise and wisely cautious, upon the Report of the 1930 Conference. Even at that date, and still more to-day, the matters dealt with have already been

decided by most educated persons for themselves, without either the guidance or any conscious need of the guidance of the Lambeth bishops. In 1930 the bishops were already 'leading from behind': they gave an impression that they were moving, if at all, like their namesakes in chess, obliquely. They spoke about contraceptive practices without consideration whether sexual congress in marriage had any lawful purpose other than procreation. It is a besetting weakness of Anglicanism that it often pronounces upon action, including forms of worship, without attention to the *doctrine* underlying hitherto accepted practices. Our forefathers had the gift, now largely lost, of saying clearly and precisely what they thought: prescriptive action followed logically from stated doctrinal principles. It is usually vain to imagine that the former can be substantially changed while the latter remain intact.

It has been widely supposed that in 1958 the bishops, in this matter, have done nothing more than accord a belated endorsement of modern hedonistic practice. There is only one thing to say about this: it is false. Their carefully guarded recommendations are the result of an ethical and theological discussion. They have set aside the age-long ecclesiastical opinion—it is nothing more—that physical sexuality in marriage is sinful unless procreation either is intended or is accepted as a possible result. The functions of marriage are admirably stated, more so than in the indefensible language of the Prayer-book of 1662 and more adequately than in that of 1928. The due place of physical sexuality in marriage is set forth rationally. It is the " most intimate and the most revealing " relationship between husband and wife, and it is held to be wrong that this should never be expressed unless there is an intention to procreate. That it is to have this result is not a divine command but rather a blessing, often not actualized. Family planning is recognised to be ethically right if the methods of achieving it are those approved by medical science and are by such ways " as are acceptable to husband and wife in Christian conscience." The grounds of this conclusion are given and are in no degree whatever a concession to any idea that marriage is legalized but otherwise unrestricted fornication.

In recognizing that the decision must be left to Christian conscience the bishops are aware that it can, in fact, be left to no other forum. Ecclesiastical authority which attempts to prescribe otherwise merely succeeds in adding a form of gross deceit to ineffectiveness, a statement for which fairly reliable evidence is available. In the long run it is as disastrous for ecclesiastical as it is for civil or criminal law to attempt to enforce compliance in matters which it can neither reliably discover nor control.

The treatment by the Conference of the Bible is unsatisfactory—the resolutions being more so than the committee's report. The former must be taken as indicating, in the merest platitudinous

language, what the bishops could agree about, on matters in which very many of them have no particular or indeed any competence. Much that is said is true and, among Christians, undisputed. But on the existing menace, the strange revival of 'fundamentalism'—the most serious threat to any religion in which reason and knowledge have any place—there is only hedging. This revival is as irrational as would be an attempt to revive human sacrifice. It cannot be met by such a platitude as that all Scripture must be seen and interpreted in the light of God's final Word to man in Jesus Christ, "the Old Testament in terms of Promise and the New Testament in terms of Fulfilment." This simply will not do. There is, of course, a sense in which it is true. Jesus himself interpreted his own mission, and based some of his actions, upon the Old Testament and so deliberately 'fulfilled' it. But this involves a conscious selection from the Old Testament and an interpretation of it never known before Christ. This Christian view of the Old Testament is to this day rejected by those of the race to whom it was given, and rightly so if the Old Testament be taken in its natural and plain meaning. The 'Promise and Fulfilment' relation between the Testaments depends largely upon 'reading in' rather than upon 'reading out' its alleged meanings. And from early Christian days, even in the New Testament, this practice involved absurd exegesis, as it still does. Is it not wholly unnatural and illegitimate to regard anything as 'Promise' when its *meaning* is only truly discoverable in its alleged 'Fulfilment'? To illustrate by only one fundamental matter, the main features of Old Testament Messianism are decisively rejected, not 'fulfilled', by Jesus, whose 'fulfilment' of them is rejected by Jews to-day. So was much else in the Old Testament: "It was said by them of old time," but "I say unto you" —something very different.

Marcion's teaching was more disastrous in its consequences than it was in his age. He correctly perceived a genuine difficulty in the relation of the Old Testament to the Christian revelation. But his extreme iconoclasm, and his agreement with the Gnostic view that the god of the Old Testament was a different god from "the God and Father of our Lord Jesus Christ," made it impossible for the Church to do justice to his true insight: she could not possibly repudiate the rock from whence she was hewn as Marcion desired. But one extreme begat another, hardly more defensible. The genuine difficulty Marcion perceived was not critically faced, and never has been. The soundest Christian position is that stated in almost the latest New Testament judgment: "We know that the Son of God is come, and hath given us an understanding, that we know him that is true . . . in his Son Jesus Christ. This is the true God, and eternal life. Little children, guard yourselves from idols." Judged by this standard, there is as pretty a collection of 'idols' in the beliefs about the character of Yahweh and his actions in the Old Testament as there

is about the ideas of the Divine among contemporary peoples or as there was when I John was written.

The Lambeth Conference has too readily accepted the views of 'Biblical theology,' from which there are already signs of reaction in England, and which have taken extreme form in the writings of Bultmann and others on the Continent. Biblical exegesis is not the science of theology, but is only preparatory to it, a sifting of the material of the *basis* on which a Christian theology can be constructed in the light of modern knowledge and reasonable inferences from it.—

To illustrate by one instance: Genesis iii can surely stand as an illustration, in mythical form, of what happens in every child of man. But it is as plain as words can make it that, in Genesis ii and iii, what is forbidden to man is the gaining of ordinary or what we should now call scientific knowledge, which theologians no less than others are devoted to gaining and passing on to others. To mate such legends with what follows inevitably from acceptance of modern evolutionary theories is but to engender monstrosities. It is not that this or that feature in the Genesis stories is incompatible with modern knowledge, but that the two pictures *as a whole* are utterly irreconcilable. The modern man, and rightly, asks, "Why prefer ancient aetiological myths to modern knowledge in constructing a theology?"

The Conference emphasizes 'Reconciliation' between men and nations as the only road to human welfare. The bishops are manifestly right; but merely to say this is what the book of Daniel calls "a little help," and I think they over-rate, in the actual circumstances of the world, what contribution Christianity, as at present exemplified in the churches, can in fact make to this essential purpose. In the actual circumstances, and these alone are those which have to be dealt with, the introduction of theological considerations tends to *complicate* rather than solve the problems. This is shewn by the manifest fact that no divisions among mankind are more irreconcilable than those which have a theological basis. The immediate problems are fundamentally ethical and social rather than theological. Christianity can contribute little to pressing world-problems so long as it is so hopelessly divided within itself. While it allows itself to remain divided because it cannot achieve agreement upon speculative theories or upon such trivial issues as whether or not its unity depends on government by bishops, it has little competence to advise upon the immeasurably more fundamental and important factors which so dangerously divide men and nations.

There is a very large amount of factual information in the Report, very useful for anyone interested in the Anglican communion throughout the world, which is not otherwise easily available, but perhaps the bishops would have achieved more if they had attempted less.

MILL—AND OTHERS —ON LIBERTY

By

REGINALD LENNARD

M.A.

Formerly Sub-Warden of Wadham College, Oxford

MILL'S FAMOUS essay 'On Liberty' was published in 1859. In its opening paragraph he described his subject as "the nature and limit of the power which can be legitimately exercised by society over the individual" and expressed the opinion that this was likely "soon to make itself recognised as the vital question of the future." And now, in a lecture published just a hundred years later, Sir Isaiah Berlin describes "the question of obedience and coercion" as one that has "long been the central question of politics" and speaks of the war between those who return "different and conflicting answers" to it as the greatest among "the dominant issues of our own world."[1]

During the intervening century the relations of Law and Liberty have deeply engaged the thoughts and stirred the passions of men; and the debate has been so ardent with hopes and fears, and so closely connected with the advocacy or deprecation of concrete projects in the sphere of practice, that—partly, at least, for that reason—the thinking has often lacked precision and detachment. To-day, as in the past, popular feeling on the subject is curiously inconsequent. There is a tendency to regard a prohibition as a greater infringement of liberty than an injunction, though the reverse is generally the case. A law forbidding young men of eighteen to smoke for two years would not be so great a restriction as that forcing them to spend those years in the army; but the 'man in the street' would probably not find that truth consonant with his prejudices. There has been little criticism of scholarships granted on the condition that the scholar shall eventually become a clergyman of the Church of England; but there would no doubt be an outcry in the name of liberty if scholarships were given on condition that the scholar should *not* be ordained. Yet the former stipulation closes the avenues to all professions but one, while the latter would leave all but one open. Again, there is a tendency to mistake changes in the direction of state interference for increases in its extent. An enactment giving the public a general right of access to mountains would be regarded by many as an example of

1 *Two Concepts of Liberty*, p. 6.

such an increase, though more coercion is surely involved in keeping people out than in requiring landowners to let them in. Misapprehensions of the kind seem, further, to be partly based on a tacit assumption that leaving people alone means leaving them, not without law, but under the existing law to which they are accustomed. It is easy to forget that, as Rashdall once put it," it is not through an unrestricted struggle for existence, through *laisser-faire* on the part of the State, that an infant of two inherits on the death of his father a landed estate extending over half a county."[1] In much of this one perceives too a tendency to identify constraint with the conscious sense of being constrained, so that the distinction between liberty and happiness becomes obscured. But it is not only in popular sentiment that the subject of liberty is befogged with confusion. As Berlin has clearly shown in his inaugural lecture, the discussions of philosophers, from Mill onwards, have involved them in some strange predicaments of thought.

Mill's essay possesses enduring value for the nobility and cogency of the argument by which he establishes the case for freedom of thought and discussion; and his far-sighted plea that diversity in opinion and " different experiments in living " should be welcomed as prerequisites of human progress has in many ways acquired fresh importance under the conditions of life in the twentieth century. But he begged a fundamental question by virtually assuming that liberty is the same thing as absence of restraint; and his attempt to distinguish self-regarding actions from other-regarding actions, and thus to fence off a definite sphere of private life which is no concern of other people and into which the state cannot legitimately introduce regulations, has been rightly judged to be a failure. There is nothing a man does or omits to do which does not affect other people. We may (for quite different reasons from his) agree with Mill that " no person ought to be punished simply for being drunk " and that " a soldier or a policeman should be punished for being drunk on duty." But the distinction cannot properly be based on his principle. Every man has at all times a duty to his fellow-men, and even to take more sleep than one needs is to reduce the time and energy that can be devoted to their service. The true ground for non-interference in such matters is not that they belong to a sacred private enclosure, but either that their regulation would be bought at too great a price in irksomeness, or else that it is bound to be ineffective—not merely in the sense that it could not be enforced, but especially because, if it could be enforced, it would not have the desired result. It is much the same with self-regulation, practicable as that might be. A man owes it to himself and to mankind to live a generally healthy life; and almost certainly the diet of most of us could be made more health-giving—or, at least, more economically health-giving—by a careful

[1] *Property: Its Duties and Rights: Essays by Various Writers* (1913), p. 55.

measurement of proteins, starches, vitamins and what not before each meal. But a self-discipline that took this form would defeat its object. It might reduce adipose tissue in the body, but it would produce a nervous crankiness far more inimical to general health and usefulness. A considerable measure of the 'happy-go-lucky' is essential for mental health; and a modicum of 'cakes and ale,' over and above what is needed for sustenance, will do less than a morbid conscience to impair a man's capacity for activities that benefit his fellows.

It would be unfair to Mill not to recognise that a great deal of what he says about the dangers of state action is both true and important. But his attempt to illustrate by concrete examples the practical conclusions to be drawn from his principle leads to some odd results. Though it does not debar all restrictions on trade (for trade is a "social act"), it does, in his view, rule out restrictions on the sale of poisons and on the import of opium: such interferences, he argues, are objectionable "not as infringements on the liberty of the producer or seller, but on that of the buyer." On the other hand, the principle is far indeed from safeguarding the individual against state interference in some matters in which it would be passionately resented as an intrusion on a man's most intimate concerns. Marriage is obviously a social act which affects other people besides the principal parties; and Mill declares that "the laws which, in many countries on the Continent, forbid marriage unless the parties show that they have the means of supporting a family, do not exceed the legitimate powers of the State." It depends, he says, mainly on "local circumstances and feelings" whether such laws are expedient or not, but "they are not objectionable as violations of liberty." Nor can one see why much more far-reaching marriage-laws should not be admissible on the same principle. Physical health is surely as relevant as economic means; and we remember that Aristotle advocated a legal limit on the size of families and thought that the rearing of deformed children should be prevented by law.

Mill was not blind to the more obvious objections that can be urged against his doctrine; but the reasoning by which he tries to meet them occasionally savours a little of casuistry in the bad sense of that term. In places, however, an apparent obscurity in his argument appears to be due merely to the fact that he sometimes employs the word liberty to mean not "uncontrolled freedom of action," but such freedom of action as in his view ought to be uncontrolled. His whole object is to determine what the state and society should and should not do in the way of controlling individuals, and when he says that certain laws "are not objectionable as violations of liberty" and speaks of "misapplied notions of liberty," it is of the desirable limits of liberty that he is thinking. There can be no doubt, however, that he took liberty as such to be simply the state of being unconstrained—something the individual retains in so far as he is not

controlled or restricted by others—and he is concerned to show how much of such liberty should be left unimpaired. Yet once, in a remark that has become notorious, he seems to open the door to conceptions of liberty utterly at variance with his own. "If," he says, "either a public officer or any one else saw a person attempting to cross a bridge which had been ascertained to be unsafe, and there was no time to warn him of his danger, they might seize him and turn him back, without any real infringement of his liberty; for liberty consists in doing what one desires, and he does not desire to fall into the river." It is true that this sentence is immediately followed by a qualification: when there is "not a certainty but only a danger of mischief," the man ought to be "only warned of the danger, not forcibly prevented from exposing himself to it." But if Mill only opens the door by this narrow chink, it is easy to push it wide open. The required certainty can only mean a feeling of certainty in the mind of the would-be preserver, and it is he who must judge what the desire of the other really is. But then where do we stop? We may feel certain that what the drunkard really wants is happiness, not degradation, and that he will not find it in the way he thinks. We may be sure no man wants to be plunged into hell-fire or to endure a lengthy purgatory, but what if a Puritan parliament or an Inquisition is convinced that one or the other will be the inevitable result of conduct which might be prohibited, such as Sabbath-breaking or the study of heretical books? Bosanquet was clearly justified in thinking that in Mill's admission about the unsafe bridge "we have in germ the doctrine of the 'real' will"; and that doctrine is one of the main supports of the theories of liberty which are based on what Berlin calls the 'positive' senses of the word in contrast to the negative conception of 'a field without obstacles.'[1]

No doubt to make an attempt to characterize the notion of a 'real will' without taking full account of the qualifications and metaphysical complexities with which it is commonly enveloped is to run some risk of doing injustice to its champions; but its essence seems to lie in the assumption that a man's true nature is rational, that therefore he must really want what it is rational to want, and consequently that the restraint of his irrational impulses, so far from being a limitation of his freedom, is the fulfilment of his 'real will.' He is 'forced to be free.' Or, to put it in a somewhat different way, we are asked to accept a sense of the word liberty which, as Berlin says, "derives from the wish of the individual to be his own master"; and it is matter of common knowledge that the man who is "swept by every gust of desire and passion" lacks self-mastery. In the picturesque language of Abraham Cowley: "If I want Skill or Force to restrain the Beast that I ride upon, tho' I bought it, and call it my own, yet in the truth of the matter I am at that time rather his Man, than he my Horse."[2] But

1 B. Bosanquet: *Philosophical Theory of the State* (1899), p. 69; Berlin: *op. cit., passim.*
2 *The Works of Mr. Abraham Cowley* (1710), vol ii, p. 682.

then it is assumed that reason is embodied in the laws of the state and the customs of society, and that in obedience to their dictates men attain the self-mastery which is true freedom. To quote Berlin once more, these doctrines really mean that " freedom is not freedom to do what is irrational, or stupid or bad" and that "to force empirical selves into the right pattern is no tyranny, but liberation."[1] In the words of L. T. Hobhouse:—" The proposition before us is that in conforming to the social tradition and only in conforming to it we are free. It does not appear to matter whether we ourselves find the rule which it propounds contrary to our happiness or opposed to our conscience. Our freedom lies, it would seem, in the surrender of our own happiness, even in the stifling of our own conscience, for we are free only as we conform to the moral tradition embodied in and supported by the state."[2]

The theories in question owe their modern development mainly to the metaphysical system of Hegel. But if we " fall back on the ordinary resources of empirical observation and ordinary human knowledge " (to borrow a phrase of Berlin's), it becomes clear that the grandiose Hegelian structure rests upon unsound foundations. It is nonsense to identify the real with the good. " Whatever else may be said of evil, it cannot properly be called unreal."[3] It is nonsense to identify liberty with good will. Bentham's questions—" Is not liberty to do evil, liberty? If not, what is it? "—are very much to the point.[4] It makes nonsense indeed of both freedom and morality to divorce them in these ways from the actual volitions of self-conscious individuals; and it was McTaggart, usually reckoned to be a disciple of Hegel, who said of him; " The most significant feature of all his writings on the metaphysics of society is the low place he gives to the conscience and opinions of the individual."[5] Moreover a theory which links freedom with the ' real will,' and identifies the ' real will ' with what is taken to be the ' general will,' is a theory capable of being used in support of the most opposite conclusions. With Hegel it was a means of exalting the state, and McTaggart, in an oft-quoted phrase, speaks of his " persistent attempt to identify the Kingdom of Prussia with the Kingdom of Heaven."[6] But the theory can just as easily be used to justify revolution. The wage-earners in their blindness may vote for the election of Conservatives or of Socialists who are not Communists, but the Marxist can still feel sure that they really will the class-war and the dictatorship of the proletariat!

The notion of ' negative ' liberty may be preferable to a ' positive ' concept of the Hegelian type. But neither is satisfactory; and some of the confusion seems to be due in both cases to the emotional

1 Berlin: *op. cit.*, p. 32.
2 *The Metaphysical Theory of the State* (1918), p. 39.
3 Arthur Heath: *The Moral and Social Significance of the Conception of Personality* (1921), p. 145.
4 They are quoted by Berlin: *op. cit.*, *op.* 33 note.
5 *Studies in Hegelian Cosmology*, p. 147.
6 *ib.* p. 149.

overtones of the words 'liberty' and 'freedom' and the attempts of philosophers to answer several questions at once. The question what liberty is, is different from the question of its rank among the aims and objects of men, and from the question what the state can or should do about it. Is it possible that things may be made a little clearer if, leaving these problems on one side, we consider in a very simple and unmetaphysical way what is implied in the ordinary meanings we attach to the word 'liberty' and what is the relation between this 'liberty' and restraint?

If I am bound hand and foot with cords, I am deprived of liberty. I have lost liberty because I am restrained. But if liberty simply means absence of restraint, this is surely equivalent to saying that I am restrained because I am restrained, that I have lost liberty because I have lost liberty. In fact by the loss of liberty we mean that my opportunities for action are reduced. But if I am in an express train I am also restrained. The pace of the train prevents my doing some things I might otherwise do. I cannot jump out and gather cowslips on the railway bank. But the pace which restrains me in this way enables me to choose whether I will spend the night in York, Newcastle or Edinburgh. The restraint deprives me of some opportunities, but opens up other and on the whole larger opportunities than those it denies me, and this is so whether my actual purpose in going north is to comfort a sick friend or to commit a series of burglaries. George Unwin was surely right when he spoke of "that great variety of choice which constitutes real freedom."[1] To think of freedom or liberty as something that we have 'complete' if we are not interfered with is absurd. But it is also absurd to identify liberty with the acceptance of lines of conduct chosen by others, however wise they may be. The restraints imposed by law and custom deny us liberty of choice in certain directions, but they may, and on the whole do, in a civilized society, open up possibilities of action in other directions to such an extent that our liberty—our range of choice—is really increased.[2]

These simple aspects of the matter have not of course been overlooked. Obviously the citizen of a civilized state enjoys a liberty (in this sense of the word) far exceeding that of a lonely Eskimo. Constrained, but also aided, by the laws and customs of society, he is able to contemplate an enormously greater range of possibilities and has an enormously enhanced power of attaining whichever among them he makes the object of his choice. He is

1 *Studies in Economic History*, p. 459.

2 Of course 'range of choice' cannot be precisely measured. "Possibilities of action," as Berlin remarks, "are not discrete entities like apples, which can be exhaustively enumerated." The quality of the alternatives and their variety are relevant considerations. In a library of a few hundred books a man who can read is presented with a greater range of choice than a man walking on the Chesil Beach who has countless pebbles from which to choose those he will throw into the sea. If some of the books are in foreign languages the range of choice is greater for one who understands those languages than for one who does not—and that whether he learnt them voluntarily or was compelled to learn them as a boy.

then it is assumed that reason is embodied in the laws of the state and the customs of society, and that in obedience to their dictates men attain the self-mastery which is true freedom. To quote Berlin once more, these doctrines really mean that "freedom is not freedom to do what is irrational, or stupid or bad" and that "to force empirical selves into the right pattern is no tyranny, but liberation."[1] In the words of L. T. Hobhouse:—"The proposition before us is that in conforming to the social tradition and only in conforming to it we are free. It does not appear to matter whether we ourselves find the rule which it propounds contrary to our happiness or opposed to our conscience. Our freedom lies, it would seem, in the surrender of our own happiness, even in the stifling of our own conscience, for we are free only as we conform to the moral tradition embodied in and supported by the state."[2]

The theories in question owe their modern development mainly to the metaphysical system of Hegel. But if we "fall back on the ordinary resources of empirical observation and ordinary human knowledge" (to borrow a phrase of Berlin's), it becomes clear that the grandiose Hegelian structure rests upon unsound foundations. It is nonsense to identify the real with the good. "Whatever else may be said of evil, it cannot properly be called unreal."[3] It is nonsense to identify liberty with good will. Bentham's questions—"Is not liberty to do evil, liberty? If not, what is it?"—are very much to the point.[4] It makes nonsense indeed of both freedom and morality to divorce them in these ways from the actual volitions of self-conscious individuals; and it was McTaggart, usually reckoned to be a disciple of Hegel, who said of him; "The most significant feature of all his writings on the metaphysics of society is the low place he gives to the conscience and opinions of the individual."[5] Moreover a theory which links freedom with the 'real will,' and identifies the 'real will' with what is taken to be the 'general will,' is a theory capable of being used in support of the most opposite conclusions. With Hegel it was a means of exalting the state, and McTaggart, in an oft-quoted phrase, speaks of his "persistent attempt to identify the Kingdom of Prussia with the Kingdom of Heaven."[6] But the theory can just as easily be used to justify revolution. The wage-earners in their blindness may vote for the election of Conservatives or of Socialists who are not Communists, but the Marxist can still feel sure that they really will the class-war and the dictatorship of the proletariat!

The notion of 'negative' liberty may be preferable to a 'positive' concept of the Hegelian type. But neither is satisfactory; and some of the confusion seems to be due in both cases to the emotional

1 Berlin: *op. cit.*, p. 32.
2 *The Metaphysical Theory of the State* (1918), p. 39.
3 Arthur Heath: *The Moral and Social Significance of the Conception of Personality* (1921), p. 145.
4 They are quoted by Berlin: *op. cit.*, *op.* 33 note.
5 *Studies in Hegelian Cosmology*, p. 147.
6 *ib.* p. 149.

overtones of the words 'liberty' and 'freedom' and the attempts of philosophers to answer several questions at once. The question what liberty is, is different from the question of its rank among the aims and objects of men, and from the question what the state can or should do about it. Is it possible that things may be made a little clearer if, leaving these problems on one side, we consider in a very simple and unmetaphysical way what is implied in the ordinary meanings we attach to the word 'liberty' and what is the relation between this 'liberty' and restraint?

If I am bound hand and foot with cords, I am deprived of liberty. I have lost liberty because I am restrained. But if liberty simply means absence of restraint, this is surely equivalent to saying that I am restrained because I am restrained, that I have lost liberty because I have lost liberty. In fact by the loss of liberty we mean that my opportunities for action are reduced. But if I am in an express train I am also restrained. The pace of the train prevents my doing some things I might otherwise do. I cannot jump out and gather cowslips on the railway bank. But the pace which restrains me in this way enables me to choose whether I will spend the night in York, Newcastle or Edinburgh. The restraint deprives me of some opportunities, but opens up other and on the whole larger opportunities than those it denies me, and this is so whether my actual purpose in going north is to comfort a sick friend or to commit a series of burglaries. George Unwin was surely right when he spoke of "that great variety of choice which constitutes real freedom."[1] To think of freedom or liberty as something that we have 'complete' if we are not interfered with is absurd. But it is also absurd to identify liberty with the acceptance of lines of conduct chosen by others, however wise they may be. The restraints imposed by law and custom deny us liberty of choice in certain directions, but they may, and on the whole do, in a civilized society, open up possibilities of action in other directions to such an extent that our liberty—our range of choice—is really increased.[2]

These simple aspects of the matter have not of course been overlooked. Obviously the citizen of a civilized state enjoys a liberty (in this sense of the word) far exceeding that of a lonely Eskimo. Constrained, but also aided, by the laws and customs of society, he is able to contemplate an enormously greater range of possibilities and has an enormously enhanced power of attaining whichever among them he makes the object of his choice. He is

1 *Studies in Economic History*, p. 459.

2 Of course 'range of choice' cannot be precisely measured. "Possibilities of action," as Berlin remarks, "are not discrete entities like apples, which can be exhaustively enumerated." The quality of the alternatives and their variety are relevant considerations. In a library of a few hundred books a man who can read is presented with a greater range of choice than a man walking on the Chesil Beach who has countless pebbles from which to choose those he will throw into the sea. If some of the books are in foreign languages the range of choice is greater for one who understands those languages than for one who does not—and that whether he learnt them voluntarily or was compelled to learn them as a boy.

" for being subjected free
Past thought of freedom."

Both advocates and opponents of the Hegelian doctrines appear to recognize this. Bosanquet can speak of the 'larger' liberty as " presenting the greater area to activity and the more extensive choice to self-determination."[1] Hobhouse, on his side, can say that " freedom in one thing may indeed imply restraint on something else."[2] But then Hobhouse, to illustrate his meaning, adds: " If I am secure in freedom to go about my business, this implies that others are prevented from hindering me in doing so," and thus avoids the essential point that the very man who is constrained in certain directions may himself obtain in other directions, as a consequence of the restraint, a larger liberty than would otherwise be his. And Bosanquet confuses the simple issue when he identifies the 'larger' liberty with what he calls the 'higher' liberty and speaks of "the more philosophical idea of freedom as submission to a noble law."[3]

On the ethical side of the matter there seems to be a good deal of confusion in regard to the relation between liberty and self-restraint. The man who lives a 'well-regulated' life is no doubt freer than one who is a 'slave' to drink or lust or (as Hobhouse points out) to narrow and irrational principles. But he is freer because a greater variety of possibilities lies open to him, because he enjoys a greater range of choice—either for good or for evil. It is a mistake to identify freedom with virtuous living, or, on the other hand, to treat all regulation as inimical to the good life, as is suggested by the saying " To form habits is to cease to be moral." A sounder view of things is expressed by the question which Professor Toynbee propounded in a recent article:—" If a human being were not an automaton in respect of his heart and lungs—if he had to make an act of free choice each time that his lungs were to inhale and that his heart was to beat, how much energy would he have left over for making free choices in the spiritual field of consciousness, thought and will?"[4] And we are brought near to the heart of the matter by the lines of Goethe:

Vergebens werden ungebundne Geister
Nach der Vollendung reiner Höhe streben.
Wer Grosses will, muss sich zusammenraffen;
In der Beschränkung zeigt sich erst der Meister,
Und das Gesetz nur kann uns Freiheit geben.

1 *op. cit.* p. 137; cp. his earlier book: *The Civilization of Christendom* (1893), pp. 368, 381.
2 *op. cit.* p. 35.
3 *Philosophical Theory*, pp. 137, 145; *Civilization of Christendom*, p. 360.
4 *The Observer*, Aug. 10, 1958.

THE ORIGIN OF RELIGION

By

THE REV. DR. S. G. F. BRANDON

Professor of Comparative Religion in the University of Manchester

THE SEARCH for origins is no new thing; it is indeed so ancient and widespread that it may truly be regarded as a characteristic of the human mind. Moreover, carefully conducted research into origins did not have to await the emergence of the Western scientific spirit, for Herodotus (fl. 468 B.C.) tells of the quaint experiment conducted by the Egyptian monarch Psammetichus to discover which was the oldest nation of mankind.[1] Speculation about the beginnings of religion is even older than this primitive essay in ethnology: Sumerian texts of the third millennium B.C. explain that mankind was created to serve the needs of the gods,[2] while the so-called 'Memphite theology,' of approximately the same period, ascribed the institution of religion to the god Ptah.[3]

Greek rationalism provides, typically, our earliest known examples of a secularist approach to the subject, with Xenophanes (f. 545 B.C.) shrewdly appraising the essential relativity of all religious conceptions[4] and Euhemerus (fl. 300 B.C.) tracing the gods back to the deified heroes of ancient time,[5] while Lucretius extols his master, Epicurus, for being the first to deliver mankind, *oppressa gravi sub religione*, from the direful fantasy which its superstition has created.[6] With the establishment of Christianity as the unique religion of mediaeval Europe such speculation about the origin of religion could have no *raison d'être*, since it was accepted as a fundamental article of faith that the whole truth concerning the past of mankind was divinely revealed in the Holy Bible. But with the growth of secular learning from the seventeenth century onwards interest revived in the history of religion, being greatly stimulated by the ever increasing knowledge of non-Christian cultures which came from maritime exploration and mercantile activity in both the eastern and western hemispheres. It is accordingly significant that in 1723 a Jesuit father, Joseph Lafitau, set forth the theory that originally there had been a religion of nature-

[1] II,2.
[2] Cf. C. N. Kramer, *Sumerian Mythology* (Philadelphia, 1944), p. 70; see also his *From the Tablets of Sumer* (Colorado, 1956), pp. 101-2, 193-4.
[3] Cf. *Ancient Near Eastern Texts*, ed. J. B. Pritchard (Princeton, 1955), p. 3b.
[4] *Fragments* 14, 15, 16. Cf. F. M. Comford, *Greek Religious Thought* (London, 1923), p. 85.
[5] Cf. *Oxford Classical Dictionary*, p. 344.
[6] *De rerum natura*, I, 62f.

rites, universal among mankind, basing his argument on the similarity found between the rites of the aborigines of the New World and those of classical paganism and Catholic Christianity,[1] while in 1795 Charles-François Dupuis actually suggested that behind the figures of Christ, Osiris, Bacchus and Mithra there lay a common tendency to deify the sun as manifest in its annual course.[2]

The nineteenth century saw the beginnings of a truly scientific approach to the problem of the origin and evolution of the religions of mankind. Famous names are linked with this new field of study. Professor Max Müller found the key to religious origins in comparative philology,[3] while Sir E. B. Tylor proposed as a 'minimum definition' that religion is 'belief in spiritual beings.'[4] Herbert Spencer propounded a Victorian version of the ancient theory of Euhemerus, to the effect that ancestor worship was the original form of religion,[5] and Sir James George Frazer maintained that an 'Age of Magic' preceded the 'Age of Religion'.[6] The search went on into the twentieth century, with suggestions that religion stems from the strange depths of the human *psyche*, or from an aboriginal sense of tribal solidarity, or from an intuitive ritual response to certain critical situations. Sometimes the quest has obviously been motivated by theological interests, as, for example, Rudolf Otto's thesis that man possesses an innate faculty for apprehending manifestations of the 'numinous,'[7] and Wilhelm Schmidt's endeavour to show that behind the sky-gods and "All-Fathers" of many primitive religions lies an original monotheism, presumably of divine revelation.[8]

These manifold attempts to explain the origin of religion, with all their various and often contradictory conclusions, surely witness to both the essential complexity and intractability of the problem; and the fact should in turn provide cogent warning to any who may feel disposed to attempt a contribution to its solution. But, since the problem is of fundamental significance and unceasingly commands attention, every carefully considered attempt should be welcome and fairly examined.

It is the opinion of the present writer that so far, in discussions of this subject, the significance of man's consciousness of time has not been adequately considered.[9] The problem of the nature of time has, of course, been very thoroughly examined by many eminent philosophers and scientists; but much less thought has been given to evalu-

[1] *Mœurs des sauvages comparées avec mœurs des premiers temps* (Paris, 1723).
[2] *L'origine de tous les cultes ou la religion universelle* (nouv. éd., Paris, 1882).
[3] e.g. Max Müller, 'Comparative Mythology,' in *Chips from a German Workshop*, II (London, 1867). Cf. L. H. Jordan, *Comparative Religion* (London, 1905), pp. 552-4.
[4] *Primitive Culture*, I (London, 1929, 1st ed. 1871), p. 424.
[5] Cf. his *Principles of Sociology* (1877-90).
[6] *The Golden Bough* (*The Magic Art*), I, pp. 233-4.
[7] *Das Heilige* (E. T., *The Idea of the Holy*).
[8] *Der Ursprung der Gottesidee*, 7 Bände (1926-40); *The Origin and Growth of Religion* (1931).
[9] The subject is treated at length in the present writer's forthcoming book *Man & His Destiny in the Great Religions*.

ating what might be termed the cultural significance of man's awareness of the temporal process. Yet it is obvious after little reflection that the realization that one is living in a world of changing phenomena is a basic experience which conditions all thought, and in turn all estimates of significance. This realization is naturally of gradual growth in each human being; but in each it is marked by two discoveries of fundamental import for the individual's subsequent evaluation of life. The first of these discoveries in its mental and emotional effect, though not necessarily in its chronological occurrence, is that of death. At some point in one's childhood the fact is learned for the first time that people die.[1] This new fact is usually acquired in connection with the death of someone of the child's acquaintance; but invariably its personal significance is at once grasped, namely, that he, the child, must himself also sometime die. In most instances this apprehension of the inevitability of one's own mortality does not produce at the time any serious mental or emotional reaction, and the normal healthy child will appear quickly to have become oblivious of it. Nevertheless, the fact is registered by the mind and can never be forgotten, and its significance steadily grows in urgency as the years pass by. Moreover, its logic steadily grows more obvious and definitive; for it sets a limit to the existence of "this pleasing anxious being" which cannot be passed, and it inevitably raises questions about the purpose of life and whether anything can lie beyond its apparent termination. And this is not all: the growing consciousness that one is moving irrevocably forward into the future towards one's end steadily increases one's sensitivity to temporal change and inspires or strengthens the intuitive urge to seek security from the effacing process of the relentless flux of time.

The other discovery in this context, usually made in childhood, is not calculated to have so profound an emotional and mental effect; but it also constitutes a basic datum for the individual's evaluation of life. This is the discovery of birth, which is the realization that the existence of every living being has a beginning; and its significance is quickly translated into personal terms by the individual in relation to himself. Although it is inevitably learned as a *fait accompli*, this fact too has its logic; for it supplies the other term to the individual's life, underlining its essential temporariness and, despite all knowledge of the physiological process of procreation and birth, investing the beginning of life also with mystery.

Consciousness of the twin facts of birth and death, accordingly, raises for each individual questions concerning his life and destiny to which he is forced to make some response. That response generally has varied according to the individual's psychological constitution and the nature of his cultural environment. But, however varied it has been, the response has been conditioned by a common factor, namely

[1] Cf. S. Anthony, *The Child's Discovery of Death* (London, 1940).

a deeply-rooted sense of insecurity, stemming from experience of temporal change and pointed by the anticipation of death.

The mental and emotional tension caused by this situation apparently marks out man as unique from among the other species; for, so far as can be determined, even the higher animals have only a very rudimentary sense of time, and they seem to be able to live in perfect contentment of present well-being, unmoved by any thought of the probable onset of change in their current situation and certainly untroubled by any awareness of their mortal state. Indeed, seen in this context, man's sense of time both raises him out of the rut of a bovine immersion in present experience and torments him with the consciousness of his essential insecurity in an ever changing world, of which the basic pattern seems to be birth, growth, decay and death.[1]

This awareness of living in a world of time, as well as in one of space with its concomitant sense of insecurity, which is thus a basic characteristic of *homo sapiens*, has presumably been a human faculty ever since the species achieved the requisite degree of mental development. This necessary presumption in turn implies that, so soon as that stage of evolution was reached, human beings began to respond to the problems which birth and death constituted for their evaluations of life. We may, accordingly, expect to find in the archaeological record of the earliest cultures of mankind some indication of the nature of this response.

On turning to the evidence of archaeology we find most notably, *inter alia*, that, so soon as his skeletal remains appear in juxaposition to his cultural deposits, *homo sapiens* is carefully burying his dead. Now this is a fact of immense significance, because none of the other animals similarly care for their dead—indeed the burial of the dead has ever been an uniquely human characteristic.[2] But these first men are not only found burying their dead; in addition they equip the dead in their graves with weapons, tools, ornaments and food.

The witness of this mortuary practice is decisive. It means, first, that in the remotest past to which the human species can be traced, man appears to have reacted to death, i.e. the death of his own kind, in a manner without parallel among the other animals. Moreover, this reaction does not merely take the form of carefully burying the dead, but the equipment with which he buried them surely presupposes a belief that, despite all evidence to the contrary, the dead would still need the things of which they had need while they lived. To appreciate properly the remarkable character of this belief, it must be remembered too that man at this time lived very close to starvation

[1] Cf. H. Plessner, 'Ueber die Beziehung der Zeit zum Tode,' in *Eranos-Jahrbuch*, (Zürich, 1937), p. 371.

[2] The so-called Neanderthal Man, the immediate precursor of *homo sapiens*, also buried his dead. Whether Neanderthal Man provided funerary equipment for his dead is disputed: cf. G. Clark, *From Savagery to Civilization* (London, 1946), pp. 43; J. Maringer, *Vorgeschichtliche Religion* (Einsiedeln, 1956), p. 76. The earlier French evidence is accepted by V. G. Clarke, *Man Makes Himself* (London, 1941), pp. 54f. & E. O. James, *Prehistoric Religion* (London, 1957), pp. 21-2, 29.

in a hard and dangerous environment; hence to surrender the use of tools and weapons that had been laboriously made and to sacrifice some of his precious food for the benefit of the dead attests the power of his conviction about the necessity of this service of the dead.

The evidence which we have of Upper Palaeolithic culture indicates also that already there existed some variety of belief about the nature of death and the state of the dead. For example, in some instances the skeleton has been found stained with red pigment, and in others it appears that the body must have been tightly bound in a crouched position shortly after death and buried in that manner. The first custom is usually, and reasonably, explained in terms of the practice of 'sympathetic magic'—red is the colour of blood, the 'life-substance,' which the pallid corpse appeared to lack. If this be the true explanation of the custom, then it would seem that in those instances in which it occurred it was not believed that the dead naturally survived in some form, but that survival could be achieved by magic. The custom of closely pinioning the corpse seems only to be explained as inspired by a fear of the dead returning to trouble the living.

Palaeolithic funerary practice, with all its variations, eloquently attests primitive man's preoccupation with death. Although the evidence, as we have it, shows what the living did for the dead, it is surely legitimate to infer that such mortuary service was not performed without its stirring in the minds of those who performed it some reflection on their own ultimate end. In other words, it is reasonable to see in this Palaeolithic funerary care evidence that, from the very beginning, the fact of death has prompted within man ideas which have found practical expression in forms that we can recognize as religious, or perhaps more precisely as magico-religious.

Besides the data illustrating Palaeolithic man's attitude to death, there is some striking evidence attesting his concern with the fact of birth. On many sites of his habitation there have been discovered figurines of nude corpulent women, carved from stone or other suitable material.[1] The most remarkable feature of these figurines is the exaggerated emphasis which is given to the sexual attributes, while the faces are left blank. Such statuettes were clearly not intended to be portraits of individual women, but rather symbolic representations of maternity. There has naturally been much speculation about the purpose of these objects, and some authorities have suggested that they are prototypes of the representations of the Great Goddess, the Earth Mother, which are found on many Neolithic sites and in many places in the ancient Near East and the Indus Valley.[2] Such an identification would presuppose that Palaeolithic man was capable of

[1] See the examples illustrated in Maringer, *op. cit.*, Tafel 14; R. Pittioni, *Die urgeschichtlichen Grundlagen der europäischen Kultur* (Wien, 1949), Abb. 27, 28.

[2] Cf. Pittioni, *op. cit.*, pp. 64, 66; Maringer, *op. cit.*, pp. 196-201; James, *op. cit.*, pp. 153f; J. Przyluski, *La Grande Déesse* (Paris, 1950), pp. 46f.

a deeply-rooted sense of insecurity, stemming from experience of temporal change and pointed by the anticipation of death.

The mental and emotional tension caused by this situation apparently marks out man as unique from among the other species; for, so far as can be determined, even the higher animals have only a very rudimentary sense of time, and they seem to be able to live in perfect contentment of present well-being, unmoved by any thought of the probable onset of change in their current situation and certainly untroubled by any awareness of their mortal state. Indeed, seen in this context, man's sense of time both raises him out of the rut of a bovine immersion in present experience and torments him with the consciousness of his essential insecurity in an ever changing world, of which the basic pattern seems to be birth, growth, decay and death.[1]

This awareness of living in a world of time, as well as in one of space with its concomitant sense of insecurity, which is thus a basic characteristic of *homo sapiens*, has presumably been a human faculty ever since the species achieved the requisite degree of mental development. This necessary presumption in turn implies that, so soon as that stage of evolution was reached, human beings began to respond to the problems which birth and death constituted for their evaluations of life. We may, accordingly, expect to find in the archaeological record of the earliest cultures of mankind some indication of the nature of this response.

On turning to the evidence of archaeology we find most notably, *inter alia*, that, so soon as his skeletal remains appear in juxaposition to his cultural deposits, *homo sapiens* is carefully burying his dead. Now this is a fact of immense significance, because none of the other animals similarly care for their dead—indeed the burial of the dead has ever been an uniquely human characteristic.[2] But these first men are not only found burying their dead; in addition they equip the dead in their graves with weapons, tools, ornaments and food.

The witness of this mortuary practice is decisive. It means, first, that in the remotest past to which the human species can be traced, man appears to have reacted to death, i.e. the death of his own kind, in a manner without parallel among the other animals. Moreover, this reaction does not merely take the form of carefully burying the dead, but the equipment with which he buried them surely presupposes a belief that, despite all evidence to the contrary, the dead would still need the things of which they had need while they lived. To appreciate properly the remarkable character of this belief, it must be remembered too that man at this time lived very close to starvation

[1] Cf. H. Plessner, 'Ueber die Beziehung der Zeit zum Tode,' in *Eranos-Jahrbuch*, (Zürich, 1937), p. 371.

[2] The so-called Neanderthal Man, the immediate precursor of *homo sapiens*, also buried his dead. Whether Neanderthal Man provided funerary equipment for his dead is disputed: cf. G. Clark, *From Savagery to Civilization* (London, 1946), pp. 43; J. Maringer, *Vorgeschichtliche Religion* (Einsiedeln, 1956), p. 76. The earlier French evidence is accepted by V. G. Clarke, *Man Makes Himself* (London, 1941), pp. 54f. & E. O. James, *Prehistoric Religion* (London, 1957), pp. 21-2, 29.

in a hard and dangerous environment; hence to surrender the use of tools and weapons that had been laboriously made and to sacrifice some of his precious food for the benefit of the dead attests the power of his conviction about the necessity of this service of the dead.

The evidence which we have of Upper Palaeolithic culture indicates also that already there existed some variety of belief about the nature of death and the state of the dead. For example, in some instances the skeleton has been found stained with red pigment, and in others it appears that the body must have been tightly bound in a crouched position shortly after death and buried in that manner. The first custom is usually, and reasonably, explained in terms of the practice of 'sympathetic magic'—red is the colour of blood, the 'life-substance,' which the pallid corpse appeared to lack. If this be the true explanation of the custom, then it would seem that in those instances in which it occurred it was not believed that the dead naturally survived in some form, but that survival could be achieved by magic. The custom of closely pinioning the corpse seems only to be explained as inspired by a fear of the dead returning to trouble the living.

Palaeolithic funerary practice, with all its variations, eloquently attests primitive man's preoccupation with death. Although the evidence, as we have it, shows what the living did for the dead, it is surely legitimate to infer that such mortuary service was not performed without its stirring in the minds of those who performed it some reflection on their own ultimate end. In other words, it is reasonable to see in this Palaeolithic funerary care evidence that, from the very beginning, the fact of death has prompted within man ideas which have found practical expression in forms that we can recognize as religious, or perhaps more precisely as magico-religious.

Besides the data illustrating Palaeolithic man's attitude to death, there is some striking evidence attesting his concern with the fact of birth. On many sites of his habitation there have been discovered figurines of nude corpulent women, carved from stone or other suitable material.[1] The most remarkable feature of these figurines is the exaggerated emphasis which is given to the sexual attributes, while the faces are left blank. Such statuettes were clearly not intended to be portraits of individual women, but rather symbolic representations of maternity. There has naturally been much speculation about the purpose of these objects, and some authorities have suggested that they are prototypes of the representations of the Great Goddess, the Earth Mother, which are found on many Neolithic sites and in many places in the ancient Near East and the Indus Valley.[2] Such an identification would presuppose that Palaeolithic man was capable of

[1] See the examples illustrated in Maringer, *op. cit.*, Tafel 14; R. Pittioni, *Die urgeschichtlichen Grundlagen der europäischen Kultur* (Wien, 1949), Abb. 27, 28.

[2] Cf. Pittioni, *op. cit.*, pp. 64, 66; Maringer, *op. cit.*, pp. 196-201; James, *op. cit.*, pp. 153f; J. Przyluski, *La Grande Déesse* (Paris, 1950), pp. 46f.

deifying an abstract principle. Whether he had such an ability is clearly beyond our knowing (in view of his artistic achievements, it would be unwise to rule it out as impossible on *a priori* grounds); but there can be little doubt that such figurines prove that he was greatly concerned with birth as it is exemplified in maternity.

Now such a concern might seem to be most reasonably explained in terms of primitive man's desire for offspring. In most societies children have been regarded as the best insurance for support in old age, and, although we know almost nothing of the organization of Palaeolithic society, it would be strange if children were not desired to ensure the continuance of the family or community by replacing those who died or grew too old to help in the quest for food. But, when Palaeolithic man's very evident concern with death is recalled, it may fairly be asked whether his female figurines, symbolic of maternity, witness only to his desire for offspring. Maternity also represents the promise of new life, and such a promise may surely be related to the menace of death. In such a primitive community birth would have been a great mystery—the strange emergence of a new individual would often seem to replace one who had recently died and been buried beneath the earth. Moreover, then, as now, there would undoubtedly have been the spectacle of the reproduction in the child of features reminiscent of some deceased member of the family.[1] The simple conclusions which naturally would have suggested themselves by the observation of such coincidences are obvious, namely, that the dead are reborn again into the community, that the womb of the mother is the gateway to life as the grave is the place of exit from life. Hence the maternal attributes came to symbolize the promise of new, or renewed, life, which served to alleviate the dread of death.

It is significant that Palaeolithic culture is known chiefly by its cave-art and stone implements and by its burial deposits and its female figurines. These different objects are severally expressive of the three main concerns of the first men of whom we have record. Their magical paintings and stone implements witness to their economic activity, these being the means which they employed to obtain their food. The burials and the figurines are mute, but eloquent, witnesses to their preoccupation with what were essentially non-material issues, which, crudely conceived though they were, we may yet fairly designate as religious.

So then at the dawn of human culture we find that, besides a natural and basic concern with the supply of food, the twin facts of birth and death were already calling forth from man a response that clearly indicates a situation which we, on *a priori* grounds, had reason to suppose might have existed, namely, that these facts, predicating temporal consciousness, were productive of that sense of insecurity

[1] Cf. N. W. Thomas in *Encycl. of Religion of Ethics* (ed. J. Hastings), XII, p. 425 a. See also M. Granet's explanation of the origin of the Chinese ancestor cult, *La religion des Chinois* (Paris, 1951), pp. 22-24.

which raises for man the question of his destiny and prompts him to action in an attempt to control it.

For the proper appreciation of the significance of these findings it is necessary to observe, in conclusion, that the extant evidence of Upper Palaeolithic culture, which is the earliest known in juxtaposition to human skeletal remains, affords no certain indication of the conception of deity. A representation of an anthropoid figure, clad in an animal's skin and wearing the antlers of a stag, which was found in the cave of the Trois Frères (Ariège), has indeed been identified by some French prehistorians as a kind of embryonic deity.[1] Generally this figure is referred to as that of the 'Dancing Sorcerer,' because there is a reason for thinking that ritual dances were performed in these Palaeolithic communities by men, disguised as animals, as part of a hunting magic. The picture of the so-called 'Dancing Sorcerer' does indeed raise several interesting problems which space will not permit to be discussed here,[2] and it may be admitted that its position in the cave could indicate that it was a cult object. However, even with this admission, the most that can be reasonably deduced from the picture is that it may represent a kind of idealized figure, combining in itself all those attributes of strength and virility which Palaeolithic man admired in the animals and would like to have possessed, while yet remaining a man—a conception indeed from which totemism might in time have derived. More notable is the negative witness of the fact that in his cave-art there is no indication that Palaeolithic man was interested in celestial phenomena; still less that he deified them or conceived of a Sky-Father.

We may, therefore, reasonably conclude that, from what we so far know of man when he first emerges in the archaeological record, it would appear that religion originally stemmed from human consciousness of the temporal process, the menace of which was focussed in death but alleviated by the promise of new life manifest in the phenomenon of birth.

1 H. Breuil, *Quatre cents siècles d'art pariétal* (Montignac, n.d., but about 1954), p. 176; Breuil & R. Lantier, *Les hommes de la Pierre Ancienne* (Paris, 1951), pp. 325-8.
2 Cf. S. G. F. Brandon, *Time & Mankind* (London, 1951), pp. 17-18.

THE SUPPOSED DOGMA OF THE MOSAIC AUTHORSHIP OF THE PENTATEUCH

By

JAKOB J. PETUCHOWSKI

B.A. (LOND.) M.H.L., PH.D.

Assistant Professor of Rabbinics, Hebrew Union College, Cincinnati.

THE AREA to be discussed here is a kind of border territory. It borders on the respective fields of Theology, Hermeneutics, the History of Biblical Criticism, and Early Rabbinic Literature. While it represents a critique of certain notions long associated with so-called Fundamentalism, it is no less critical of undeserved claims made on behalf of the Higher Criticism where the latter's competence is extended into areas of purely theological concerns. We are thus interested not only in the past history of ideas, but also in the future tasks—and limitations—of exegesis.

As our starting-point we take the popular notion—shared by defender and antagonist alike—that the modern critical study of the Scriptures represents a departure from, or a rebellion against, the traditional view of the origin of various biblical books, and of the Pentateuch in particular. Fundamentalists, both Jewish and Christian, are credited with adherence to a dogma clearly stating the Mosaic authorship of the Pentateuch. More often than not they are not only credited with such a dogma by others, but they do indeed make such a claim themselves. It is, therefore, a typical orthodox response—perhaps somewhat more vociferous in a previous generation than it is now—to oppose the so-called Higher Criticism of the Bible. This response may take the form of *ex cathedra* denunciation, or, as in the case of the late Dr. David Hoffmann, of laboriously marshalling *Die wichtigsten Instanzen gegen die Graf-Wellhausensche Hypothese.*

Among liberal circles, on the other hand, we find the wide-spread view that, once the Mosaic authorship is demonstrated to be untenable, the traditional theological constructions, said to rest on the assumption of such an authorship, have *ipso facto* been demolished. Among Christian liberals this demolition may have as its consequence

inter alia a certain wariness in the continued use of Old Testament "proof-texts" hallowed by a long tradition. Among Jewish liberals it is the authority of the Law which is being called into question; and that the Law represents a superseded stage of religion, which the Apostle Paul tried so hard to prove by an ingenious application of the methods of *midrash* and allegory, is regarded by some Liberal Jews as a simple truism in the light of the "scientific" findings of the Higher Criticism—simply because Moses did not write the Pentateuch.

There is, however, one basic methodological question which does not seem to have been adequately faced by either fundamentalist or liberal. It is this: Does the authority of the Law, the obligation to abide by its moral and ceremonial provisions, really rest upon the assumption of the Mosaic authorship? Or, to be even more basic and fundamental, did early post-biblical Judaism really have any dogmatic notions about this Mosaic authorship?

There can be no doubt that, in the period of the *Mishnah* and the *Gemara*, the Mosaic authorship of the Pentateuch was generally assumed. There was, according to the state of biblical knowledge at that time, no reason to doubt it. And so, in b. *Baba Bathra* 14b, where the Talmud discusses the authorship of the various canonical books, we read among other things the following:

"Moses wrote his book, and the passage dealing with Balaam, and the Book of Job. Joshua wrote his book, and the last eight verses of Deuteronomy. Samuel wrote his book, and the Book of Judges, and the Book of Ruth. David wrote the Book of Psalms, etc., etc."

Prima facie the Mosaic authorship of the Pentateuch seems to be of no greater significance than, say, the fact that Samuel is credited with the authorship of the Book of Ruth. Since Balaam might have been expected to make a collection of his own oracles, it had to be expressly stated that it was Moses who did so, not Balaam. On the other hand, since it was deemed unlikely for Moses to have penned a description of his own demise and funeral, the verses dealing with that part of the biography of Moses were credited to Joshua—though, as we shall have occasion to see, this ascription to Joshua did not go altogether unchallenged.

As can easily be seen from the few examples we have quoted from the b. *Baba Bathra* passage, what was involved here was a certain notion of *history*. The outstanding representative of each epoch was made responsible for the literary productions of his age. Since Samuel's life spanned the latter period of the Judges and the early period of the Kings, *he* becomes the historian of the period of the Judges. And, seeing that the story of Ruth is set in the time "when the judges judged," he necessarily becomes the author of the Book of Ruth as well.

There is, however, no question of *dogma* involved in all this. Indeed, clear formulations of dogma are hard to find in rabbinic liter-

ature in any case. From the Tannaitic period we have, in fact, only one such formulation, and that is the beginning of the tenth chapter of the *Mishnah* tractate *Sanhedrin*. Here we read that all Israel have a share in the World-to-Come, which broad statement is immediately followed by a qualification of "all Israel." These are among the categories which are excluded: "He who says that the Resurrection of the Dead is not contained in the Torah; he who says that the Torah is not from Heaven; and the 'Epicurean'."

For our present purposes we may limit ourselves to a consideration of the second category, of the man who says that "the Torah is not from Heaven." Now "Heaven" here may be a metonym for God, as we frequently find it in rabbinic literature (cf. A. Marmorstein, *The Old Rabbinic Doctrine of God*, Vol. I, pp. 105ff), or it may be understood quite literally in the light of such passages as Deuteronomy iv. 36. But there can be no doubt that what is meant is a denial of Divine Revelation—the word "Heaven," in whatever sense we take it, emphasizing the *supernatural* aspect of the Revelation. The Mosaic authorship is *not* mentioned in this context.

That the "Mosaic authorship" *per se* is quite immaterial to this dogmatic formulation is made even clearer once we consider the comment of the *Sifré*, a Tannaitic (*i.e.* early) Midrash, to Numbers xv. 31. The biblical words "for he hath despised the word of the LORD" are here applied to the man

> "who says: 'Moses took down the whole Torah from dictation by God; but this particular matter he said of his own accord.'"
>
> (*Sifré*, ed. Friedmann, p. 33a.)

Or, as it is worded in a parallel *baraitha* quoted in the Babylonian Talmud, *Sanhedrin* 99a:

> "Even if a man were to say: 'The whole Torah is from Heaven, except this one particular verse which God did not speak, but which Moses said of his own accord,' he would be the one referred to in the verse about him who 'hath despised the word of the LORD.'"

What all this means is simply that a man with complete faith in the "Mosaic authorship of the Pentateuch" may find himself, in spite of such faith, or perhaps on account of it, excluded from salvation. For what matters here dogmatically is not the "Mosaic authorship" at all, but the *divine* authorship.

The problem involved is that of the theological, or philosophical, possibility of Divine Revelation,—not one of the literary history of the documents containing this Revelation. If, for example, I find it philosophically impossible to believe in a God who reveals himself, then, even if I were convinced on the basis of internal and external evidence that the Pentateuch could not possibly be post-Mosaic, my belief in the "Mosaic authorship" would not be sufficient to assure me of my share in the World-to-Come.

But perhaps, by the same token, if I do believe in a God who reveals

himself, I am not quite so untrue to the old dogma if, instead of accepting the sole authorship of Moses, I am also inclined to detect the work of J, E, D, and P. In other words, the *theological* problem of Revelation, and the *literary* problem of the evolution and the transmission of the Text, are, and must be retained as, quite separate.

And so *mutatis mutandis* they were already kept distinct by the ancient Rabbis. Thus, for example, the very Rabbis who did not have the slightest doubt that the Torah was "from Heaven" could quite dispassionately discuss the material and concrete "how" of the Text's evolution. In the Babylonian Talmud, *Gittin* 60a, we read that some Rabbis thought that the Torah came into being by individual instalments (*torah megillah megillah nitnah*), while others held the view that it was revealed as one unit (*torah hathumah nitnah*). That is not to say that some of the talmudic Rabbis anticipated Wellhausen, but merely to indicate that the dogma of "Torah from Heaven," at the time of its original formulation, did not carry with it any one canonized version of the Torah's literary history.

Reference has already been made to the rabbinic view which ascribes the last eight verses of Deuteronomy to Joshua. In b. *Baba Bathra* 15a this view is attacked by another Rabbi who, basing himself on Deut. xxxi. 26, finds that Moses himself had already referred to "this book of the Torah." Moses must, therefore, have already known the Pentateuch in its complete form. The last eight verses of Deuteronomy were dictated by God while Moses was still alive, and Moses wrote them down with a tear in his eye. One Rabbi, in other words, preferred to take a more historical approach, the other a more poetic one. But neither of them denied the dogma of the "Torah from Heaven."

However, once we separate the dogmatic aspect from the aspect of literary history, it follows that a belief in Divine Revelation *per se* need not impose any limitations on the lengths to which a critical study of the Scriptures might lead. No cause is served, for example, by the scholar with conservative theological leanings who attempts to date biblical documents as early as possible—if not earlier. The theological question should be: "Is this God's Revelation?" It becomes neither more nor less so the nearer it is placed in time to the age of Moses. Scholarship should be the only criterion here.

This, of course, goes for the other extreme as well. The "late" dating of legal and prophetic documents has not always been undertaken completely without ulterior motives, either. Someone may have a pet notion (due, perhaps, to philosophical, political, or religious prejudices) that "true" monotheism or universalism could not antedate Amos or even Deutero-Isaiah; and he will label apparently contradictory material as later "glosses" and "interpolations." A grave injustice may thus be done to an earlier prophet or priest who may have been somewhat less of a henotheist or particularist than he

is now made out to have been. Needless to say, whether a biblical document is "early" (let alone "Mosaic") or "late" should be determined on the basis of evidence only; and this will increasingly become the procedure once it is generally realized that the "dating" of biblical materials, one way or another, leaves the basic theological issues completely unaffected.

It is true that liberal Protestants and liberal Jews have a stake in that approach to the Bible which purports to trace the "evolution" of religion from the very beginning of their respective faiths—just as the orthodox in both denominations may be happier with the traditional notion of a Revelation which was *einmalig*. The latter, however, may well ponder the dogmatic considerations outlined above, while the former may take to heart the fact that the Higher Criticism, in the form it has taken on so far, is itself the *product*, and not the cause, of religious liberalism. We might remember in this connection that Rabbi Isaac M. Wise (1819-1900), the famous organizer of American Reform Judaism, and the founder of the Hebrew Union College where its rabbis were to be trained, had no use for the Higher Criticism at all. In fact, he is said to have rejected for his faculty a noted rabbinic scholar (later to become famous at a *Conservative* seminary) who, fresh from years of study at German universities, had owned up to his acceptance of the new critical approach to Bible studies.

The history of both post-biblical Judaism and post-New Testament Christianity has shown, moreover, that the dynamics of religious development have been relatively independent of those "original" meanings of biblical words and books the determining of which is regarded by the Higher Criticism of the Bible as one of its main tasks. A Judaism based on the "original" and "literal" meaning of the Text yields at best a narrow Sadduceanism or a petrified Karaism, but not a vital and adaptable way of life like Pharisaic-Rabbinic Judaism. And to this day liberal Christianity has to put a question-mark behind the most exact description of the "historical Jesus." In the one case as in the other it is the *post-biblical* "evolution" which is at least as important as the alleged biblical one; and the reconstruction of biblical "strata," important as it most certainly is in terms of clearer historical insights, can do but little justice to the faith and the dynamics of a historical and living "holy community."

The dogmatic formulation of the ancient Rabbis is still relevant for us to-day. The question is not: "Is it Mosaic?" or "Is it Pauline?" The question we are called upon to answer is: "Is it from Heaven?"

RENAN AND MATTHEW ARNOLD: TWO SADDENED SEARCHERS

By

DR. JOAN N. HARDING

IN A RECENT article in *The Times Literary Supplement*, "Return to Renan,"[1] the writer, reviewing a new appraisal of Renan as essayist by Dr. Richard M. Chadbourne,[2] says: "He (Renan) had been the counterpart of an eminent Victorian, and he quite simply saw, eventually, the vulnerable side of himself, and tried to cover it up. At his best Renan is direct, virile and incisive, but at his worst he is a terrible prig." If the analogy intended is with Matthew Arnold, a similarity noted by various writers beginning with Arnold himself, it is interesting to find that Arnold was equally aware of his own vulnerability when he saw his own characteristics reflected in Renan, and took equally definite steps to cover it up.

Both men were acutely aware of the disharmony existing between themselves and the society in which they lived, and each set out to resolve this disharmony by bringing his society into unity with himself.[3] Each was conscious that his problem was fundamentally a religious one. Indeed a "want" advertisement quoted in a denominational weekly might well have been inserted by the shades of Arnold and Renan: "Having lost God, two saddened searchers seek a substitute."[4] The nature of the substitute depended largely on the nature of its author, for both men tended to create a God in their own image. Arnold, however, never broke completely with the Church of England, although the bond with orthodoxy wore perilously thin and at moments seemed liable to snap altogether. Renan was forced by circumstances to a clean break with the Church, but ever afterwards hankered after his lost saints whom he protested he abandoned gladly in the cause of science. But he protested too much; nor could he ever get away sufficiently from the memory of his religious crisis to view it with that scientific calm he claimed to possess.

Both Arnold and Renan were born into the bourgeoisie. Arnold's family may have belonged to the upper strata, Rugby being the Eton

1 *Times Literary Supplement*, June 27, 1958, p. 360.
2 Richard M. Chadbourne, *Ernest Renan as an Essayist* (Cornell University Press. London, Oxford University Press, 1958).
3 *Cf.* Gabriel Séailles, *Essai de biographie psychologique* (Paris, 1923), pp. 44-45.
4 *Baptist Times*, Nov. 2, 1944, vol. xc, No. 4680.

of the newly rich, " the main hotbed of Philistine saplings."[1] Renan, on his mother's side, was connected with the *petite bourgeoisie*. Her family was in business at Lannion, and after his father's death by drowning Renan, then only five years of age, and his elder sister stayed for a time with their relatives there. But Arnold and Renan were both instinctively 'aristocrats,' proud in the consciousness of their superior talents. They early began to see through the shams of so-called democracy, and recognized its greed, self-interest, materialism—the levelling-down of all men to one standard of banal mediocrity. This dissatisfaction with mere industrial prosperity and mechanical development fell strangely on the ears of a generation intoxicated with the wonders of the Crystal Palace and the Grande Exposition; to us, they have a familiar sound. Their mood of unrest, divine or infernal, is an intrinsic ingredient in the twentieth-century mentality. One wonders how far their influence has made it so.

Renan's sphere was more particularly scientific, Arnold's literary and educational, but both covered much common ground. Renan's "religion" of science or philosophy coincided frequently with Arnold's " religion " of culture. Moreover a study of social conditions led Renan to consider French education with the same critical attitude which Arnold adopted towards the English system. The criticisms of the one help to temper the enthusiasms of the other, and to maintain the balance between State control and individual initiative in matters of education.

Both men sustained a double intellectual burden. Beside his ordinary work as a professor in the Collège de France, Renan embarked on an ambitious scheme for a history of the Origins of Christianity, and at the same time published copious articles, reviews and correspondence in which he discussed incidental aspects of contemporary life. As Bourget pointed out, no other Frenchman of the day carried out a more extensive twofold programme.[2] Meanwhile in England Matthew Arnold, while performing his irksome duties as an Inspector of Schools and drawing up reports on specifically educational subjects, had come to realize that the failure of the existing system of education needed to be interpreted within the wider context of society as a whole, and readily turned his attention to the entire range of contemporary English thought and action.

To the majority of readers, Renan's work as a specialist in Semitic philology is of interest only in so far as it explains his philosophy. His erudite studies in religious history are significant in so far as they become the basis of his own attitude towards religion, and also reveal the existence of a certain critical turn of mind. They have therefore the same importance as Arnold's amateur studies in religious history, being at once creative and revelatory of the writer's mind. Similarly,

[1] Hugh Kingsmill, *Matthew Arnold* (London, Duckworth, 1928), p. 22 (quoted from Swinburne's essay on *Matthew Arnold*).

[2] Paul Bourget, *Essais de Psychologie Contemporaine* (Paris, Lemerre), p. 56.

Arnold's work as a specialist in education is of interest for the light it throws on the social conditions and intellectual mood of mid-nineteenth-century England, in the same way as Renan's amateur incursions into the realms of educational practice, if not of theory, reveal parallel conditions in France. Renan, however, as a professor of Semitics could naturally be expected to speak with greater authority on French education than Arnold could evince as a critic of Bible studies, for Renan had had personal experience of *l'instruction supérieure*, both as a student and as *maître d'études*, whereas Arnold's knowledge of Biblical criticism came to him always at second-hand. Arnold was, then, frequently writing on subjects about which he was imperfectly informed; Renan, never. His clear intellectual grasp lit up every subject with which he dealt. All the more tragic is his later imaginative dissolution, the blurring of his perceptions by the confusion within his emotions.

Primarily Arnold was a poet. Certainly his poetic inspiration failed to invent new verse forms of expression for itself after 1869, and had been faltering for a long time before that, but in Arnold, as Professor Lowry points out at length,[1] poet and prose critic are inseparable. His essays on Amiel, Sainte-Beuve, Gray, Georges Sand, Shelley, Milton, Tolstoy, show that right up to the end of his life he maintained undiminished the fund of original and powerful ideas on poetry as a " criticism of life " which were essential to his conception of prose and poetry alike. Upon such grounds, one could also claim for Renan the title of poet. There is little French prose that has the delicate rhythm of his *Prière sur l'Acropole*, of his *Essai sur la Poésie des Races Celtiques*, or his *Souvenirs d'Enfance et de Jeunesse*. All those qualities which Arnold claimed for Celtic literature in an essay plainly inspired by his Breton contemporary are shown by Renan himself.

Moreover, his imagination, like Arnold's, was stirred by the contemplation of two rival worlds. Arnold was early introduced to the classics: he knew them academically, and loved their restraint and regularity, chiselling his own verses with the same fineness and precision. But because too thorough a knowledge of any subject clogged Arnold's creative response, a more potent source of inspiration came to him from Celtic legend, of which he had but a superficial knowledge culled largely from Renan himself. The vague wistful magic of this little-known world appealed to the romantic traits of one who, at twenty, had been the disciple of Lélia and Werther, but who had stifled those traits under an austere classicism of form, in order to inhibit too great a spontaneity of feeling. Similarly in Renan, classic precision and romantic '*vague*' struggled for supremacy. The grey mournful *landes* of Brittany, the murmurings of perilous seas in faery

[1] Ed. Professor Lowry, *Letters to Arthur Hugh Clough* (London & New York O.U.P., Humphrey Milford, 1932), Introductory xi, pp. 32-33.

lands forlorn, the legends of dim saints and witches and miracles had early passed into his being. But another love claimed him after his first visit to Italy, and later to Greece. He was immediately enamoured of the serenity and lucidity of their art. Henceforth the love of clarity and temperateness vied with his Celtic yearning for the mysterious, the infinite.

Both men were further aware of a third element in life beside the Celtic and the Hellenic—the Hebraic, an element of which they recognized the greatness in world-thought, but by which they personally were little attracted. Both saw it as an alien force in the Aryan constitution of European culture, diverting it from its natural development. Neither had any affinity with the stern brood of prophets calling down fire upon a stiff-necked people. Although both were themselves prophets in their own generation, pointing out persistently the faults and follies of their nations and the misfortunes bound to result from them, they did so in such tones of unction, with such urbanity and gentlemanly decorum that one would hardly expect them to be at home in the grim world of an Amos or an Ezekiel.

Beyond these chance similarities of susceptibility and outlook, there remains the fact that Arnold was directly influenced by Renan. This influence has been thoroughly traced by Mr. Lewis F. Mott in an article in *Modern Language Notes*, Vol. XXXIII, No. 2, February 1918.[1] That Arnold himself was aware of a close resemblance emerges in a letter written to his sister, Mrs. Foster, in December 1859, while engaged in an enquiry into elementary education on the Continent. The main difference between their efforts he saw to be that Renan tended " to inculcate morality, in a high sense of the word, upon the French nation," while Arnold was seeking to inculcate intelligence upon the English; " but with respect both to morality and intelligence, I think we are singularly at one in our ideas, and also with respect both to the progress and to the established religion of the day."[2] Arnold's admiration for the intellectual flexibility of the French, their superior criticism, their social graces never blinded him to their moral faults. In his review of Renan's *Reforme Intellectuelle et Morale* in 1872, he wrote, " a nation's intellectual place depends upon its having reached the very highest rank in the very highest lines of spiritual endeavour; this is what in the end makes its ideal; this is what fixes its scale of intellectual judgment, and what it counts by in the world. More than twenty years ago, we said, lovers of France as we are, and abundant and brilliant as is her work of a lower order than the very highest:—' France, famed in all great arts, in none Supreme '—and this still seems to be the true criticism of her."[3] Renan was one of the few educated Frenchmen of his day who had had a vision of the

[1] *Cf.* Saintsbury, *Matthew Arnold* (London & Edinburgh, Blackwood, 1899), pp. 101-103.
[2] Arnold, *Letters* (London: Macmillan & Co., 1895), I. 111, Dec., 24, 1859.
[3] *Essays in Criticism*, Series III, pp. 173-74 (quoted Tinker & Lowry, *Poetry of Matthew Arnold* [London, O.U.P., 1940] p. 34).

true ideal; the majority of his countrymen were content with the frivolity of pleasure. "If the educated and articulate classes in France were as sound in their way as the inarticulate peasant is in his, France would present a different spectacle. Not 'imagination and sensibility' are so much required from the educated classes of France, as a simpler, more serious view of life; a knowledge how great a part *conduct* (if M. Challemel-Lacour will allow me to say so) fills in it; a better example. The few who see this, such as Madame Sand among the dead, and M. Renan among the living, perhaps awaken on that account, amongst quiet observers at a distance, all the sympathy; but in France they are isolated."[1]

As long as Renan's faith in the importance of conduct lasted, Arnold still hoped that France might be saved from herself. It is significant that his outlook for the future of France grows more pessimistic only as Renan abandons his tone of moral earnestness for one of bantering frivolity. The above essay was written in 1877; by 1879, Arnold was writing to M. Fontanès, a French Protestant pastor: "I have begun Renan's discourses,[2] but have got only a little way. His taking Victor Hugo's poetry as prodigiously *au sérieux* does, I confess, amaze me in so fine and delicate a mind; but Renan is not sound, I think, in proportion to his brilliancy."[3] This discovery of Arnold's marks the first weakening of his sympathy for one with whom he felt himself to have so much in common, and from then on, the spiritual rift widened.[4] By 1883, he was still more critical of Renan: "The sense of 'the things by which men live,' as Isaiah says, seems to me to be wearing out in France. Renan has much less of it than a person of far less regular life and conversation and far less wide and exact attainments—Sainte-Beuve."[5] It is not surprising, then, that with the appearance of Renan's *Abbesse de Jouarre*, he forsook his hopes of a spiritual association of England and France, which seemed to have been symbolized by his own sense of affinity with Renan. "I confess I do not look forward to any close alliance of this country with France, the character and aspirations of the two nations have become so different, and are becoming more so" . . . "You do not mention Renan's *Abbesse*; he has been on the *pente* tending towards such a production for some time. I suspect that outside of France he has almost annulled, by that production, his influence as a serious writer, which is a pity."[6]

Some years previously, during his American tour, he had pointed out the French tendency to lubricity, their worship of the Goddess Aselgeia. The popular literature and art of France were dedicated to the service of that deity. "She is becoming the great recognized

[1] Arnold, *Mixed Essays* (London, Smith, Elder, 1880), pp. 345-46.
[2] "Victor Hugo au Lendemain de sa Mort," *Feuilles Détachées* (Paris, 1892), pp. 279-87.
[3] Arnold, *Letters*, II, Easter Sunday, 1879.
[4] *Cf. Ibid*, 199, Feb., 9, 1882.
[5] *Ibid.*, II. 214-15, June 29, 1883
[6] *Ibid.*, pp. 214-15, June 29, 1883.

lands forlorn, the legends of dim saints and witches and miracles had early passed into his being. But another love claimed him after his first visit to Italy, and later to Greece. He was immediately enamoured of the serenity and lucidity of their art. Henceforth the love of clarity and temperateness vied with his Celtic yearning for the mysterious, the infinite.

Both men were further aware of a third element in life beside the Celtic and the Hellenic—the Hebraic, an element of which they recognized the greatness in world-thought, but by which they personally were little attracted. Both saw it as an alien force in the Aryan constitution of European culture, diverting it from its natural development. Neither had any affinity with the stern brood of prophets calling down fire upon a stiff-necked people. Although both were themselves prophets in their own generation, pointing out persistently the faults and follies of their nations and the misfortunes bound to result from them, they did so in such tones of unction, with such urbanity and gentlemanly decorum that one would hardly expect them to be at home in the grim world of an Amos or an Ezekiel.

Beyond these chance similarities of susceptibility and outlook, there remains the fact that Arnold was directly influenced by Renan. This influence has been thoroughly traced by Mr. Lewis F. Mott in an article in *Modern Language Notes*, Vol. XXXIII, No. 2, February 1918.[1] That Arnold himself was aware of a close resemblance emerges in a letter written to his sister, Mrs. Foster, in December 1859, while engaged in an enquiry into elementary education on the Continent. The main difference between their efforts he saw to be that Renan tended " to inculcate morality, in a high sense of the word, upon the French nation," while Arnold was seeking to inculcate intelligence upon the English; " but with respect both to morality and intelligence, I think we are singularly at one in our ideas, and also with respect both to the progress and to the established religion of the day."[2] Arnold's admiration for the intellectual flexibility of the French, their superior criticism, their social graces never blinded him to their moral faults. In his review of Renan's *Reforme Intellectuelle et Morale* in 1872, he wrote, " a nation's intellectual place depends upon its having reached the very highest rank in the very highest lines of spiritual endeavour; this is what in the end makes its ideal; this is what fixes its scale of intellectual judgment, and what it counts by in the world. More than twenty years ago, we said, lovers of France as we are, and abundant and brilliant as is her work of a lower order than the very highest:—' France, famed in all great arts, in none Supreme '—and this still seems to be the true criticism of her."[3] Renan was one of the few educated Frenchmen of his day who had had a vision of the

[1] *Cf.* Saintsbury, *Matthew Arnold* (London & Edinburgh, Blackwood, 1899), pp. 101-105.
[2] Arnold, *Letters* (London: Macmillan & Co., 1895), I. 111, Dec., 24, 1859.
[3] *Essays in Criticism*, Series III, pp. 173-74 (quoted Tinker & Lowry, *Poetry of Matthew Arnold* [London, O.U.P., 1940] p. 34).

true ideal; the majority of his countrymen were content with the frivolity of pleasure. "If the educated and articulate classes in France were as sound in their way as the inarticulate peasant is in his, France would present a different spectacle. Not 'imagination and sensibility' are so much required from the educated classes of France, as a simpler, more serious view of life; a knowledge how great a part *conduct* (if M. Challemel-Lacour will allow me to say so) fills in it; a better example. The few who see this, such as Madame Sand among the dead, and M. Renan among the living, perhaps awaken on that account, amongst quiet observers at a distance, all the sympathy; but in France they are isolated."[1]

As long as Renan's faith in the importance of conduct lasted, Arnold still hoped that France might be saved from herself. It is significant that his outlook for the future of France grows more pessimistic only as Renan abandons his tone of moral earnestness for one of bantering frivolity. The above essay was written in 1877; by 1879, Arnold was writing to M. Fontanès, a French Protestant pastor: "I have begun Renan's discourses,[2] but have got only a little way. His taking Victor Hugo's poetry as prodigiously *au sérieux* does, I confess, amaze me in so fine and delicate a mind; but Renan is not sound, I think, in proportion to his brilliancy."[3] This discovery of Arnold's marks the first weakening of his sympathy for one with whom he felt himself to have so much in common, and from then on, the spiritual rift widened.[4] By 1883, he was still more critical of Renan: "The sense of 'the things by which men live,' as Isaiah says, seems to me to be wearing out in France. Renan has much less of it than a person of far less regular life and conversation and far less wide and exact attainments—Sainte-Beuve."[5] It is not surprising, then, that with the appearance of Renan's *Abbesse de Jouarre*, he forsook his hopes of a spiritual association of England and France, which seemed to have been symbolized by his own sense of affinity with Renan. "I confess I do not look forward to any close alliance of this country with France, the character and aspirations of the two nations have become so different, and are becoming more so" . . . "You do not mention Renan's *Abbesse*; he has been on the *pente* tending towards such a production for some time. I suspect that outside of France he has almost annulled, by that production, his influence as a serious writer, which is a pity."[6]

Some years previously, during his American tour, he had pointed out the French tendency to lubricity, their worship of the Goddess Aselgeia. The popular literature and art of France were dedicated to the service of that deity. "She is becoming the great recognized

[1] Arnold, *Mixed Essays* (London, Smith, Elder, 1880), pp. 345-46.
[2] "Victor Hugo au Lendemain de sa Mort," *Feuilles Detachées* (Paris, 1892), pp. 279-87.
[3] Arnold, *Letters*, II, Easter Sunday, 1879.
[4] *Cf. Ibid*, 199, Feb., 9, 1882.
[5] *Ibid.*, II. 214-15, June 29, 1883
[6] *Ibid.*, pp. 214-15, June 29, 1883.

power there; never was anything like it. M. Renan himself seems half inclined to apologize for not having paid her more attention. 'Nature cares nothing for chastity,' say he; '*Les frivoles ont peut-être raison*;' the gay people are perhaps in the right. Men even of this force salute her; but the allegiance now paid to her in France by the popular novel, the popular newspaper, the popular play, is, one may say, boundless."[1]

Arnold, like Renan, sees that the tendency of French life has been to eliminate from the national character those elements of seriousness, steadiness and honesty which came from the Germanic infiltration, in favour of the Gaulish gaiety, quickness, sentiment and sociability, the Latin rationality, leaving *l'homme sensuel moyen* predominant.[2] "Few things have lately struck me more than M. Renan's dictum, which I have already quoted, about what used to be called the virtue of chastity. The dictum occurs in his very interesting autobiography, published but the other day. M. Renan, whose genius I unfeignedly admire, is, I need hardly say, a man of the most perfect propriety of life; he has told us so himself. He was brought up for a priest, and thinks it would not have been in good taste for him to become a free liver. But this abstinence is a mere matter of personal delicacy, a display of good and correct taste on his own part in his own very special circumstances. 'Nature,' he cries, 'cares nothing about chastity!' What a slap in the face to the sticklers for 'Whatsoever things are pure!'"[3] But Arnold does not waver for a moment in his conviction that immorality has caused the downfall of empire after empire: all have foundered on the rock of their own lack of purity. "And therefore, even though a gifted man like M. Renan may be so carried away by the tide of opinion in France where he lives, as to say that Nature cares nothing about chastity, and to see with amused indulgence the worship of the great goddess Lubricity, let us stand fast, and say that her worship is against nature, human nature, and that it is ruin."[4]

What Arnold failed to realize was how easily morality, divorced from faith in Absolute values, degenerates into universal hedonism. "The moral law seemed to (him) so self-evident that (he) had no doubt that it would stand by itself without any dogma as a scaffolding."[5] Had he been able to look into the future with its widespread blurring of the distinction between good and evil, Arnold might have regarded less complacently his own share in undermining the supernatural beliefs of his day; for this imaginative dissolution of Renan's, with its confusing effect on the minds of his younger contemporaries, was in fact but the logical conclusion of the critical attitude Arnold himself had sought to foster in the England of the 'seventies. The greater clarity of Renan's reasoning powers com-

1 *Discourses in America* (London, Macmillan, 1885), pp. 40-41.
2 *Ibid.*, p. 47.
3 *Ibid.*, pp. 55-56.
4 *Ibid.*, pp. 56-57.
5 Norman Nicholson, *Man and Literature* (London, S.C.M. Press, 1944), p. 12.

pelled him to carry his trend of analysis to its utmost limits. If Arnold never probed the tragic futility of intelligence divorced from faith, it was because of his failure to think with the same startling penetration. He was saved from cynicism by the very inconsistency of his thinking. In many ways it would have been better if he, like Renan, had followed his attempt to "emancipate" religion to its logical conclusions, for it would have spared others the necessity of making the same experiment. As for Renan, "It was good that this experiment should have been made, and made, in one sense, once and for all. Renan's failure was no accident, it was the logical conclusion of a philosophy reduced to history which expects from the facts themselves the interpretation of facts, and in face of their inability to answer, has nothing to offer but renunciation and despair."[1]

1 Gabriel Séailles, *op. cit.*, Preface, p. viii.

THE SIGNIFICANCE OF DISAGREEMENT AMONG PHILOSOPHERS

By

WILLIAM GERBER

PH.D.

Author of "The Domain of Reality"

THE PREVALENCE of disagreement among philosophers has made some people happy and others sad.

In the chorus of those made happy, the first voice is that of Socrates, proclaiming, as a boon of fortune, that disagreement, through controversy and questioning, will lead us to the truth. The second ecstatic voice is that of St. Augustine, triumphantly chanting that disagreement about the nature of God is good because it is a testimony of God's inexhaustible richness. Hegel's is the third euphoric voice. He intones the joyous dogma that disagreement in the form of thesis and antithesis should be praised because it produces harmony and synthesis.

Charles Hendel, the fourth member of our quintet, has smilingly written: "Philosophy . . . *cherishes* . . . differences, without seeking to reduce them to a stereotype or to an orthodoxy."[1] Lastly, according to Sidney Hook, who in this context is jubilant, "The continuous disagreements among philosophers . . . [in the United States prove] that American philosophers are free. Ultimately (he adds, breaking into rhyme) it is more important that they be *free* than that they *agree*."[2]

On the other side of the music hall, in contrast with the jocund quintet, a sad antistrophe about disagreement in philosophy is sung by a trio consisting of Manegold of Lautenbach, Francis Bacon and Isaac Newton. Manegold said that disagreement among philosophers is the work of the devil. Bacon complained that philosophy was futile because "instead of producing grapes and olives it yields but the thistle and thorns of dispute and contention."[3] The third and last of the gloomy comments is Newton's. He wrote: "Philosophy is

1 Charles Hendel, "Agenda for Philosophers," *Fortune*, vol. 28, Nov. 1943, p. 186. Italics added.
2 Editor's introduction to *American Philosophers at Work*, edited by Sidney Hook (New York: Criterion Books, 1956), p. 13. Italics added.
3 *Novum Organum*, Book I, paragraph 73.

such an impertinently litigious lady that a man had as good be engaged in lawsuits as to have to do with her."[1]

Having thus made the briefest of curtsies to Clio, we may be certified for admission to the laboratory for investigating the significance of this medicine for souls, this untranquillizer, which has made some people happy and others sad.

Is Disagreement Epidemic?

Upon entering the laboratory, we observe the analytical tables and chairs (I had almost said " analytical couches "), and, flanking them, two distinguished practitioners, engaged in—of all things—a philosophical disagreement. On one side of the laboratory stands Brand Blanshard, *belittling* the prevalence of disagreement among philosophers. He wears over his shoulders a sandwich-board sign announcing that those who emphasize disagreement among philosophers are UNFAIR TO PHILOSOPHY. The smaller print on his board says that on many points philosophers speak with one voice. His exact words are: " . . . all sorts of religious superstitions, political fallacies, and ethical monstrosities . . . have . . . been rejected with one voice by philosophers".[2] On the other side of the laboratory strides Oliver St. John Gogarty, who, by contrast with Blanshard's minimizing, is *exaggerating* the prevalence of disagreement. Gogarty's sandwich-board sign contains this couplet:

" Things that on the land and sea go
Are projections of your Ego."[3]

We would do well, I think, to sit at a middle table, eschewing the extreme positions, and acknowledging, at least tentatively, that disagreement among philosophers is rampant, but that agreement is also rampant. We should realize that what is needful, for our purpose, is a delimiting of the philosophical areas which are infested with disagreement and of the areas infested with agreement.

Kinds of Disagreement

Let us sit down at one of the investigating tables and begin to shuffle our 3" x 5" cards. These cards, let us say, contain digests of historic disagreements among philosophers. There are fistfuls of them. How shall we sort them? To help in answering this question, as to the kinds of philosophical disagreement, we would do well to ask the preliminary questions, What is philosophy? and What are the kinds of things which philosophers study and about which they disagree?

While flipping the 3" x 5"'s with one hand, and stroking our chins with the other, let us tentatively define science as the study of the *general* aspects of things. We shall then be able to define philosophy correspondingly as the study of the *most* general aspects of things.

1 Letter to Edmund Halley, June 20, 1687.

2 Brand Blanshard, in Blanshard and others, *Philosophy in American Education; Its Tasks and Opportunities* (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1945), p. 105.

3 " Job's Healer," in Gogarty's *Collected Poems* (New York: Devin-Adair Co., 1954), p. 125.

Philosophical disagreements will thus be seen to be disagreements about the most general aspects of things.

We are now in a position to establish three categories in which to arrange our 3″ x 5″ cards, for the kinds of activities in which philosophers engage, in studying the most general aspects of things, and in disagreeing about them, are three in number, namely:

(1) classifying things,
(2) speculating about things, and
(3) preaching about things.

Significance of the First Kind of Disagreement

Having grouped our 3″ x 5″ example cards into these three batches—disagreements in classification, disagreements in speculation, and disagreements in preaching—with a rubber band around each, let us riffle through the first batch, on disagreements in classifying things, and try to abstract therefrom the significance of this kind of disagreement.

Philosophers (to read a few of the cards at random) have disagreed in their classifications in that some have classified the things of the world into matter and mind, others have classified the things of the world into matter and the void, into being and non-being, into essence and existence, into God and the world, into the known and the unknown. If we look for famous names at the tops of the cards, we shall note, for example, that Zoroaster classified the things of the world into products of the good spirit Ormuzd and products of the bad spirit Ahriman; that Democritus classified things into the full and the empty; that Plato classified things into reality (which was unchanging) and appearance (which was changing); and that Descartes classified things into thought and extension.

What is the significance of disagreements of this kind? Disagreement about classification, I suggest, can mean one of two things:

1. A's classification can be better than B's if B's has greater defects, such as not being exhaustive and not being made up of mutually exclusive categories.

2. A's classification and B's can, by a rough approximation, be adjudged to be equally good if neither one is guilty of major defects.

Thus, if you find that you are in disagreement with another philosopher about the classification of the things which comprise the world or an important segment of the world, you may do one of two things: First, you may criticize your opponent's classification as not exhaustive or as not made up of mutually exclusive categories or as suffering from another objective defect; and, secondly, if you still disagree after the objective criticism is over, you will have to content yourself with recognizing that he has as much right to his classification as you have to yours. *De gustibus non disputandum; chacun à son goût*; or, in English, "You pays your money and you takes your choice."

As we take a last look at our 3" x 5" cards on this first of the three kinds of disagreements, namely, disagreements about classification, we shall note that the often-agitated category of disagreements over terminology is a subspecies of disagreements over classification. If A, let us say, defines the beautiful so as to include Rodin's *Man With a Broken Nose*, and B defines the beautiful so as to exclude it; or if A defines knowledge so as to include accidentally correct beliefs, and B defines knowledge so as to exclude them—the differences between these A's and these B's are, on one level, differences in terminology, and on the level of the next higher species they are differences of classification.

The significance of differences in philosophical terminology is the same as the significance of differences in philosophical classification; that is, when disagreeing with someone on terminology, you may begin by criticizing his terminology for some objective defect, such as lack of precision or unnecessary departure from common usage; and then, at a later stage, if—after objective defects have been eliminated—you find that you and your adversary are still in disagreement, you will have to content yourself with recognizing that he has as much right to his definition as you have to yours.

Thus, in the first stage of this kind of disagreement you can eliminate some elements of it by objective criticism; but in the final stage you must smile and say, *De gustibus*.

We pick up next the cards representing the second kind of philosophical disagreements, those of speculation.

Significance of the Second Kind of Disagreement

Philosophers speculate, and, in speculating, they disagree, about, for example, the origin of things, the *modus operandi* of things, and the destiny of things. What does it signify if you find yourself in an unyielding disagreement about such a matter? It signifies, we shall find, after studying the cards with diligence, that you and your adversary are not yet in possession of the techniques necessary for empirically investigating the factual issues involved. But keep on arguing; because in doing so you may promote the development of the required techniques.

By a little Procrustean stretching, we may establish briefly that the significance of disagreement in speculation is analogous to the significance of disagreement in classifying and defining. Disagreement in classifying and defining, we said, can be mitigated by the cooperative elimination of objective defects and thereafter must remain a matter of tolerance. Disagreement in speculating has similarly two elements or stages:

First, disagreement among speculative philosophers has an element or stage in which objective discussion is profitable, for such discussion may lead to the establishment of techniques for empirically

investigating the problem being speculated about. For example, the more you argue about the origin of the solar system, the better chance you have of developing the research techniques necessary for determining the origin of the solar system.

Secondly, disagreement in speculating has an element or stage in which the opponents must shake hands and say, *De gustibus*. This is the stage in which you have done all you can in objectively discussing your disagreement, and you and your adversary still differ intuitively.

Now we put a rubber band around the second group of 3″ x 5″ cards, on speculative disagreements, and drop them into the bin marked "for filing," with the first batch, on disagreements in classification.

Significance of the Third Kind of Disagreement

As our work gets easier and easier, we pick up the last group of 3″ x 5″s, on disagreements in preaching or in valuing. What does it signify if, as our cards indicate, A preaches that we should maximize pleasure, and B preaches that we should exemplify loyalty, or if A preaches that faith is better than works, and B preaches that works are more meritorious than faith?

Pull out the Bed of Procrustes again, for the significance of disagreements in preaching or valuing is to be made commensurate with the significance of disagreements in classifying and speculating.

Disagreement in classifying and speculating, we have said, has two distinguishable stages. In the first stage, the disagreement is susceptible of being reduced by objective, rational means, and in the second stage the opponents must sing *De gustibus*.

The same, we shall say, is true of disagreements in preaching. For, in preaching, we are talking about either instrumental values or terminal values. If you find yourself in disagreement with an opponent over instrumental values, you can bring to bear on the disagreement objective facts and more or less objective probabilities. But if you and your opponent disagree over terminal values, you and he (or you and she) must content yourselves with the notion that there is no point in disputing over tastes.

Recent Adumbrations

Let us close our investigation, as we opened it, with a skimming of the cream of history. In the course of our own century, thinkers, writers, psychiatrists and others have had intermittent dalliance with one curve or another of the body of doctrine at which we have just arrived, namely, the body of doctrine which says that disagreement in philosophy—whether disagreement in classification, or disagreement in speculation, or disagreement in preaching—is a two-stage affair, of which in the first stage you can make progress by

arguing, but in the second stage you must connect yourself with a bemused and tolerant condescension toward your adversary.

Of these twentieth-century thinkers, writers, etc., who view disagreements in philosophy more or less as we do, let us pass the spotlight of attention upon four, namely, the philosopher and mathematician Bertrand Russell, the philosopher and lawyer Felix Cohen, the novelist Robert Musil, and the teacher Lewis S. Feuer.

Russell, the first of our four witnesses, has said: "... If an opinion contrary to your own makes you angry, that is a sign that you are subconsciously aware of having no good reason for thinking as you do. If someone maintains that two and two are five, or that Iceland is on the equator, you feel pity rather than anger, unless you know so little of arithmetic or geography that his opinion shakes your own contrary conviction. ... So whenever you find yourself getting angry about a difference of opinion, be on your guard; you will probably find, on examination, that your belief is going beyond what the evidence warrants."[1]

Translating Russell freely into our own idiom, we shall find that what he has said, or what he might be willing to say, is that, when your disagreement is in what we have called the first stage, anger is out of place because you can deal with the matter objectively (by showing where Iceland is, for example, on the map); and, when your disagreement is in the second stage (Russell is saying, or might be saying), anger is out of place because you have no good reason for angrily berating the view of your opponent, and what you should do is to be tolerant instead of angry.

Felix Cohen, our second witness, said, shortly before his death:

"Generally, the theories we believe we call facts, and the facts we disbelieve we call theories; the attitude of respect for objects we respect we call reverence, and the attitude of respect for objects we hold in contempt we call idolatry; we are all familiar, of course, with the observation that orthodoxy is my doxy and heterodoxy is the other fellow's doxy."[2]

If we translate Cohen, as we did Russell, into our vocabulary, we shall find that what he said, or what he might have been willing to say, is that, when your disagreement is in the first stage, you can deal with it objectively; but, when your disagreement is in the second stage, you are likely to engage in name-calling, with such weighted words as 'idolatry' and 'heterodoxy,' unless you are willing to be tolerant, as you should be.

Robert Musil, the third of our four consultants, wrote, in his novel *The Man Without Qualities*: "Truth is not a crystal one can put in one's pocket, but an infinite fluid into which one falls headlong."[3] If

1 Bertrand Russell, "An Outline of Intellectual Rubbish," in his *Unpopular Essays* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1950), p. 104.

2 Felix S. Cohen, "The Vocabulary of Prejudice," *Fellowship*, Nov. 1953, p. 5.

3 Robert Musil, *The Man Without Qualities*, translated from the German by E. Wilkins and E. Kaiser (New York: Coward-McCann, 1953), vol. II.

we translate Musil, as we did Russell and Cohen, into our language, we shall find that what he said, or what he might be willing to say, is that, when your disagreement reaches the second stage, you can no longer deal with the matter as if it were a crystal in someone's pocket, but you must recognize that you and your opponent are flailing in an infinite fluid, and you should therefore be pleasantly tolerant toward him and his tastes.

Finally, Lewis S. Feuer has recently written:

" Russell's use of Ockham's Razor, Dewey's principle of continuity, the empiricist principle of verifiability, Moore's principle of common sense, are all examples of the projective operation of various emotional decision-bases. A variety of motives, narcissistic, sadistic, identificational, express themselves in their respective philosophical principles. The problems of philosophy, which they purport to solve, are anxieties stated in logical form."[1]

In our terms, Feuer's dictum means that, when your disagreement has reached the second stage, what makes you still insist that you are right is in yourself (or, as we should say, is a matter of taste) and is not in the matter itself.

Now if by chance anyone should disagree with my interpretation of the significance of disagreement among philosophers, I venture to predict that our disagreement will develop through a stage of mutual accommodation and into a stage at which the only thing left to say is, *De gustibus*.

1 Abstract, distributed by the Eastern Division of the American Philosophical Association, of the paper " The Bearing of Psychoanalysis upon Philosophy," by Lewis S. Feuer, prepared for the annual meeting of the Division, Philadelphia, Dec. 1956.

CREDO OF AN EMPIRICIST

By

BRYAN MAGEE

M.A.

WRITING can be a form of self-deception, for in order to express our thoughts and feelings at all we have to present them in a form which is shaped and orderly, and our thoughts and feelings are seldom shaped and orderly: so we have to impose on them a coherence which they do not possess. Yet although our attitude to this thing or that may be made at least to appear *coherent*, it is logically impossible to have a single attitude to everything—to have, as literary critics usually demand of authors, "a coherent attitude to life". This is another way of putting the now familiar realization that there cannot be an explanation of Everything, since to explain something means to place it in context, showing to what other things it is related, and how—and there are no other things to which Everything could be related. Religious attitudes err in trying to provide an explanation of Everything, which is impossible—and in any case our ontological beliefs could never entail our moral beliefs. Materialist attitudes err in supposing that all our legitimate wonderings are such as can be met by explanations—I for one am struck with wonder that anything should exist at all, yet I know there can be no "explanation" of existence. (Clearly the existence of a God is not an explanation of existence. And if a mortal life is so wonderful that it has to be explained by reference to an eternal life, then eternal life is infinitely more wonderful, and how shall we explain that?) Different forms of experience compel not merely different attitudes but different *kinds* of attitude. This sense of the miraculous that never leaves me, this awe that I am, cannot influence the way in which I would seek to discover the structure of a chemical compound, or cure unemployment, or make my business run at a larger profit. My experiences in seeing Shakespeare or listening to Brahms would not help me if I fell in love with another man's wife. In short, my moral outlook is independent of my mystical and aesthetic experiences, and both are quite different from knowledge and the procedures for obtaining it.

It is, I suppose, from mystical and aesthetic experiences that the religious impulse chiefly derives—not from the fact that we behave as we do and that things are as they are, but simply from the fact that we and things are. Self-conscious awareness would be just as wonder-

ful in any possible world. That I am here, now, emotionally and intellectually aware, immediately surrounded by this liquid world of the sensory life, is a fact so amazing as to make it absurd to suggest that anything must be impossible unless it is *logically* impossible. And this direct experience that I am now having is incorrigible, it is what it is, I cannot be in error about it. Falsehood, like truth, is of inference or language or representation, not of experience. So long as I contemplate direct experience the possibility of error does not arise. It is only when I make inferences from direct experience, or attempt to describe it, that I can be wrong or talk nonsense—and then of course you may prove my inferences false and my descriptions nonsensical, but if you do you are not saying anything at all about my experience, which is the fact falsely inferred from or misdescribed. Facts, which are unaltered by our descriptions of them, are not modified when the descriptions are modified, nor eliminated when the descriptions are eliminated.

The nature of direct experience, then, is not amenable to language —it can only be contemplated, it cannot be talked about. To the extent that most epistemology and nearly all metaphysics are concerned with how our direct experience can be described and what can be inferred from it they are vacuous. Nothing can be inferred from it—no moral precepts, no historical facts, no existences, no immortalities—except the fact that anything is possible. For this reason (and because it is private and incommunicable) it can play no legitimate part in moral and social life, despite the fact that contemplation of it is the most wonderful and important activity, and that metaphysical understanding, the cure or culmination of our wonder, is the only alternative to death.

The more profound religions, and especially Hinduism, are centred on this experience (the contemplation of being). But the mistaken demand for a coherent view of life leads them to assert that since moral, social and material activities cannot possibly have any connexion with it they must be illusory. In a corresponding way pseudo-religions like Confucianism and Buddhism concern themselves entirely with prescriptions for moral and social behaviour without insisting on the derivation of these from transcendental facts or experiences which could not possibly entail them. Adherents of the former type of religion commonly regard Christianity and Mahommedanism as materialistic. Adherents of the latter regard them as confusions of good morals with bad metaphysics and irrelevant history.

But although several religions attempt to justify ethical precepts in entirely different ways, they are in virtual agreement on those ethical precepts. Hindus, Buddhists, Taoists, Mahommedans, Christians, agnostics and atheists all agree that it is wrong to lie, steal, kill and commit adultery; that it is good to be generous and merciful; that one

should honour one's promises, love one's neighbour and do as one would be done by. Therefore when, say, a Christian avers that he tries to tell the truth *because* he is a Christian—that he derives his morality from his religion—he deceives himself. For if he had any other religion, or no religion, his morality would be the same. And it is untrue to say that agnostics and atheists owe their morality to the fact that they have been brought up in a Christian heritage, because most of the human race has not been brought up in a Christian heritage, yet it shares the same morality. And it is also untrue to say that at least men owe their sense of morality to the civilizing influence of *some* religion, because there were Greeks of the highest moral stature in the humanistic society of fifth-century Athens.

To ask what are the sources of our moral precepts, and how they have become what they are, is to raise a host of factual questions—anthropological, social, historical, psychological—which I cannot answer, and which probably no one else can answer either. Yet at least they are factual questions. To ask, on the other hand, for a justification of our moral precepts, is to raise not a factual but a moral question, and an absurd one at that. For "justification" in this sense is itself a moral word: to justify a moral action or judgement is to give moral reasons for it—or at least to show that there are no prohibitive moral reasons against it. And it is obviously just as absurd to ask for a moral justification of morality as it is to ask for an inductive justification of induction. It is like asking "Why is the law legal?" To say that religions do not justify ethics is therefore simply a tautology. Humanists cannot justify ethics either, for the simple reason that ethics cannot be justified. Because of all this the only moral standards we can rationally subscribe to are empirical. "Things and actions are what they are, and the consequences of them will be what they will be: why then should we desire to be deceived?"

Established religions, then, are irrelevant to both my metaphysical experiences and my moral outlook. I know of no reason why I should subscribe to any of them, and I do not see how my behaviour would be altered if I did. This last conviction is confirmed by the fact that I have no idea which of my friends and acquaintances are Christians (except for those who are Roman Catholics) and which are not. Unless one actually discusses religious topics with them, or happens to know that they attend religious services, there is no way of telling. It is certainly not revealed in their lives, and one would not expect it to be. Their morals are the same as mine, and their private experiences are private. Of course their metaphysical views may be correct, though I see no reason for holding them. But it makes no difference in personal intercourse. Similarly the Christian Church does not impinge upon me at all as far as its religious teachings are concerned. I appreciate, I think, the part it has played, especially in the thousand years of the Middle Ages, in making the Western world what it is.

Some of its buildings, which can be as different from each other as Chartres and King's Chapel, are the loveliest I have ever seen, and the services held in them are often beautiful. I know of no myth so powerful, moving and prolific as the Christian myth. It embodies insights of primal significance, and informs many of the things I value most in my life—especially in music, from Bach's *Passions* to *The Dream of Gerontius*. And if I had to live on a desert island with but one volume I would choose the King James Bible. But I am not concerned with theology. Of course I am concerned with religious bodies when, for good or ill, they intervene in political or social questions, but then the import of their actions and pronouncements is political or social, and can only be judged as such.

The moral content of politics is in fact extremely small. But it is there—moral problems are bound to arise wherever there is a constant necessity for making practical decisions. But all attempts to distinguish public from personal morality, to exempt political activity from any of the sanctions of private life, have been utterly discredited. Indeed, any kind of theoretical *system* is as untenable in politics as in metaphysics, and for similar reasons: there can be no grounds for believing it, for even if it were true we could not possibly know; it is unfalsifiable and incorrigible; in trying to explain everything it succeeds in explaining nothing. Furthermore, in political thought systems are infinitely dangerous, for they prejudge the nature of, and therefore the solutions to, problems which have not yet arisen. Political Catholics, Fascists, Communists—all who claim inside knowledge of Absolute Truth—will not admit that they can ever be wrong, and this attitude leads them logically to the belief that an End which is infallibly known to be right justifies whatever means are most appropriate to attaining it: monolithic government, authoritarian pronouncements, rewritten history, the index and the censor, the stake and the gas-chamber, all are visited on men for the good of Man, saving him from heresy and deviation, preserving him for the heavenly state. People and parties who start with the idea of what they want and then hack society about—and individuals' lives—in order to fit it have never succeeded, and I do not believe they ever will succeed, in reaching their ideal. They ignore the fact that wherever we want to go we have to start from where we are—which is why the central question of all politics and all government is "*What should we do now?*". Politics is a question not of what to think but of what to do. And the most we can possibly do is to make the best we can out of what we have. This means that the only rational procedure here, as elsewhere, is the empirical one—proceeding on the basis of experience, recognizing the permanent possibility of error, improving specific things in specific ways, removing specific evils, and above all acknowledging, what no one in his private life would deny, that the relation between happiness and misery is not proportional and that

an increase in the former does not justify an increase in the latter.

Only empirical criteria are relevant to our experience. But our experience is miraculous, immense: the starry sky above, the moral law within, love, friendship, work, family and social life and organization, the physical world, music and poetry, the plastic arts—the whole impossible reality of being. The most important things of all—and I cannot even say what they are, much less describe them—cannot be talked about. There is so much beauty in the world, and so many private visions have been symbolized in works of art; yet you cannot have my metaphysical insights and I cannot have yours. (In any case what we call our insights are usually our confusions.) But truth is public. The truth of a thing can only be determined by the evidence for it. What can be shown to be true can be *shown* to be true, and what cannot is either speculative, false, nonsensical, or not a matter of truth and falsehood at all. Where there is knowledge there can be no difference of opinion, and where there is difference of opinion there must be tolerance. We should not require anyone, least of all ourselves, to accept matters of faith as matters of fact. We think far too many things already that we do not believe. "Everything is what it is and not another thing." Life itself is the miracle.

THE IDEA OF DESTINY

By

PAUL W. PRUYSER

PH.D.

THE idea of destiny tends to be shunned nowadays in civilized circles. There is one preponderant tradition behind it which has made it fall into discredit: the originally Greek, and later Stoic idea of fate as something inescapable, and the portrayal of life as a chain of causes and effects guided by a powerful outside force, God or Goddess. This is illustrated by the Greek saga of the Moira, a collective name for the three Goddesses of Fate: Clotho, who spins the thread of life; Lachesis, who twists and braids the thread into stretches sometimes loose and sometimes tight; and Atropos, who finally cuts it with a huge pair of scissors. This saga does picture life as it is sometimes felt to be, arbitrarily determined by others than ourselves, and we, the subjects, in its grip. The best one can do under such circumstances is to surrender one's will and to accept one's fate; if not with a smile, then at least in a dignified resignation.

But for the ancient Greek and Roman who would also recognize the lighter side of life and a margin of pleasure and good luck, perhaps even of freedom, there was still another Goddess who provided this, once in a great while. That Goddess is Tyche or Fortuna, a symbolization of unpredictability and chance, by whose activity the chain of causes and effects could at times be broken. As the Moira represents determinism, Fortuna represents indeterminism. Later thought and tradition has added moral and aesthetic qualities to this pair of deities: we have come to think rather uniformly of " bad fate " and of " good fortune." But both Moira and Fortuna are always external to us; they determine our lives for us with sombre rigidity or tricky playfulness.

The idea of destiny, however, has still another aspect which has been so neglected that some dictionaries and encyclopedias simply fail to define destiny except by dodging it: " Destiny—see Fate." This neglected aspect is linked with the meaning of our English word " destination." The word is rooted in the Latin verb " destinare " which means literally " to erect and make fast ", and also " to decide," " to have a certain expectation." It can also mean " to aim " and " to stick to a goal." We are here obviously in an entirely different sphere of meaning: the actor is in this case not a God or Goddess or any extraneous arrangement, but in a supreme way the experiencing subject

himself! This is the second meaning of the word destiny which I would like to emphasize in this paper.

Destiny in this sense has the character of a goal, which may have been set by another, but which is seen, undertaken and dealt with as a task by the individual himself. Thus, it marks a situation of utmost personal involvement, a situation not simply around a person and imposed from without, but one arising from within him in relation to his world. It is a situation of cognition and conation, and sometimes intense emotion.

Another characteristic of goals is that they seem stretched out in time before the person and are also experienced as here and now, due to the effort with which they are approached. Tasks and goals are not in the past; their present being is in the mode of potentiality and their actualization is eagerly awaited. Faced with a goal, the person brings as it were the future into the present by formulating the goal in terms of a task which is with him here and now, and which demands his concentrated attention. One " meets " a task, by searching for a solution, which means that one is confronted with it and contemporaneous with it. Tillich's term " centred act "[1] is an appropriate term to describe the attitude of persons when they are meeting a task.

Goals and tasks are aspects of problems. But the word problem is sometimes loosely used. It may mean the work involved in arithmetical computations, it may mean a scientific situation leading to an invention or the discovery of a law, and it may mean a psychological conflict such as a difficult marital situation which presses for a solution. At bottom, the difficulty of a true problem is that the implementation for its solution is not seen as at hand. It demands search and discovery. One must search for something like " the missing link," which is not obvious, which is perceptually not present, which is not simply here for the seeing and the taking. As Polanyi[2] has said, there is an element of novelty involved in the solutions of problems. The solution must be discovered; it cannot be reached by the simple procedure of mechanically following certain rules, as one does in arithmetical calculation. If this were the case, there would not be a real problem, for it would be possible to trace the whole process back from the solution to its beginnings, as one can follow the links of an uninterrupted chain in either direction.

True heuristic acts, such as are involved in problem-solving, are irreversible. The obstacle that separates the trying subject from the solution is a logical gap, which has a certain width, and this width is a good measure of the difficulty of the problem and hence of the ingenuity needed for solving the problem. Over this gap there is a way, but this way is undetermined and uncertain because it is not mapped out. One takes such a gap by a leap! The leap is always an

1 Tillich, P.: *Dynamics of Faith*. Harper Bros. N.Y., 1957.
2 Polanyi, M.: Problem Solving. *Brit. J. Philos. Science*, 1957, 8, pp. 89-103.

original act, subjectively felt as equivalent to insight and illumination.

We would add to Polanyi's analysis that it is also a choice, because there is always the alternative of halting before the gap, of giving up the solution and thereby discarding the problem. And discarded problems have no real existence; a problem must be seen in order to be. In case the problem continues to exist psychologically, it has not been discarded but has merely been postponed; its existence is then felt as a quasi-need (Lewin) with all the unpleasant after-effects of our first abortive attempt at a solution: restlessness, obsessive thoughts, lack of closure, again placing before us a choice.

It seems that Polanyi's analysis of the nature of problem-solving is relevant to the idea of destiny. The irreversibility of a heuristic act places it outside the complete control of mechanical causality. Faced with a logical gap, a man must leap. The selection of leaping as against the alternative of staying back, and the outcome of the leap, are original with him. His " centred act " shapes this part of his destiny as being of his own making.

This becomes even clearer when we follow Polanyi's analysis further: problem-solving requires a preoccupation with the unknown. Yet the person is purposely directed upon this unknown—the unknown has a provisional reality character and creates a tension, because of the discrepancy between it and the actual and available, but insufficient " clues " or preconditions. There is in problem-solving a heuristic anticipation.

Task, problem, the idea of a leap, irreversibility, anticipation, the unknown—all these terms are frequently found in that somewhat loose group of literary, philosophical and theological writings called "existential " or " existentialist." As aspects of the concept of destiny they form the leading concern and organizing idea of such thinkers as Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, Jaspers, Heidegger, Sartre and of the contemporary theologian Tillich. Though these men are by no means the same, or even similar, in their message, their work is nevertheless organized around a particular conviction of the nature of man. In the simplest language, and allowing for many individual qualifications, it may be said that they all conceive of man as a choosing animal; they all hold that life in its many phases and manifestations is characterized by historicity, i.e. irreversibility; they all feel that living means risking and the taking of chances, and that its genuine form, its essence, is experienced as potentiality and anticipation.

The latter is not for all existentialists marked by a clarity of goal or purpose; indeed, if a goal is posited at all it may even be quite negative, namely death and nothingness. In such a case there would be a goalless task. But task there is; with all the work which it demands, it is seen as the essential ingredient of human life. There is a striking community of thought among all existentialists, in so far as they all acknowledge that an adequate portrayal of human life must use the

image of a way or road or traject or journey, leading from a relatively known "here" to a lesser known "there," which is more or less remote and distant.

Sooner or later, man is confronted with a problem which he cannot tackle by simple calculation; he will be confronted with a crisis, a gap —be it logically, morally, aesthetically or spiritually. And if he is to live (as opposed to stagnating or dying) he must make decisions, he must choose, he must be original, he must invent novelty. He must take some leap or bold step. His most decisive actions and most centred acts always contain an element of uncertainty, which he replaces by the irreversible certainty of the unique act which he chooses to commit.

This idea of destiny as destination is thus a significant and widely used theme in human affairs. In technical terms, it is the assertion of a difference between the existence and the essence of man. In simpler words, it is the expression of a feeling that man is not naturally and spontaneously himself, but has to become himself at his own expense.

Theologians have been apt to state this theme in terms of man's estrangement from his Maker, and from his ordained creatureliness. Despite different reference points, the humanistic version of the theme is very similar: Plato considered man to be alienated from his origins but also equipped with memory which creates a nostalgic longing—hence the troublesome and danger-laden journey of life, walking or by chariot, made to regain cosmic contact and to provide closure. And when we say, as the modern humanist does, that the ultimate concern of man is man, we imply that the man of our concern has a double aspect: the man in the street, mirrored in his own, but more ideal, dignified, responsible, beautiful and cognizant *alter ego*. In a word, the concern with man is in terms of a more essential man, whose life is a portrayal of truth and veracity.

In all these variations the theme remains clearly recognizable that man is not merely the empirical object of the various sciences, but also a sort of sacramental being who is called upon by a God or by his fellow-man or even more simply by the scheme of nature to become greater and truer and more beautiful than he now is.

Estrangement, fall, corruption, pitiful neglect, inertia—all this is thus only half the story. The other half deals with a goal, a task, a calling, an ideal, an essence, or whatever—by works, by grace or by some spontaneous development inherent in man himself. We find that the many possible descriptions of man nearly always comprise elements taken from each of the two meanings of destiny mentioned in the opening paragraphs of this paper. On the one hand the destiny of fate and fortune which tells of some supra-personal arrangement—on the other hand the destiny of destination, which tells of the centred personal acts of choice, decision, ingenuity, dedication, anticipation

and realization. In this latter sense of destiny, man is not the object, but the subject of determinism.

A few lines earlier, I came close to contrasting man as the object of the sciences with man as the object of humanitarian and sacramental concern. How sharp is this contrast? It must be remembered that Polanyi's analysis of problem-solving is quite naturalistic, and that there is very little indication of supernaturalism in the writings of some existentialist thinkers. It is even more interesting to consider some current conceptions in biology, medicine and the allied sciences and their bearing upon the concept of man and his destiny.

When determinism was the keynote to all rational thought about man, destiny as fate and inescapable determination received biological under-pinnings from the delineation of hereditary, congenital and familial diseases or tendencies which would hold the individual in their grips in the same way as once the Moira was supposed to reign supremely over the lot of man. Many doctors in those days were therapeutically nihilists or even fatalists; when they saw the hand of fate all they could do was to diagnose and label the untoward condition and help the patient to accommodate himself to his lot.

But if one considers some of the key-concepts now in use in biology and medicine the perspective seems vastly different; without exaggeration it must be said that the modern biological concept of man is in many ways in very close harmony with the humanitarian and sacramental view of human life. The principle of homeostasis states that not only humans, but all organisms act in such a way that the vital processes are kept at some optimal level of efficiency, despite the most diverse external and internal conditions. Determinate chains of events are counteracted by other events of the organism's own making in order to preserve some ideal of functioning. At bottom, this is self-determination interacting with determination from elsewhere. The concept of homeostasis, the phenomena of spontaneous generation and regeneration, the ideas of the steady state and organismic regulation, indeed the whole modern conceptual framework of the "open system"[1] all clearly involve the postulation of optima of some sort and the organism's purposive striving to maintain or regain such optima. They imply that organisms live up to a kind of biological "ought" and to a categorical imperative which cannot be accounted for in terms of purely mechanical pulls and pushes between parts and organs. And there is, after all, the simple but difficult idea of growth, which tells us that the essence of life lies in transformation, and that living things live *toward* the realization of some scheme or model without which the transformations would make no sense at all.

Inasmuch as the vital biological processes involve optima, and not mere statistical averages, there is some implication of purposivism in

1 Von Bertalanffy, A.: An Outline of General System Theory. *Brit. J. Philo. Science*, 1950, 1, pp. 134-165.

the perspective on life now held by biologists, and by scientists in allied fields. Two recent publications by Sinnott[1] and MacLeod[2] give eloquent testimony to these views. Organisms seem to escape from rigid extraneous determinism precisely because they have the capacity to restructure the prevailing conditions within themselves and in their environment in accordance with some anticipated pattern of " essence." In addition to destiny as fate, they live under the aegis of a destiny of destination.

We may also ask on what grounds we expect that a man, who is now afflicted by a serious disease, will ever get better? A sick man, after all, is a demonstrable and tangible reality which we explain in terms of several interwoven chains of causes and effects. Why would this reality of sickness, which we can even describe as an inevitability, ever give way to that as yet unrealized possibility which we call the " recovered patient "? There are three factors which empirically justify this expectation, without, however, predicting its fulfilment. One is faith, which has been called the " evidence of things unseen "; one is hope, the expectation of a possible good; and the last one is work, which is a kind of expenditure of self toward the realization of another self, which *is not*, except as ideal and essence. All three partake in anticipation; they derive their possibility from a goal, such as health, which is for the sick man a mere potentiality, basically unknown.

It is small wonder, therefore, that situations along the dimension of health and illness cannot be easily expressed in tough-minded scientific concepts. They have led to the invocation of another Goddess whose name is *Vis Medicatrix Naturae*, the healing power of nature.

It seems, then, that some very diverse considerations give rise to the recovery of an old and almost forgotten idea, the destination aspect of destiny. Though the Moira and Fortuna still hold their sway, it is no less true that life, and particularly the life of human individuals, is a " creative advance ", to use Whitehead's celebrated phrase. The gentle and sharp Cambridge philosopher added that the essence of the universe is that it passes into a future, that nature is transition, and that all explanations of life include " aim " as a necessary factor.[3] Speaking of personal identity, he had this to say: " In each personality, the large infinitude of possibility is recessive and ineffective; but a perspective of ideal existence enters into the finite actuality."[4]

1 Sinnott, E. W.: *Life and Mind*, Antioch Press, Yellow Springs, Ohio, 1956.
2 MacLeod, R. B.: Teleology and Theory of Human Behavior, *Science*, 1957, 125, 477-480.
3 Whitehead, A. N.: *Adventures of Ideas*, Mentor Books, New York, 1955.
4 Whitehead, A. N.: *Essays in Science and Philosophy*, Philosophical Library, New York, 1947.

CRUELTY

By

M. H. K. KANE

M.C., M.D., M.R.C.P.

CAN it be that mankind is growing more tender-hearted? Crimes for which flogging would have been considered mercy in the Middle Ages, and death by torture a fair punishment, are now referred to the psychiatrist. A painless execution in retribution for a brutal murder arouses a storm of protest in a country where a hundred and fifty years ago children were still hanged for stealing. The lenient chastisement of youthful criminals, even the mild correction of naughty children, provokes stern disapproval. The pangs of natural death, even when mitigated by narcotics, now seem so piteous that we are almost prepared to relieve them by legalized homicide, euphemistically disguised under the name of euthanasia. The humane slaughtering of cattle is today enforced by a species which once slaughtered men for sport; and a Church which at one time burned its heretics is now expected to denounce fox-hunting. It seems only a matter of time before all blood sports are pronounced illegal.

It is strange that the God-fearing religious culture of the Middle Ages should have been so cruel, in contrast to the merciful mood which prevails in these irreligious days of humanism. Perhaps the modern humanist, prone to exaggerate the importance of the incarnate phase of his long pilgrimage, is unduly solicitous about the sufferings which it entails. But this cannot be the whole explanation, for our mediaeval forefathers were as unmoved by the everlasting sufferings of the damned in hell as by the temporal afflictions of their fellow-citizens on earth. It is unlikely however that the human race is really changing. The Nazi incident showed how easily human cruelty can revive. Perhaps there is some admixture of self-pity and sentimentality in this admirable and welcome expansion of modern compassion.

Everyone agrees that the body corresponds to the mind; but the exact basis and nature of their correspondence still remains obscure. In this essay I am assuming that the metabolism of the body is the evolutionary precursor and natural symbol of the morality of the mind, and that it is in this context that their correspondence can be revealed. Let us see how this idea works out in practice.

Metabolism depends on the interaction of two elemental and

antagonistic impulses—anabolism and katabolism. The former builds up and enriches the body at the expense of the environment. The latter breaks down and impoverishes it with benefit to the environment. Normal health is the product of an even and harmonious equipoise between these two opposing processes.

This two-way traffic with the environment, this power of alternately depleting and fertilizing the surrounding world, is in the last analysis the essential quality which distinguishes living from inanimate matter. It constitutes the raw act of living, and all the instincts are differentiated from these primaeval sources of energy. But it should not be thought that the environment, the hinterland with which these exchanges takes place, is itself inert and passive. Its most important content is our living fellow-creatures, animal or vegetable, which we eat and build up into our bodies, and then break down for energy or return to the environment with our excretions. It follows that our anabolic takings not only enrich ourselves but also impoverish our fellow-creatures, and that our katabolic givings not only impoverish ourselves but also enrich our fellow-creatures. Anabolism thus stands inescapably for self-assertion and self-gain, and katabolism for self-renunciation and self-loss.

Within moderate limits all these antitheses are normal and healthy. But if either motive preponderates and comes to dominate the other, we are faced on the bodily level with the excesses of hypertrophy and atrophy, and on the mental level with the immoderations of self-aggrandizement and self-sacrifice. Under these circumstances anabolism and katabolism stand respectively for spiritual evil and spiritual good.

In this way we can correlate the elemental urges of the body with the spiritual aspirations of the mind. Growth and evolution appear as the evolutionary precursors and natural symbols of self-love and others-love. The normal antagonism between anabolism and katabolism merges insensibly into the no less normal opposition between selfishness and selflessness; and the pathological extremes of hypertrophy and atrophy foreshadow the spiritual gulf between evil and good.

It will be understood that anabolism and katabolism, although themselves neither good nor evil, symbolize higher motives which, themselves normal in moderation, become spiritual good or evil, when indulged to excess.

The obvious criticism of this arrangement takes this form. Why should excessive anabolism stand for evil and excessive katabolism for good? Why, if both are abnormal, should not both stand for evil?

The answer is no less obvious. Nature is not neutral in the conflict of metabolism. At death katabolism always triumphs and anabolism is always vanquished. In the last event the break-down must prevail over the build-up. Surely, if the mind really corresponds to the body, it is in this elemental context that their correspondence is revealed.

In youth a predominantly self-assertive mind should conform to a predominantly anabolic body. In maturity the balance between growth and decline should be manifested by an equipoise between egoism and altruism; and in old age the increasing katabolic trend should be reflected by an increasing capacity for self-sacrifice. Here we have a genuine basis of body-mind correspondence, a lesson of self-renunciation where science and religion are in complete agreement; and here perhaps is the long-sought rendezvous where these two great truth-seeking disciplines can shake hands and sign a lasting peace. If we reject this explanation, is it not that we are unwilling rather than unable to solve the body-mind conundrum?

This view is a modern restatement of an older Eastern philosophy. In Yoga doctrine life is the product of a ' will to live ' (anabolism) in perpetual conflict with a ' will to liberation ' (katabolism). The latter is the stronger of the two and always proves to be the final conqueror. Space forbids any further elaboration of this theme.

We feel intuitively that of all the vices cruelty, defined as the infliction and the enjoyment of suffering, is the most detestably evil. If therefore we are right in our contention that anabolism is the amoral precursor of evil, cruelty, the very acme of evil, should have strong affiliations with anabolism. But at first sight it is not altogether clear why the infliction and enjoyment of suffering should be related to this blameless impulse to build up our body-minds by borrowing energy and power from the environment.

Anabolism and katabolism, when mutually restrained, are both normal, so that we may reasonably assume that their satisfaction in moderation is pleasurable. There is no reason why the breaking-down of the body should not be as agreeable as its building-up, why our repayments to the environment should not give us the same satisfaction as our borrowings, why our excretions should not be as gratifying as our absorptions. Indeed on the higher levels of mind we are told that (for reasons not immediately relevant) it is actually better to give than to receive. Sometimes, even in bodily affairs, this is true. Many a woman might find more pleasure in suckling an infant than in eating a meal. It is more enjoyable for her to give milk than for her child to take it. But because a single meal in the life of a larger and stronger animal often entails the premature destruction and death of a smaller and weaker one, the anabolic pleasure of the former often means the katabolic suffering of the latter.

The central theme of anabolism is eat-absorb-grow; and its moderate satisfaction is, as we have seen, pleasurable. Linked with this central theme are the associated activities of hunting, stalking, catching, and killing, all of which become infected with the same pleasurable tone of feeling, and all of which involve a painful feeling tone in the victim. But we must remember that it is the eating, absorbing, and growing, not the unavoidable pain inflicted, which *satisfy* the impulse, and so

bring pleasure. The infliction of pain is incidental and not essential to satisfaction. There is no reason to believe that animals are cruel, in the sense that they enjoy the sufferings of their prey, of which they are probably completely unaware. On this level suffering is neutral to satisfaction. A cat, playing with a mouse, enjoys the repeated thrill of hunting and catching, but it is unlikely that it takes pleasure in, or even has knowledge of, the mouse's agony.

Human cruelty, in its least objectionable form, is manifested in connection with sport, and in this context scarcely rises above the animal level. Here the association of cruelty with anabolism is obvious. Most of the victims of sport are edible; and the satisfaction is derived, not so much from the eating, as from the preliminaries of hunting, stalking, and killing, which during the long history of our animal ancestors have been associated, like conditioned reflexes, with the satisfaction of hunger. In fox-hunting, where the quarry is notoriously inedible, the original motive has altogether disappeared, and the preliminaries are the sole source of pleasure, a typically Pavlovian demonstration.

Regarded as an animal, therefore, the human sportsman is not more cruel than another. It is the thrill and danger of the chase, not the anguish of the victim, which brings him his fun. Like other hunting animals he is heedless of the suffering he inflicts. As a human being, however, he is equipped to understand and appreciate what suffering means, so that if he claims the privileges of humanity, he must admit the indictment of cruelty. For on this conscious level there is little doubt that the elemental pleasure of anabolism spreads beyond the cognate activities of hunting and killing, and, except perhaps in the most insensitive and bestial of mankind, must become associated with the infliction of pain. Only if degraded to animal status may the sportsman be acquitted of this charge.

There is an obvious correspondence between our disposition to kill animals and to eat their flesh, and our disposition to kill our enemies and to annex their property. The increased size and strength attained by eating an animal corresponds to the increased power and influence attained by conquering an enemy. There is an important body-mind correspondence between size and power. Size is to the body what power is to the mind. In the animal world, where food is often in short supply, the one involves the other, and no confusion arises. Size means strength, more strength means more food, and more food means greater size. In human affairs, however, size is no longer quite so important. In most parts of the world man's conquest of nature has assured adequate nourishment and standard size is taken for granted. The bodily satisfaction of the anabolic craving for size is thus practically assured. But there still remains a corresponding mental craving for power, whose satisfaction is far more difficult, and whose aberrations are far more dangerous. For power has this difference

from size. Increase of size, although constantly associated with the infliction of pain, cannot be attained by such means. The eating and absorbing are the essentials, the suffering incidental. Power, on the other hand, *can* be won by inflicting pain. The torturer *can* bend the victim to his will, the tyrant *can* tame his slaves by privations and hardships. The tiger kills to eat, and so gains bulk and strength. The dictator tortures to hurt, and so wins sovereignty and subservience. Where the body craves for food to increase size, the mind craves for pain to increase power. Cruelty therefore on this higher level is not merely, as with animals and sportsmen, a chance-associated preliminary of anabolic satisfaction, but an independent cause of this satisfaction in its own right.

Much cruelty, otherwise incomprehensible, can be explained on these lines. The reality, even the phantasy of inflicting pain and extracting prayers for mercy, can engender an immoderate and dangerous sense of power, related to, but far in excess of, the normal ambitions of a healthy-minded man.

It should not of course be thought that, in deriving cruelty from a normal impulse, I am attempting to justify it, or to prove that it is normal. Anabolism and katabolism are only normal as long as they are mutually restrained. Once they evade mutual restraint they become pathological states of hypertrophy and atrophy.

Cruelty thus seeks and sometimes wins a hypertrophy, a veritable gigantism of power. It is the gluttony of the mind, craving for domination; and like other gluttonies, this repulsive vice soon brings its nemesis. It is a sin of incontinence, rather than of violence; and although in taking this view I diverge from so great an authority as Dante, who punished his tyrants among the violent, and not among the incontinent, I am emboldened to maintain my view by the disturbing fact that cruelty is often associated with sexual desire, and that its indulgence may often bring sexual satisfaction. It is this unpleasant and distressing problem which must now be faced.

It is not so inexplicable as it seems at first sight. It must be realized that the impulses of anabolism and katabolism are the fundamental energizers of all living matter. They are not only the motive power of life; they are life itself. They constitute the act of living; and all other activities of life are derived from them. They are the sources of energy behind all the instincts and tendencies. It follows that in first deriving cruelty from anabolism and then associating it with sex, I am not investing it with a dual origin; for sex, and all our other instincts, are ultimately derived from this two-way traffic with our environment.

Let us consider the relationship of sex to metabolism rather more closely. The act of living is, as we have seen, a *compromise* between enriching ourselves at the expense of our fellow-creatures and enriching our fellow-creatures at the expense of ourselves. Normal behaviour displays no excesses, no extremes of enrichment or im-

poverishment. The body tends to maintain its size, the mind to restrain its ambitions, within moderate limits. A man who aspires to be a giant or a dictator is behaving abnormally.

In that dearly-prized range of reality which we call sex the same antithesis is recognizable, but the same moderation is conspicuously absent. Here once more we have an interaction of opposites, a give and take, this time between the sexes. The man absorbs the woman and the woman absorbs the man. On the bodily level the ovum absorbs the sperm in a literal amd material sense. Compromise however, so conspicuous in all our other modes of behaviour, is now replaced by immoderation; and it is of course this extravagance of behaviour, this tendency to excess, which gives sex its ecstatic flavour, and which, by evading the tyranny of time, admits it to the heights of heaven or the depths of hell. Here we leave behind ordinary people, prudent moderation, and wordly-wise concessions, and enter a land where perfect men and women, heroes beyond reproach, goddesses without stain, know nothing of cautious restraint and balance-sheets of profit and loss. In the bodily and mental raptures of sexual passion there are no bargains and reservations. He or she takes or gives all, triumphs unconditionally or surrenders abjectly. Compromise is unthinkable. Even the bodily act of sexual union is a capitulation and a killing. A symbolic death creates a new life.

We thus find in the masteries and subjections of the act of sex a pattern comparable to the gains and losses of metabolism, but without its compromise and moderation. The pleasure inherent in the satisfaction of all elemental impulses is heightened and rises to ecstatic levels; for now both impulses, released from mutual restraint, are felt and satisfied in their full spiritual force; and the joy of katabolic subjection, involving as it does a symbolic and not a real death, is as great as that of anabolic domination.

But in spite of these excesses the balance between giving and taking is not disturbed. The swing of the pendulum is lengthened, but there is no imbalance between its phases. In the long run love's reciprocal tyrannies and enslavements cancel out into a harmonious worldly relationship; and, as passion fades, the elemental pulsations of increase and decrease revert to a shorter and less sexual rhythm. Gradually with the passage of time marriage becomes a worldly affair of give and take.

Sexual desire is thus seen as a specialized exaggeration of our elemental urge to wax and wane. Instead of impelling us to maintain life by mingling in metabolic or social moderation with other living creatures, it constrains us to create new life by mingling in sexual excess with a single desirable partner. By its extravagances it stretches out beyond the compromise of time, and touches for a moment the good and evil perfections of eternity.

The simple exchanges by which our bodies grow, live, and decline

are not always exempt from abnormality. They have their hypertrophies and their atrophies, their tumours and their wastings. It is not surprising therefore that in the more complex, varied, and vulnerable field of sex, pathology should be a frequent intruder. When this happens the cruelty, always implicit and never far below the surface in the immoderations of sex, may invade man's alert and receptive consciousness; and, forming a sterile and sinister partnership with an almost ungovernable charge of pleasure, renounce all association with coitus and childbirth, the normal aims of sex, just as we have already seen it in sport severing all connections with eating and absorbtion, the normal aims of anabolism. Thus generated, the sexual perversions of sadism and masochism—the sexually-stimulating infliction and endurance of pain—sometimes become competent in their own right to appease sexual desire, without the assistance of the usual bodily contacts.

It seems that, when suffering is associated, even remotely, with the satisfaction of an elemental impulse, the pleasure inherent in satisfaction is liable to become detached from its normal outlet and connected with the conception of suffering: and that this partnership, under the name of cruelty, now becomes adequate to satisfy the impulse outside the normal channels. We have already seen how anabolic desire can, in the realm of sport, be fed and appeased by cruelty; and now we find that the same cruelty can provide the same vicarious satisfaction in the more complex field of sex.

Both these perversions, sexual and non-sexual, represent a failure of complex mental processes to conform to their simple bodily prototypes.

The October number of *The Hibbert Journal*
will commemorate the centenary of the publication of
The Origin of Species
with an article by Sir Julian Huxley
on "Darwin and the Idea of Evolution"

SURVEY OF RECENT PHILOSOPHICAL AND THEOLOGICAL LITERATURE

I. PHILOSOPHY

By
F. H. HEINEMANN, M.A., Ph.D.

"THE concept of dreaming is not derived from dreaming, but from dream-reports." "The notion of a dream as an occurrence logically independent of the sleeper's waking impression has no clear sense." Such are the paradoxical theses of N. Malcolm's *Dreaming* (Routledge, 12*s*. 6*d*.). This closely reasoned book offers advice for talking critically about dreams, a sort of negative "philosophical psychology," certainly useful but not for the analysis of dreams. A positive "philosophical psychology" remains an urgent desideratum. What can its problems still be in face of the massive work of the psychologists? That American psychology has come of age and cannot be disregarded by philosophers is proved by R. S. Woodworth's *Dynamics of Behaviour*, E. R. Hilgard's *Theories of Learning* and B. F. Skinner's *Verbal Behaviour* (Methuen, 36*s*.; 45*s*.; 42*s*.). Skinner's book arose in response to Whitehead's challenge that a scientific account of verbal behaviour is impossible: "Account for my behaviour as I sit here saying: No black scorpion is falling upon this table!" The surprising result is a textbook of 478 pages. Hilgard's work is a second revised edition of his well-known textbook. Philosophically Woodworth's book is the most interesting, in proposing a behaviour-primacy theory of motivation, as opposed to a need-primacy theory (Freud, Hull). He regards the tendency to deal with the environment as *the* primary drive in behaviour. This represents a possible perspective, though there may be more primary drives. Behaviourism is here superseded by a dynamic psychology. *Instinctive Behaviour*, a collection of pioneer essays by Konrad Lorenz, D. J. Kuenen, N. Tinbergen, P. Schiller and J. von Uexküll, edited by C. H. Schiller (Methuen, 45*s*.), is still more important. The *ethological* standpoint of these authors, based on a comparative study of behaviour, is a real alternative to mechanistic behaviourism. Instinctive modes of behaviour characterising different species emerge, and *the* environment is replaced by a plurality of qualitatively different *Umwelten* and *Wirkwelten* (Uexküll).

Parapsychology and Psychoanalysis still have a great popular appeal. In *The Sixth Sense* (Chatto & Windus, 21*s*.) Rosalind Heywood states the case for ESP and gives a most readable account of the history of psychical research and of the amateurish and scientific experiments made to establish extra-sensory perception, clairvoyance and telepathy. How difficult it is to exclude wishful thinking in this field becomes apparent also in S. G. Soal's

and H. T. Bowden's scholarly report on card-guessing experiments with two fabulous Welsh boys in *The Mind Readers* (Faber, 30*s*.). The remarkably high scores are meant to prove telepathy. However, money prizes for high scores kept the interest of the boys, a rather unusual distorting feature in a "scientific" enquiry. The present crisis of psychoanalysis impels N. O. Brown to reshape it into a wider theory of human nature, culture and history, in order to cure with its help "the general neurosis of mankind." This rather fantastic attempt, undertaken in *Life against Death, The Psychoanalytical Meaning of History* (Routledge, 30*s*.), is put in its place by A. Wheelis's *The Quest for Identity* (Gollancz, 21*s*.). This distinguished American psychiatrist regards the loss of man's old identity as the malaise of our time; but he adds: "To pursue psychoanalysis in quest for identity is to pursue an illusion." All that can be achieved by it is adjustment and conformity. This would seem to be essentially correct and to justify Camilla M. Anderson to go *Beyond Freud* (Peter Owen, 30*s*.). Her theses, that deep analysis is not the only method in psychotherapy; that the behaviour of persons is dependent on their beliefs; that a person in emotional bondage to the past cannot experience "the good life"; and that religion and psychiatry are close collaborators, are more correct than new. Francis J. Mott claims to have rediscovered "the human mind as a specific instance of a universal configuration governing all integration" (*The Nature of the Self*, Allan Wingate, 42*s*.).

Michael Polanyi's *The Study of Man* (Routledge, 7*s*. 6*d*.) is welcome as an introduction to his *Personal Knowledge*. He is right in affirming the tacit, pre-verbal personal component in all our thought, but wrong in rejecting "knowledge embodied in strictly impersonal statements as self-contradictory, meaningless, a fit subject for ridicule"(!). To *understand* is wonderful, but science cannot help being impersonal and *predicting*. By overstating his case the author weakens it. The personal factor is not even mentioned in J. G. Kemeny's introduction to the philosophy of science, *A Philosopher Looks at Science* (Van Nostrand, N.Y., 37*s*. 6*d*.). He defines science as "all knowledge collected by means of the scientific method." Consequently, he covers a wide field of sciences, down to psychology and the social sciences. Unfortunately, *the* scientific method does not exist, and the differences in method in the many sciences are disregarded.

Metaphysics as a science and not as an ideology is defended by W. O. Martin in *Metaphysics and Ideology* (Marquette Univ. Press, $2.50) from a Thomist point of view. Even if metaphysics and ideology are called cultural superstructures, "an infinite gap remains that can never be closed." Austin Farrer, however, would like to free himself from the dependence on Thomism and "on the breath-taking naivety of old linguistic realism," as he informs us in the preface to the second edition of *Finite and Infinite* (A. & C. Black, 35*s*.). J. Schwabe's *Mathematics, Music, Mythology and Metaphysics*, edited by Mohan Singh (Academy of Spiritual Culture, Amritsar 40*s*.), is notable as an exposition of Hans Kayser's neo-pythagorean musical world-view. The authors claim to have discovered "lambdoma," the basic diagram of the Pythagoreans, as the key to all cosmic order. We seem really to be living in *The Paradoxical Universe*, as G. Melhuish assures us (Rankin, 21*s*.). He proposes an "energetic-logic of paradox" as a key to the world said to exist in a "paradoxically energetic state." Among the new metaphysical tracts A. A. Vogel's *Reality, Reason*

and Religion (Longmans, 30*s*.) will appeal to our readers. It is a sober attempt to defend and justify traditional metaphysical explanation against the attacks of the positivists and scientists, and also the Thomist definition of God as *actus purus*, against Tillich's attack that such a God would be a dead God. The discussion is more interesting than the proposed revised version of Aristotelian ontology. I. Epstein's *Judaism* (Pelican, 3*s*. 6*d*.) is a historical representation from an orthodox point of view, with stress on the Talmud rather than the Bible or philosophy. D. G. Runes's *Dictionary of Judaism* is now published in this country by Peter Owen (35*s*.).

An attempt to re-establish the cognitive character of moral judgments and their *objective* meaning in opposition to subjectivist non-cognitive theories is made by Pratima Bowes, a pupil of Professor Acton, in *The Concept of Morality* (Allen & Unwin, 21*s*.). Objectivity is here not claimed for particular judgments, but for the standards on which they are based; these are taken as "self-justifying" and as "facts." The objectivity of moral values is discussed, in the wake of Max Scheler and Nicolai Hartmann, in S. Krohn's *Die Normative Wertethik* (Turku Univ. Press). *The Objective Society* is a term of abuse for Everett Knight (Routledge, 16*s*.) describing the contemporary bourgeoisie and especially the universities which merely gather facts and have ceased to think, to create knowledge and values. Believing with Sartre in the "historical advance" of communism, he attacks "the incredible triviality of Anglo-Saxon philosophy which is no longer a quest for truth, but a vested interest." A sparkling and refreshing pamphlet, lacking objectivity! *The Social Purposes of Education* in face of the massive changes in contemporary society is the theme of K. G. Collier's scholarly work (Routledge, 21*s*.). His analysis of the present situation, as well as the plea for more rigorous standards of duty, trust and conscience and for the highest degree of participation of the pupils, deserve the serious attention of all teachers. *Contemporary Sociology*, edited by J. S. Roucek (Peter Owen, 70*s*.), is an encyclopedia of global trends in sociology, especially American. It proves that sociology is on the march. J. Maritain, writing *On the Philosophy of History* (Bles, 15*s*.), tries to discover certain philosophical laws which enlighten history without *explaining* it as a *necessary* sequence of events. *Cosmos and History* is a welcome reprint of M. Eliade's "The Myth of the Eternal Return" (Harper, $1.35).

Morris Weitz's *Problems in Aesthetics* (Macmillan, 48*s*. 6*d*.) is a useful introductory "reader," including material from Plato to Miss Macdonald. Surprisingly, the author holds that theory has no legitimate role in aesthetics and that art cannot be defined. Therefore his selection is somewhat arbitrary and includes linguistic analysis. The collection of essays, *Moving into Aquarius*, by Michael Tippett (Routledge, 18*s*.), is valuable as the confession of an artist about his art, his relations to other composers (Schönberg, Stravinsky) and to his "teacher" Jung. His general rules of artistic creation are less convincing. The title of A. Hauser's *The Philosophy of Art History* (Routledge, 35*s*.) is new, but misleading. Such a philosophy does not exist. In fact, the book discusses the methodology of the history of art (*e.g.* the dialectical, sociological and psychoanalytic methods). *Lermontov*, the passionate Russian Byron, twice banished to the Caucasus, twice fighting a duel and killed in the second in his 27th year, is the subject of a perceptive study by J. Lavrin (Bowes & Bowes, 10*s*. 6*d*.).

The following contributions to the history of thought have reached us: *The Upanishads*, A Fourth Selection, Taittiriya and Chhandogya, translated by Swami Nikhilananda (Phoenix House, 25*s.*); S. Sambursky, *Physics of the Stoics* (Routledge, 23*s.*), an important new interpretation of Stoic Physics as a continuum theory in opposition to the atomic theory; Rom Landau, *The Philosophy of Ibn Arabi* (Allen & Unwin, 13*s.* 6*d.*), a welcome introduction to a little known, but " most significant thinker of Islam "; W. J. Ong, *Ramus, Method, and the Decay of Dialogue*, and *Ramus and Talon Inventory* (Harvard & O.U.P., 80*s.* each), two massive volumes which provide new foundations for the study of Ramus and Ramism, reveal the enormous range covered by the French humanists of the 16th century and are indispensable for specialists; C. Bibby's penetrating and illuminating study of *T. H. Huxley* and his educational activities and influence (Watts, 25*s.*); A. Ellegard's detailed description of the reception of Darwin's theory in the British Press, 1859-1872, in *Darwin and the General Reader*, (Almquist, Stockholm, kr. 20), where the reactions are duly summarized, catalogued and statistically analysed. *The Journals of Kierkegaard* are republished with a new introduction by Alexander Dru (Harper, $1.45). *Kierkegaard's Dialectic of Existence* (Oliver and Boyd, 21*s.*) is proposed by H. Diem as a clue for dissolving the contradictions between the Kierkegaard of the Journals with their Luther-criticism and the Kierkegaard of the published works who in the wake of Luther prepared the way for the dialectical theology. Heidegger's *The Question of Being* is now also published by Vision Press (25*s.*). G. F. Kneller's *Existentialism and Education* (Phil. Lib., $3.75) is a plea for replacing group-centred by person-centred education. Why Marx's predictions about the downfall of American capitalism were false is explained by a former communist, Earl Browder, in *Marx and America* (Gollancz, 16*s.*). The tenth anniversary of the American Jewish Archives is commemorated by two valuable scholarly volumes, edited by J. R. Marcus, *American Jewry, Documents, Eighteenth Century* (mostly unpublished) and *Essays in American Jewish History* (Univ. Publ., N.Y., $8.50 & 7.50). R. J. Tresolini's *American Constitutional Law* (Macmillan, 52*s.* 6*d.*) is designed as a textbook for students; it discusses the general principles as well as many special cases.

Mind (April) brings good tidings: the term " soul " is permissible though not obligatory, but, alas, not in its traditional sense. R. G. Olson discusses existentialist authenticity and inauthenticity in " Authenticity, Metaphysics, and Moral Responsibility " (*Philosophy*, April). " Malcolm on Dreaming " is incisively attacked by R. M. Yost (*Phil. Quart.*, April). I. Scheffler examines two strategies for interpreting teleology (*B.J.P.S.*, Feb.). J. J. C. Smart regards sensations as brain processes (*Phil. Rev.*, April). A. H. Johnson compares " Leibniz and Whitehead " (*Phil. and Phen. Research*, March) whereas J. W. Davis discusses " Berkeley's Doctrine of the Notion " (*Rev. of Metaphysics*, March) and J. C. Cooley " Toulmin's Revolution in Logic " (*Journal of Phil, No.* 7). The *Revue Internationale*, 45-46, devoted to Karl Marx, includes valuable reports on recent studies and a comprehensive bibliography on Marx and Marxism. With Professor C. D. Broad's Presidential Address on " Dreaming " (*Proc. Soc. for Psychical Research, Vol.* 52) we return to our starting-point, but are startled by the suggestion of an " astral double " to the normal human body as much the simplest working hypothesis.

OXFORD.

II. THEOLOGY

By

THE REV. H. L. SHORT, M.A.

In spite of the revival of what is called " Biblical theology " in our day, the tide of battle has rolled away from the Old Testament, and it is possible to record the generally-accepted conclusions of scholars in this field without arousing serious controversy. This is admirably done in small compass by Professor G. W. Anderson, of Durham, in *A critical introduction to the Old Testament*, in the series " Studies in Theology " (Duckworth, 12*s*. 6*d*.). He shows where there are differences of opinion, and gives references to recent scholarship. His last chapter, on " The Old Testament as Christian Scripture ", seems perfunctory. Professor M. A. Beek, of Amsterdam, in *A journey through the Old Testament*, translated by A. J. Pomerans (Hodder & Stoughton, 21*s*.), attempts a rather different task. In a series of short broadcast talks he tells in turn the stories of the Old Testament, with gentle piety but modernist scholarship. The result is very attractive, but strangely unlike anything written by English scholars today, though no doubt it is often preached. Authentic " Biblical theology " appears in *Creation and Fall*, by Dietrich Bonhoeffer (SCM, 8*s*. 6*d*.), subtitled " A theological interpretation of Genesis 1—3". It is an emotional extraction of Christian meaning from the opening chapters of the Old Testament, as far as Cain's murder of Abel, from lectures delivered in Berlin in 1932-3—too early to give a clear foreshadowing of his tragic *Letters from prison*, with their anxious reformulation of Lutheranism. Old Testament scholarship, on the other hand, is represented by *The account of the Tabernacle: translation and textual problems of the Greek Exodus*, by D. W. Gooding, in the collection " Texts and Studies, second series " (CUP, 22*s*. 6*d*.), and *Ten years of discovery in the Wilderness of Judaea*, by J. T. Milik, No. 26 of " Studies in Biblical Theology " (SCM, 12*s*. 6*d*.). Dr. Gooding rejects the usual belief of scholars that the closing chapters of the Septuagint version of Exodus are translated from a more primitive Hebrew text, now lost; instead, he suggests, with evidence, that the accepted Hebrew text was tendentiously translated into Greek, and the translation later corrupted. Abbé Milik, a leading figure in all the discoveries and excavations at Qumrân, gives a detailed and authoritative account of all that has been found and the theories about it. In *A debate: is the Bible infallible?* (Epworth Press, 2*s*.), John Wenham, a conservative evangelical (he dislikes being called a fundamentalist), and Rupert E. Davies, a moderate evangelical (he repudiates liberalism), take opposing views but hardly come to grips, in rival papers given before the Theological Society of Bristol University.

Professor Meredith F. Eller, of Central College, Fayette, Missouri, prints his lecture-notes in *The beginnings of the Christian religion* (Vision, 50*s*.). Starting from primitive animism he jog-trots through the Old Testament and the New, ending with II Peter; is this the usual pattern of introductory courses in " Biblical Literature " in American colleges—all facts and no fun? No. 25 in " Studies in Biblical Theology " is *A new Quest of the Historical Jesus*, by James M. Robinson (SCM, 9*s*. 6*d*.). Beginning not with Schweitzer but with Bultmann, he declares that the new quest is not merely a continuation of the

old, for it is existential rather than just historical. Professor George S. Hendry, of Princeton, in *The gospel of the Incarnation* (SCM, 15*s*.), argues that the Jesus of history, separated from us by time, is revealed to us as Christ in the Church's preaching and sacraments. Professor Hendry is of Scottish origin, and exemplifies the strongly Barthian cast of modern Scottish theology. Dr. Leslie D. Weatherhead has a different approach, in *The resurrection of Christ* (Hodder & Stoughton, 2*s*. 6*d*.), which he endeavours to explain in terms of spiritualism. Different again is *The cure for human troubles*, by W. Montgomery Watt (SPCK, 15*s*.), which combines the Christ of Christian orthodoxy with ideas of " archetypal synthesis "; though earnestly argued, it does not seem to meet the modern point of view to which it is directed. It may be appropriately mentioned here that the first paper-back edition of *The Moffat translation of the Gospels* has been published (Hodder & Stoughton, 2*s*. 6*d*.).

The world into which Christianity was born is admirably displayed by Professor Arnold J. Toynbee, in *Hellenism: the history of a civilisation*, volume 238 in the Home University Library (OUP, 7*s*. 6*d*.). Hellenism collapsed, perhaps committed suicide; Christianity survived, carrying within it anti-Christian Hellenic ideas which periodically burst into life again. Henri Daniel-Rops continues his history of the Church with *The Church in the Dark Ages* (Dent, 42*s*.). It is intended as a popular Catholic history, but is somewhat solid with facts. The ' Dark Ages ' of the title extend to A.D. 1050. In *The holy rule: notes on St. Benedict's legislation for monks* (Sheed & Ward, 35*s*.), Dom Hubert van Zeller, O.S.B., gives a devotional and didactic running commentary on the Benedictine rule, in which the original document almost disappears. A new volume in the valuable Catholic series of lives of saints, " The Makers of Christendom ", is *The lives of Ange de Joyeuse and Benet Canfield*, by Jacques Brousse, translated by Robert Rookwood in 1623 (Sheed & Ward, 18*s*.); both were Capuchins of the 16th century, the former being once a French noble and the latter an English puritan. An interesting introduction by Anthony Birrell gives the historical background and the subsequent history of Canfield's *Rule of perfection*, which was valued by English Quakers. D. B. Wyndham Lewis, in *A Florentine Portrait* (Sheed & Ward, 12*s*. 6*d*.), tells in lively style the story of St. Philip Benizi (1233-85), the wealthy physician who resigned his profession to found the Servite Order and nearly became pope. *Encyclopedia of the Papacy*, by Dr. Hans Kühner (Peter Owen, 35*s*.), is a chronological list of the popes with biographies, mostly brief. It originally appeared in German; though it bears no *imprimatur* it seems to be by a Catholic. On the other hand, *Nationality and the Western Church before the Reformation*, by I. P. Shaw, the Maurice Lectures for 1936 at King's College, London (SPCK, 7*s*. 6*d*.), is definitely Protestant; its thesis, vigorously argued with much evidence, is that the pre-Reformation churches of Europe were of national, not papal, origin and organization. A classic of the Greek Orthodox Church is *The ladder of divine ascent*, a mystical treatise by the 6—7th-century abbot St. John Climacus, translated by Archimandrite Lazarus Moore (Faber, 25*s*.). While almost nothing is known about the author, says M. Heppell in his introduction, the book was widely read in Slav monasteries for centuries.

Catholic faith and practice are authoritatively presented by means of question and answer in *Christ in us: instructions in the Catholic faith*, by James

Killgallon and Gerard Weber (Sheed & Ward, 6*s.*), and a basic difference between Catholicism and Protestantism is set out historically in *Holy Writ or Holy Church*, by George H. Tavard (Burns Oates, 30*s.*). Writing as a Catholic, he gives a critical account of the Council of Trent and is sympathetic towards Anglicanism.

Protestant theological history is finely represented by a rather unexpected volume in the series "The Library of Philosophy and Theology", *From Rousseau to Ritschl*, a translation of eleven chapters of Karl Barth's *Die Protestantische Theologie im 19. Jahrhundert* (SCM, 42*s.*). It is very long—one might almost say long-winded—but Barth's comments on how the European theological situation was built up are very stimulating, and he is very fair, seeking no cheap victories. His *A shorter commentary on Romans* (SCM, 15*s.*), lectures given in Basle in 1940-1, is Barth on more familiar ground; he himself calls it "a smaller younger brother" of his commentaries on the same epistle in 1918 and 1921. Professor Antoine Adam, of the Sorbonne, giving the Zaharoff Lecture in Oxford this year, spoke *Sur le problème religieux dans la première moitié du XVIIe siècle* (OUP, 2*s.* 6*d.*), considering especially the relation of Pascal to his age and the reason for his importance today.

Miscellaneous books on Protestant history include: *The Baptist Union: a short history*, by Dr. Ernest A. Payne (Carey Kingsgate Press, 21*s.*), an authoritative account written by a historian who is also an honoured leader and administrator in his denomination and in the World Council of Churches; *Soldiers of the Word*, by John M. Gibson (Philosophical Library, New York, $3.75), a history of the American Bible Society from its founding in 1816; *The doctrine of Jehovah's Witnesses*, by Roger D. Quidam (Philosophical Library, $3), a remarkable criticism in blank verse (!) of this vehement modern sect; and *The astonishing youth: a study of John Wesley as men saw him*, by Dr. Maldwyn Edwards (Epworth Press, 10*s.* 6*d.*), in which a leading Methodist historian tries to tell why Wesley was so deeply loved by so many of his contemporaries. In *To the refreshing of the Children of Light*, Dr. Geoffrey F. Nuttall, a Congregationalist speaking to Quakers, discusses the scriptural phrase "Children of Light", which was one of George Fox's names for his followers, and draws some modern conclusions (Pendle Hill, Pennsylvania, 35*c.*). In *Glasgow speaks: a reply to the Joint Report on Anglican-Presbyterian Relations* (Grant, Glasgow, 2*s.*), an official committee of the Glasgow Presbytery firmly says 'no' to any attempt to introduce "the historic episcopate" into the Church of Scotland.

An interesting attempt to apply psycho-analytical concepts to religion is made by Gilbert Cope, in *Symbolism in the Bible and the Church* (SCM, 30*s.*). Everything is explained in terms of psychological type-images, particularly of creation, sex and suffering. The result is illuminating, though it seem s sometimes too ingenious and occasionally superficial. His treatment of early Christian symbolism seems inadequate, and when he comes to modern times he is exclusively Anglican.

Sir Russell Brain, giving the Eddington Memorial Lecture of 1959, spoke on *Science, philosophy and religion* (CUP, 4*s.* 6*d.*). His conclusion is not new, that "there remain open to us modes of apprehension which are not concerned with science and with which science is not concerned", but in reaching it he throws valuable light from biology on the problems he raises, though he leaves most of them in mid-air. *Religion and the scientists* (SCM,

5*s*.) is a collection of lectures given by seven eminent Cambridge scientists in the university church there, in which they were given a free hand to say what they thought about religion from the point of view of their own branch of science. Some valuable things were said, but for the most part it is disappointing to find that scientists, like most of us, do not seem to keep abreast of thought outside their own specialities. Mostly they began by agreeing with Sir Russell Brain's conclusion, that in general science is irrelevant to religion, except that religion must be intellectually respectable in a scientific age; it is noteworthy that several of them believe that " the universe has a plan ". The scientific view of the world and man is taken seriously into account by Dr. E. L. Mascall in *The importance of being human* (OUP, 10*s*. 6*d*.), in which he insists, however, that existence is an inter-penetration of matter and spirit, so that evolution and the Fall are both true, and nature is supernaturalized by grace.

Leslie J. Tizard, minister of Carrs Lane Church, Birmingham, died last year of cancer, at the height of his powers. A fine memorial volume, containing representative sermons and a brave and thoughtful diary which he wrote in the last weeks of his life, is published under the title *Facing life and death* (Allen & Unwin, 16*s*.); it is heart-warming to read. An anthology of brief passages from the writings of Dr. Albert Schweitzer is called *The light within us* (Philosophical Library, New York, $2.75); it is remarkable how the essence of Schweitzer's philosophy of life can be conveyed in a few quotable sayings.

Two books commending Buddhism to the West are *Mahayana Buddhism: a brief outline*, by Beatrice Lane Suzuki (Allen & Unwin, 13*s*. 6*d*.), and *Studies in the Middle Way*, by Christmas Humphreys (Allen & Unwin, 15*s*.). According to the second, " theosophy is the accumulated wisdom of mankind ". Western mysticism is represented by a new translation, by Dr. Ira Progoff, an American psychologist, of the 14th-century classic, *The Cloud of Unknowing* (Rider, 21*s*.); Dr. Progoff, in an introduction, draws parallels with Freud and with Zen Buddhism. *Live beyond your limitations*, by Celia Barrie (Regency, 10*s*. 6*d*.), is an attempt at psychological uplift, which may be helpful to some. The indefatigable Sri Aurobindo Ashram, of Pondicherry, continues its unending task of publishing the works of Sri Aurobindo, and now issues the second book entitled *On Yoga*, in two bulky volumes (Rs. 24.00). The closing paragraph on p. 1715 is: " Sense of humour? It is the salt of existence. Without it the world would have gone utterly out of balance—it is unbalanced enough already—and rushed to blazes long ago ". This reviewer says Amen.

OXFORD

REVIEWS

Positivist Thought in France during the Second Empire. By D. G. Charlton. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Pp. 251. 35*s*.

Reviewed by Philip Spencer (*Oxford*)

'POSITIVIST' is an epithet that has been applied for many years to the thought of the Second Empire as though it fitted like a glove: for literary histories, rapid surveys, general descriptions, it was conveniently comprehensive. No doubt one needed a certain naivety to imagine that any single adjective could adequately characterize so complex a period; but 'positivist' has been fairly ensconced, and Dr. Charlton's essential merit is to call its use into question. Though his book preserves the traces of a thesis, he writes pleasantly and acutely, and the only criticisms that can reasonably be made of his analyses are rare and trifling. He is of course helped by the fact that the word, though loosely applied, retains a basic meaning. Unlike 'romantic,' 'classic', 'baroque', its precise denotation is not past reclamation. Charlton sensibly ties it to its philosophical sense: positivism is that theory of knowledge which restricts our knowledge to phenomena and their laws of relation and succession, and implies that all knowledge must be verifiable empirically. On this definition the argument of the book is based. It is perhaps not surprising that Comte, the father of positivism, when judged by this critical standard, is shown to betray the essentials of his creed as soon as he claims for his hypotheses a certainty which they do not possess, and, in particular, as soon as he makes a jump from a subjective to a 'proven' ethic. Comte's inconsistencies have been common knowledge since they were first attacked by Littré; but Charlton shows that instead of being late aberrations (as Littré argued) they can be traced back to the fount of the doctrine, the *Cours de philosophie positive* of 1830-42.

But if Comte was not a true positivist, who was? The only two contemporary figures who seem faithful to the fundamental philosophical definition are Littré himself and Claude Bernard. Bernard, a scientist rather than a philosopher, managed to remain strictly within the limits of positivism by virtue of his very reason and moderation. Unwilling to develop any new ethic, metaphysic or religion, he stuck to an agnosticism that was remarkable, in his time at least, by its mildness and lack of dogmatism. Littré's achievement was more complex. Loyal to Comte's first formulation of positivism, he defended the doctrine against the master's deviations and contrived to present it with a new clarity and cogency. Not only did he preserve it from Comte's authoritarianism: he protected it from the materialism into which it might so easily have sunk. If he slipped, it was in claiming too much for the 'certainties' of science and assuming too readily that moral judgements could be given a scientific basis.

Charlton's book might well end here; but having found so little to justify the exact description of 'positivist,' he extends his investigation to the two

prophets of the Second Empire, Renan and Taine. The bleak and exclusive certainties of science, which are all that the positivist can allow, circumscribe the prophets far too narrowly: they struggle to escape. It is instructive to observe Renan rejecting the traditional conception of metaphysics and then being led, as he develops his science of 'philology,' to turn aside from orthodox positivism in order to salvage the emotional attitudes and experiences of the ordinary religious believer. As Charlton well says, "Where Comte is the Catholic of positivist religion, Renan is its Nonconformist." But Renan, before the tragic disintegration of his last years, contrives in a most interesting way to recast the idea of progress as part of a religious system. Taine is more ambitious, if no more successful: and his attempt to fuse positivism and idealism reflects his search for 'angelic knowledge' that leads to a subsequent and lamentable confusion between positivism and 'scientism.' It is a paradox, as Charlton acutely points out, that the criticisms of Taine made by Bergson and Boutroux are precisely the criticisms made by later positivists.

Is it possible to find a more orthodox attitude among the Second Empire authors to whom positivism is so frequently attributed? The only two in whom any consistency can be discovered are Louise Ackermann, a poetess who lingers in occasional anthologies, and Sully-Prudhomme, a former Nobel prize-winner whose verse hardly survives outside Fauré's settings. Charlton's chapter on Sully-Prudhomme is particularly interesting, for it shows his reluctant acceptance of a doctrine to which he was emotionally averse, and reveals him as a much better philosopher than he is usually thought. "The Reluctant Positivists" might indeed be an alternative title for this book. The Second Empire was essentially a period of hesitation and pervasive doubt in which any kind of affirmation was difficult. There was no more certainty about positivism than about any other doctrine: few, even if they began by accepting philosophical positivism, found it satisfying enough to claim their ultimate allegiance, and eventually it was only the less sensitive, the less speculative, who did not try to escape from its severities into a more congenial and relaxing climate. It would be wrong to suggest that positivism was tried and found wanting, at least on the logical plane; but the positivists themselves fell abruptly and significantly short of their own standards.

The Parting of the Way. Lao Tzu and the Taoist Movement. By Holmes Welch. London: Methuen, 1958. Pp. 204. 21*s.*

Reviewed by Homer H. Dubs (*Oxford University*)

THIS work is an example of how books should not be written. With a fair knowledge of Chinese, which the author admits however to be inadequate for this very difficult subject, he has undertaken to interpret the many strains of thought that make up what is called Chinese Taoism.

The first part deals with the Lao-tzu (a title meaning "the Venerable Viscount"). Welch translates him from the English, using Waley chiefly, but not exclusively. Welch places the Lao-tzu in the sixth century B.C. and remarks that his son served the state of Wei (p.1). Since this state did not come into existence until 424 B.C., it is as if he had declared that the father lived in the time of Julius Caesar and his son served France! Chinese history

moreover records that this son made peace between the states of Wei and Ts'in in 273 B.C., so that the father's date can be approximated. The Lao-tzu's book contains a larger number of references to military matters than in any other ancient Chinese philosopher, but Welch seems quite unaware of this circumstance. He does not even see that the Lao-tzu attacked Confucianism in all its aspects. The early oral tradition about the Lao-tzu's book was never written down, because when, in the first century B.C., such traditions were written out, Taoism was temporarily dead. Today we have only later and inadequate commentaries. Welch, with the aid of Waley's translation, has produced a rather good interpretation of the Lao-tzu's ethics. But he quite misunderstands the Lao-tzu's metaphysics.

The Lao-tzu took pains to deny practically everything accepted by the "good" people of his day. Duyvendak is correct in translating the first line of the first chapter as "The Way that is truly the Way is not a constant way," *i.e.*, there is no regularity in the universe. Modern science has however made it almost impossible for us today even to think of a world without uniformities. But this postulate was essential to the Lao-tzu's thought. Ch'uang-tzu, who was an equally great ancient Taoist, is given no adequate treatment in this book.

The second part of the book deals with the Taoist religion as such. Here Welch has used the works of good Chinese historians. He thus offers the only adequate survey of later Taoism available in English. He does not, however, see the Mazdean origin of Chang Ling's Taoism, although he points out that it was different from other Taoisms. He follows Maspero in stating that mediaeval Taoism was guilty of systematic sex promiscuity. These charges, which Chinese would consider as imputing the utmost vileness to a religion, can be traced back to certain Taoist converts to Buddhism, who would naturally make charges that would be welcome to Buddhists. They are similar to the charges of cannibalism, etc. made against early Christians.

The last part of this book states the author's own Taoism, which he applies to the world's problems today, urging quietism, detachment, and contentment in one's situation, even in the present disordered age. This chapter, which may be the reason why the book was written, demonstrates the perennial allurement of the Lao-tzu's teaching.

The Christian Faith and Non-Christian Religions. By A. C. Bouquet. London: Nisbet, Library of Constructive Theology, 1958. Pp. x + 430. 25*s*.

The Comparative Study of Religions. By J. Wach. Columbia University Press; London: Oxford University Press, 1958. Pp. xlviii + 231. 36*s*.

Reviewed by S. G. F. Brandon (*University of Manchester*)

DESPITE the ever increasing tendency to specialization in religious studies, as in other fields of research, a healthy demand for a more general view continues to call forth such volumes as the two under review here. After all, it is natural to seek to know what the common religious experience of mankind means, while the adherents of a religion such as Christianity, which claims

universal validity, must be constantly aware of the problem constituted by the existence of other faiths.

Dr. Bouquet's book contains the garnered wisdom of a lifelong study of the religions of mankind—in fact he tells us that this interest started with him at the age of fifteen, when he heard Romesh Dutt lecture on the great Indian epics of the *Ramayana* and *Mahabharata*. Although the book is discursive in style, it gives evidence of both the width and depth of the author's learning; throughout its considerable length one feels that the purpose which inspired its inception has been sustained to the end. That purpose is to develop the Logos doctrine of the second-century Christian apologists, *i.e.*, that there were *Christians* before *Christ*, "the latter being the supreme manifestation of the Logos," into an interpretation of the religious history of mankind which will relate what is regarded as of value in other religions to Christianity, as the supreme revelation of the nature and destiny of man vis-à-vis God.

In the course of his exposition Dr. Bouquet does not hesitate to express himself clearly, but with unfailing courtesy, on a number of controversial issues. For example, about the *summum bonum* of Buddhism he concludes, "It seems clear that the sensation called *nibbana* is the sensation which the professional psychologist calls that of identity-mysticism, in which the individual mystic perceives himself as identified with the Absolute, the little self identified with the Great Self, and this identification might be symbolical rather than numerically factual." He maintains that, despite recent attempts to show that Buddhism has been concerned with the betterment of the conditions of man's life in this world, the Buddha sought only to change the 'mental and spiritual outlook' of suffering humanity. Likewise he declares in regard to Hinduism in this connection, that the work of the Ramakrishna Mission "is in flat contradiction" to the doctrine of *karma*—indeed he sees in the new social consciousness of the ancient Eastern religions a notable tribute to the superiority of Christianity.

In his chapter on 'Indigenisation' Dr. Bouquet provides a most interesting discussion of the problems which confront a Christianity, which has had its vital development in the West, when it is sought to fit it into an alien cultural ethos. Among other notable features, attention should be drawn to the valuable account of the important book of Mr. D. C. Vijayavardhana entitled *Revolt in the Temple*, in which Buddhism is presented as a form of scientific humanism. Dr. Bouquet's book also provides a useful corrective to H. Kraemer's thesis in his *Religion and the Christian Faith* (1956). An unfortunate defect, however, must be noticed: there is no index, and such an aid is essential where so many different subjects are touched upon in a discursive manner.

For all the valuable information which it contains and the spirit of sympathetic understanding in which it is written, the present reviewer finished the book with a certain sense of disappointment. Early on, Dr. Bouquet had remarked that he did not think that, "taken as a whole, Christianity as it stands, is yet quite fit to fulfil that function" (*i.e.* to be the ultimate common world faith). But the reasons for this view are nowhere explained at length, neither is any attempt made to justify the traditional Christian soteriology, the logic of which negatives the claims of all other religion. Surely, if one is seeking to recommend Christianity as a faith of

universal validity, the problem must be faced whether the post-70 A.D. synthesis achieved in the Synoptic Gospels truly represents the original form of the movement which stemmed from the life and teaching of Jesus of Nazareth?

The late Professor Joachim Wach devoted his life to the study of religion, endeavouring to construct a science of religion ('Religionswissenschaft') and to define its methodology. He taught in the University of Leipzig and, in America, in Brown and Chicago Universities. When he died in 1955, he was in the course of completing the present work, which has been prepared for publication by Professor J. M. Kitagawa, who contributes a lengthy introduction entitled "The Life and Thought of Joachim Wach."

After briefly sketching, from the days of Max Müller, the development of the discipline that has become traditionally known as 'Comparative Religion,' Wach states his belief that "a comparative study of religions such as the new era made possible enables us to have a fuller vision of what religious experience can mean, what forms its expression may take, and what it might do for a man." The postulation of such a comparative study naturally encounters the objection that no individual can expect to be able to understand any religion other than his own. Against this objection, Wach maintains that, granting the possession of the necessary mental equipment, "whoever has had wide experience with human character possesses one more qualification for understanding an alien religion, for such a person has thereby contacted the minds of people in the variety of their acting, feeling, and ways of thinking."

After discussing the nature of religious experience, the expression of that experience in thought, action and fellowship is severally investigated. These chapters often tend to become a catena of quotations from the works of a great variety of authors (and the necessary references are irritatingly grouped together at the end of the volume); it is possible that Wach would have expressed his own views at greater length here, if he had lived to complete the work.

In his introduction Kitagawa says that Wach was most 'intrigued' by anthropology, *i.e.* the nature and destiny of man. But the present work certainly does not reflect this preference; indeed the statement is made on p. 76 that "the first and most fundamental theme in any statement of faith concerns the nature of *Ultimate Reality*." Such a declaration, which is amply corroborated by the preoccupation with theological issues shown throughout the book, suggests that Wach, like so many other authorities in this field, seemed to believe that religion originated in man's aboriginal concern with deity and not with the more urgent problem of his own place and destiny in the world of his experience.

Several surprising errors have been noted. The ancient Egyptians never believed in "reincarnation (migration of souls)", as stated on p. 91; and to say that in Buddhism *moksa* means "the annihilation of the *dharma*—and this is *nirvana*" certainly requires much qualification. The Congress of the International Association of the History of Religions held in Rome, 1955, was the eighth, not the seventh of such Congresses as stated on p. xvi.

The Individual and the Universe. By A. C. B. Lovell. B.B.C. Reith Lectures, 1958. London: Oxford University Press. Pp. 111. 10*s.* 6*d*

Reviewed by F. J. M. Stratton (*Cambridge*)

IN HIS opening lecture, entitled *Astronomy Breaks Free*, Professor Lovell shews an unusual sympathy with some of the persecutors of the early European astronomers, whose new theories and discoveries seemed to undermine the contemporary views of the Earth, the Sun and the planets and to contradict the doctrine of the Holy Scriptures in many passages. He reminds us that even Milton's cosmogony was Ptolemaic and not Copernican; in *Paradise Lost* Raphael tells Adam that *whether Heaven move or Earth*

"From Man or Angel the great Architect
Did wisely to conceal."

Professor Lovell concludes a discussion of various theories of the *Origin of the Solar System* with a statement that the genesis of the cloud from which the Earth and planets were formed is unlikely to have been a rare event in the cosmos: in the universe now within reach of our telescopes there may well be over a billion systems, similar to our solar system. The question of the evolution of some forms of living material elsewhere in the universe he hands over from the astronomer to the biologist.

An account of the *New Astronomy* arising from the observations secured with the giant optical telescopes in California and the more recently built radio telescopes is followed by a discussion of the support that the State should give to fundamental scientific research. Comparing the attitude and actions of Great Britain, the United States and the U.S.S.R. in this connexion, Professor Lovell points out the perilous position of the first two nations arising from the parsimonious governmental attitude to science and technology.

The final lectures on the *Origin of the Universe* are the most enthralling of the series. Professor Lovell puts aside all theories that precede the introduction of the theory of general relativity by Einstein. In the end he comes down to two theories. One is a universe expanding from a primeval atom created at a definite moment of time some thousands of millions of years ago. The names of Lemaitre and Gamow are connected with two variants of the theory of a universe expanding from a primeval atom. The second theory is that of a steady state universe in which, while the most distant galaxies are moving out from our possible field of view, fresh matter is being continuously created and new galaxies are being formed to replace those lost; the all-over view of the universe remains essentially the same. We may possibly be able within a few years to decide from observations between these two rival theories.

Professor Lovell does not rule out the possibility that our universe may not be the whole cosmos, that other universes created at different times might exist. He adds that we can never penetrate the regions of space and time where they might exist; this may be so, but there remains the possibility that our universe might be penetrated from the outside by some other system of different age and origin. If galaxies leave our universe, might not galaxies enter it from outside?

As to the beginning of the universe, Professor Lovell explains that the steady state universe extends to an infinite time in the past and that there is no

limitation on its future extent in time—it has no beginning and no end. When we come to the ultimate question of the creation of the primeval atom of the alternative theory, we pass from physics into metaphysics; space and time, or space-time, says Professor Lovell, did not exist before that event. This, I take it, means that at this point we have reached a stage where the language developed to explain the universe of our sense experiences altogether fails us: according to an Oxford professor this is the case also when we deal with the microscopic world of ultimate particles. We have no right to expect that words and theories developed from the limited range of our experiences are applicable to the problems at either end of the much wider range of space (or size) and time to which our theories lead us.

We would like to hear from Professor Lovell a development of the hints that he throws out here and there as to the theological implications of the latest cosmological theories.

The Catholic Church in the Middle East. By Raymond Etteldorf. New York and London: The MacMillan Company, 1959. Pp. 184. 46*s*.

Reviewed by Eric Bishop (*Redhill*)

THE price makes this book prohibitive this side of the Atlantic, where it happens to work out at 3*d*. a page. Roman Catholic Parish Libraries might have a copy, which should be on loan to the would-be pilgrim en route for most of the countries visited (sometimes twice) by the author, most of whose chapters divide themselves into three main sections—the writer's experiences and often ideas, the relationship of the specific country with Communism and the extent of the (Roman) Catholic Church in the particular area. It is not before the end of the book that there is much reference to "Protestantism in the Middle East," where we have a "brief survey," This survey is part of the final discourse on the area as a "Battleground of ideas." The transliteration of Arabic (sometimes quite wrong) leaves much to be desired; while it is surely time in the interests of unified (and scholarly) endeavour that "Moslem" should now read "Muslim" with the other similar changes. More serious, however, is the repeated use of the term "Mohammedan," since this adjective is never used by the Muslim inhabitants of the countries envisaged, though this is not yet true of Africa south of the Barbary States.

For Monseigneur Etteldorf the *Middle East* comprises the Lands of the Fertile Crescent, plus Iran (which should surely be Persia once again), Egypt and Turkey. Equally with other writers he introduces the reader to the current phenomenon of the Middle East being not so much a geographical area as a state of mind (2).

The writer kept his eyes open as he toured the lands, though we are surprised at some of the statements—as that it took an "entire day to go by car to Bethlehem." We went there three times last July. It would occupy not much more than an hour even if the route chosen was through the Shepherds' Fields. But we are grateful for several of his phrases. "Jerusalem is a living sign of our failure" (8), though we question the one reason offered just previously for the Crusades. And has "Amman" really changed its name? Has it not rather gone back to its Old Testament nomenclature of Rabbath-Ammon (17)? As in all the chapters the author concentrates on

the witness of the "Catholic Church," often giving little pictures of his personal experiences in illustration; all too often he writes of the paucity of priests, a plaint that would find an echo in the leadership of other branches of the Church of Christ. His note on the Samaritans is pertinent, "who live and dress and worship God as their ancestors did thirty centuries ago" (23). It is natural to write of Israel after Jordan; though we are inclined to wonder how many of the recent immigrants can boast an ancestry in dispersement dating back twenty centuries (27, 28). As in other chapters there is some discussion of the political situations as the author found and studied them. There are too, in this as in other studies, statistical facts dealing with the numbers of "Catholic" and other Christians in the different lands. Readers will also be grateful for the allusions to Church History, which include the intricacies of the Uniate Churches. Nor does he forget mention of the Orders which have meant so much in Near Eastern countries—Franciscans in Egypt, Dominicans and Jesuits in Iraq—and all of them in Jerusalem. Rightly he turns to Syria after Egypt, as the other partner in the U.A.R. But the author takes deserved advantage of Damascus and her touch with St. Paul. It was here he discovered that "Arab Nationalism . . . does not concentrate on a single nation but includes all the so-called Arab nations" (73). But we doubt his suggestion that "the more accurate term" would be "Moslem nationalism." What would Kano, Karachi or Jakarta say to this (74)? We are grateful for the references to refugees, the scattered as the concentrated (see the last chapter). "Homeless and hopeless, they live as if they are doomed to be refugees for ever" (170). Then Lebanon with its multifarious groups, including the 80,267 Druses, but is it quite correct to say "use the Koran" (104)? The Monseigneur rightly says the Lebanese are Phoenician and notes the bilinguality of the country, as its narrow Christian majority. He obviously enjoyed himself in Iran (Persia) though he was mostly in the north. Here he has something to say on Nestorianism. There remain Iran's neighbours, Iraq and Turkey—the former the home of civilization and the latter the most western of the countries visited—and the least Christian. The author supports other writers on the low economic level of so many in such a rich country as Iraq, and does not forget the curious minor sects which flourish. Much of the chapter on Turkey is devoted to Byzantium, while here he has more to say too about the Armenians, though they are found in all these countries. The book closes with the realisation of the preponderating position of Islam throughout the area; we are grateful that he comments that "Protestant missionaries . . . try to adapt themselves to the mentality of the people" (173). We could wish the way opened for the author to revisit these lands and make it his prior aim on that occasion to make contact with the non-Roman groups, not thinking of them in terms of "dissidence" or "separateness" but as fellow-heirs of the Gospel which we must share in proclaiming.

The Easter Enigma. By Michael C. Perry. London: Faber. Pp. 264. 21s.

Reviewed by L. A. Garrard (*Oxford*)

IT is some time since a full length examination of the evidence for the Resurrection of Jesus appeared in English (Goguel's masterly *La Foi à*

la Résurrection de Jésus dans le Christianisme primitif is a surprising omission from the very full bibliography at the end of this book), and there was certainly room for a new study such as this, particularly in view of the new insight it brings to bear from the point of view of Parapsychology. The book falls, in fact, into two nearly equal parts. The first, which traverses well-trodden ground, deals with the narratives in the New Testament and (a valuable addition) the Apocryphal Gospels and seeks to assess their historical value. The second, a more novel undertaking, is an attempt to see how far Psychic Research can produce parallels which may throw a light on what occurred.

In a historical survey such as Part One a large measure of subjectivism is inevitable. The Liberal is often (and in the author's view justly) accused of allowing his dogmatic refusal to believe in miracles to prejudice him against those writings in which they are recorded. He will retort that the Conservative is in danger of falling into a different critical pitfall, through allowing his acceptance of the supreme miracle of the Incarnation to make all lesser miracles seem free from any difficulty whatever, so that all ordinary standards of historical reliability cease to apply to the records of a life so unique. Mr. Perry goes almost to the limit, short of verbal inerrancy, in harmonizing the New Testament narratives and sometimes invites for his own reconstruction the application of epithets like "fanciful" and "far-fetched" which he freely applies to those he does not favour. He is convinced not only that the grave was empty but even that there was a guard of temple police watching it. Only the earthquakes and one appearance in Matthew are rejected and Luke's insistence that the disciples never left Jerusalem, which is in flat contradiction to statements in Matthew and John.

After considering and rejecting Dr. Selwyn's theory of a mystical experience and the attempts of others to interpret the visions in terms of the phenomena of Spiritualism, Mr. Perry goes on in the second part to make a careful analysis of different kinds of veridical hallucination and phantasm, individual, collective and reciprocal. It is suggested that, since phantasms of the living and the dead are indistinguishable in appearance and characteristics, their genesis may be taken to be the same. Since the disciples knew that Jesus was dead there would be a subconscious predisposition against such visions, and Strauss was wrong in thinking that their psychological condition was such as to make a subjective hallucination probable. The New Testament narratives describe a series of events on a much larger scale than any modern parallel, both in duration and, particularly, in the extent of conversation, which is usually limited to a few sentences at most. Here, of course, everything depends on the extent to which we allow exaggeration in the Gospel narratives. One useful test of reliability is absent; the risen Jesus never imparts detailed information hitherto unknown to the percipients and subsequently verified. Mr. Perry will not make use of the argument that the success of the Church supports the truth of the Resurrection.

His own view is that "Jesus wished to convince his disciples that he was alive and had transcended death, and continue the teaching which Calvary had interrupted." He "therefore communicated with his disciples we do not know how, so we call it 'telepathy'—and caused their minds to project an apparition of his body as they had known it. This would demonstrate to them, in the only way in which they could understand, that it was really he

who was teaching them and that he had truly conquered the powers of Death." After the Ascension any further messages he wished to give were still received by telepathy, but no longer externalized visually as apparitions. Paul's vision was of an essentially different kind from those before the Ascension. True, Luke xxiv. 37 ff. makes Jesus disclaim any such explanation as that given here, but these words must be an interpretative addition to his actual message. As for the disappearance of the body from the tomb, which, it is frankly admitted, has no logical connexion with the appearances, this was due to a sheer miracle, a Divine action without precedent and unrepeated, and has no relation to what happens to the ordinary Christian.

It is unlikely that many of Mr. Perry's readers will be entirely satisfied with his reconstruction. It reveals more clearly than he would care to admit how irreconcilable are the New Testament records. Nevertheless even those whose preconceptions are very different from his will be grateful to him for his careful examination of the evidence and especially for his useful study, in the light of psi phenomena, of the possible nature of the Resurrection appearances and for the wealth of illustrative material which is here presented.

The Cultural Heritage of India. Volume I. Calcutta: The Ramakrishnan Institute of Culture, 1958. Pp. lxiv + 652. 35 *Rupees.*

Reviewed by E. J. D. Conze (*London*)

CULTURAL creativeness is very unevenly distributed among the nations of this earth. Two of them, Greece and India, have a quite outstanding record, and their contributions to human culture have been incomparably rich, influential and enduring. People who take " the cultural heritage of India " for their subject have therefore plenty to write about. This work of the Ramakrishnan Mission first appeared in 1937 in three volumes, and now the second edition has been enlarged to four. The first volume deals with " The Early Phases,"—Prehistoric, Vedic and Upanishadic, Jaina and Buddhist. To some extent it is a work of propaganda, and the Ramakrishnan Mission hopes that " it will contribute in some measure to the appreciation of Indian cultural values and point to the part which India can play in the future world renaissance," and the editors tell us (p. lxiv) that " the aspirations and the way of life as proposed by this culture " are " acceptable to the entire mankind."

More than 30 Indian scholars have combined to write this history of Indian cultural activities from the beginning to the emergence of the two heterodox systems of Jainism and Buddhism, and the later developments of Buddhism are also included in this volume. Most of it is pleasant to read. We first have an account of the " background of Indian culture," especially of the races which make up the population of India; then we have four articles about " Prehistoric India,"—the Stone Age, the Indus Valley Civilization, the origin of the Indo-Aryans, and the cultural interrelations between India and the outside world before Asoka. Then follow 12 articles on " Vedic Civilization," of which three are devoted to the Upanishads; finally part IV deals first with Jainism, and then eight articles try to do justice to Buddhism.

In contrast with the remainder of the book, the section on Buddhism

struck me as rather feeble. This may be because I know very much more about Buddhism than I do about Hinduism. More probably the reason can be found in the ambivalent attitude of the modern Hindu towards Buddhism. On the one hand the Buddha is one of India's greatest sons; on the other hand, however, Buddhism rejected the authority of the Vedas, ridiculed the pretensions of the Brahmins, made light of the caste system, and evolved a philosophy very much at variance with that of the Upanishads. The articles on Buddhism are, in fact, not up to the standard of our present knowledge. Their authors are quite unaware of the vast progress in Buddhist studies made in Europe and Japan during the last 20 years. Their accounts are not only far from authoritative, but also show no great breadth of understanding. Prof. Mookerjee (p. 594), for instance, tells us that " it is a puzzle how and why Buddhism came under the spell of the Tāntric cult, which had a dominant share of sorcery and magic." Its " external vesture is certainly a caviare to the general mind, if not positively repulsive." Whatever this may mean, it is no longer good enough in 1958. Prof. Bhattacharya's statements about " Dhyāni Buddhas " and " Saktis " have been refuted a hundred times by now, but he steadfastly abides by the views expressed by Hodgson in 1830, and takes no cognizance of anything that has been said since. There are in addition numerous minor errors and inaccuracies. I was naturally somewhat grieved to find that my own book on *Buddhism* (1951) is on p. 612 ascribed to " Cassirer, Bruno," which is in fact the name of the firm who published it. A sentence said on p. 481 to occur on p. 405 of the *Astasāhasrikā* cannot be found there. And so one could go on for a long time. In the hands of Brahmins Buddhism does not fare very well. The editor of a parallel work would probably be unwise to entrust the Byzantine period to a classical scholar reared on Homer and Sophocles, who would be bound to be rather unsympathetic and disparaging. It is a measure of the wealth of Indian culture that no one except a genius like the late Ananda Coomaraswamy can be equally appreciative of all of it.

What struck me when reading this book was that the Hindus seem to be the only people who take the idea of a world culture at all seriously. Although their notions on the subject, as expressed in this volume, particularly on pages x-xi, seem somewhat lacking in clarity, the problem itself is real and even urgent, and it is rather startling that no one else seems to be troubled by it.

The History of Israel. By Martin Noth: translated by Stanley Godman. London: A. & C. Black, 1958. Pp. viii + 480. 42*s.*

Documents from Old Testament Times. By Members of the Society for Old Testament Study: edited by D. Winton Thomas. London: Thomas Nelson, 1958. Pp. xxvi + 302. 18*s.*

Reviewed by H. F. D. Sparks (*Oxford*)

MARTIN NOTH'S *Geschichte Israels*, first published in 1950, has by now become a classic. Although the highly individualistic approach adopted, especially to the early period of Israel's history, renders it unsuitable as a text-book to put into the hands of the uninitiated, it is none the less a great

work, and no one could deny that an English translation is well worth while. It is, therefore, all the more to be regretted that Mr. Godman's translation of the second edition (1954) is so inadequate.

It is not merely that such sentences as "The conversion of narrative details of the 'patriarch'—stories into tribal history (Gen. xxxv, 16-20 draws attention to Rachel's grave)—is inadmissible" (p. 74, n. 3) time and again make it very difficult to extract any sense at all out of particular passages: it is rather that such translations as 'the Deuteronomium' (p. 102, n. 3), 'King Mesha of Moab remarks in his inscription (Z. 10)' (p. 157), 'Accadic literature' and 'Accadish' (pp. 269, 270), or 'the chronistic work' (p. 338, n. 2), give the impression that the translator, whatever may be his competence as a German scholar or a writer of modern English, has but the very slightest acquaintance with the subject-matter with which he is dealing. Errors in Hebrew words and phrases printed in square script are frequent; and proper names appear in a strange medley of Semitic, German, and English—e.g., Elia (p. 133, n. 1), Asthaarthe (p. 143), 'the Gattite' (p. 180, n. 2), Philistea (pp. 258, 259), Jojachin (p. 310), and Johannes (p. 374). All this creates an atmosphere of general confusion and uncertainty. Many of these instances are presumably the result of ignorance. But many, it seems, are due to sheer carelessness: thus, we have 'Terebinthe' twice on p. 121 but 'Terebinth' on p. 125, Shiloh on pp. 95-98 and 166 but Shilo on p. 225, Schoschenk on p. 230 but Shishak on p. 238 (both forms are listed separately in the Index), Sanherib on p. 265 but Sennacherib on pp. 266 and 267, while Demetrios and Demetrius both occur on p. 358 and on p. 371. And on two occasions we are referred for further information to 'p. 000' (pp. 186, 265)!

No one of any experience will expect a translation of a work of this size and scope to be entirely free from mistakes and ineptitudes. But the number in *The History of Israel* is out of all normal (and, indeed, reasonable) proportion. Even when the most liberal allowance has been made for errors and obscurities on the part of the author, as well as for the vagaries of two sets of printers, one German and one English, there can be no doubt that for a very large lion's share of a very large total the translator alone must be held responsible.

By way of contrast, *Documents from Old Testament Times* deals with the (extra-Biblical) raw material for the history of Israel and is a model of careful editing. The documents are divided into five sections—'Cuneiform', 'Egyptian', 'Moabite', 'Hebrew', and 'Aramaic'; and most sections are further subdivided—e.g. the Hebrew section consists of 'The Gezer Calendar', 'Inscribed Potsherds from Samaria', 'The Siloam Inscription', 'Letters from Lachish', 'Seals', 'Weights', and 'Coins'. The text in each case is given in translation (though not always *in extenso*), preceded by a brief introduction, and followed by a series of notes. Twenty-one contributors are named at the beginning of the book. The Editor himself writes a general Introduction; and there are sixteen excellently reproduced plates. All in all, it is a production of which the Society for Old Testament Study may well be proud.

Hinduism, Its Meaning for the Liberation of the Spirit. By Swami Nikhilananda. World Perspectives Series, London: Allen & Unwin. Pp. 189. 16*s*.

Reviewed by W. S. Urquhart (*Torphins, Aberdeenshire*)

WRITERS on the meaning and value of Hinduism are to be found to-day in many parts of the world, east and west, and Swami Nikhilananda occupies one of the outposts. For the last twenty-eight years he has been in America as leader of the Ramakrishna-Vivekananda Centre in New York, and previously he was for several years a monk in the Ramakrishna Order in Bengal. Thus by training, vocation and experience he is well qualified to undertake this short but comprehensive study of Hindu beliefs and religious customs. It is a difficult task; he is allergic to definiteness, and the diffuseness of his style and the want of coordination between details and fundamentals, make satisfactory construction of his arguments within the limits which he has set for himself almost more than can be expected. There is the further handicap that he is dealing with modes of thought in regard to which it might be said that contradiction is metaphysically authorized, but this hardly excuses the logical chaos which is a not infrequent resultant of the metaphysical position.

The Swami covers a wide range in his exposition, going back in time to the Vedic period, but acknowledging also the contribution of saints and philosophers, lawyers and politicians in ancient, medieval and modern periods. His claims as to the value of Indian religious and philosophical thought are high, and he thinks that it was the religion of India which preserved for it a certain unity through all the vicissitudes of foreign invasion and domination. He does not, however, indulge in uninterrupted panegyric, and in his zeal for the establishment of a unique catholicity in Hindu practice he rather weakens his case by accusing Christians and Moslems of strengthening their propaganda by dwelling on the injustices of Hinduism.

He devotes several chapters to the various activities which are inculcated by the different types of Hinduism, but he certainly does not put them all on the same level of spiritual value; and although he commends certain religious leaders for having tried out all the commonly practised methods, he supplies the caution that some of them could be safely used only by specially 'heroic' souls.

Throughout the book the balance is well maintained between the conceptions of the Absolute and unqualified Godhead on the one hand and the Relative Godhead on the other, although his own tendency is in favour of the former and he is by preference an acknowledged follower of Sankara. He strives to show impartially, however, how the qualified Godhead makes use of *maya*, or illusion, to create the unreal world, the world of ordinary life. The interplay between the two aspects becomes frequently confusing, as when contradictions are encountered on one level, recourse is had all too readily and frequently to another—in which all discrepancies disappear, sometimes, one feels, as by the waving of a magician's wand.

One result is a too slight emphasis upon ethics, which is regarded as a prelude to deliverance rather than as valuable in itself. The distinction between good and evil is blurred when we come near to the ultimate goal in the Absolute. The feeling of oughtness is still considered to be of the nature of bondage. On the whole our author would agree with the statement of Dr. Hubert Benoit, who says in a recent *Hibbert Journal* article that "True and effective courage consists not in submitting to the pressure of duty, but in

rejecting this reassuring crutch and assuming our liberty." But a resultant of this assumption is often that ethical action tends to become individual and subjective rather than social and grounded in reality. Stress upon non-attachment is apt to weaken the normally close connection between motive and result, and even to issue in a form of social conservatism, as, e.g., in the repeated requirement that a satisfactory teacher must be of " good family." The comparative disregard of purposefulness in the general cosmic conception is also unfavourable to ethics in that it removes a possible realistic background, and assigns too much importance to the " lila " or sportiveness of God. We are told that there is " neither rhyme nor reason behind the cosmic activity ", and, again, " only the ignorant read a motive into the creation. Their little brains fool them all the time."

The prevailingly negative character of Indian religious philosophy creates difficulty for Swami Nikilananda. He is very successful in showing that the Vedantic Absolute is not to be confused with the Buddhistic Void, but he is too easily, in his comparative estimate of religions, mesmerized by the common saying that all religions are of equal value. This may be justified by saying that it is the only possible attitude if we would avoid contempt of other religions and steer clear of the further descent towards the assertion, without sufficient consideration, that one's own religion is the best. But surely we cannot deny the intrinsic desire to discover the best, and we are surely less than human if we do not apply this to religious as well as to other matters. And the ultimate question is whether God is a static undifferentiated entity or the ever-active divine source of a progressive world.

One of the most interesting topics in the book is the Swami's discussion of the value of belief in a Personal God. He seems to allow the need of this conception, but again plurality rushes in, and the efficaciousness of a Personal Deity is lost in the crowd of possible incarnations. And after all he holds that faith in a Divine Personality is only a temporary solace and that in the end all needs will be met—or overwhelmed—in the undifferentiated Unity of the Absolute.

The value of this book is great in encouraging the search—the sympathetic search—for what is good in all religions, but it leaves us with a great longing for something positive, and with the desire to substitute for " all religions are equally good " a never-ceasing effort to find in each some help towards the discovery of the Best. The mathematical illustration of the centre of a circle and the radii, with the suggestion that the radii come nearer to one another as we approach the centre, is hardly appropriate to the religious quest, and we still have the desire to discover the radius which will guide us most satisfyingly towards the reality and the fulness and the activity of the Centre. It is obvious however that the mathematical illustration cannot without absurdity permit of such differentiation amongst the radii, and so it becomes increasingly plain that the illustration should not be applied to the manifold contentions which it is meant to support and its unrestricted use should be emphatically deprecated.

Jung and St. Paul. By David Cox. London: Longmans, Green & Co., 1959. Pp. xiv + 359. 32*s*.

Reviewed by G. Stephens Spinks (*Clovelly Rectory*)

PSYCHOLOGICAL studies of theological and religious matters have greatly improved in recent years, with advantage to psychology and religion, indeed the theologians may be said to have turned the tables on the psychologists. There was a time when a book under such a title as the present stimulating work would have been heavily biased on the psychological side and adversely critical of the subject selected for study. The improvement has been due in large measure to psychologists, prominent among them Jung himself, taking theology seriously, and to theologians becoming well equipped in matters psychological, e.g., Pfister's *Christianity and Fear*, Victor White's *God and the Unconscious*, L. W. Grensted's *Psychology of Religion* (H.U.L.), H. L. Philp's *Freud and Religious Belief* and R. C. Zaehner's *Mysticism —Sacred and Profane*, which are representative of an increasing volume of work from writers who are practising Christians, whether Protestant, Roman Catholic or Anglican. Jung's importance for religion may be said to arise from his insistence upon religion as a fundamental need which must be satisfied if there is to be any personal integration for the individual. The book under review is a worthy addition to the study of Jung's relevance for theology in the modern world; it is excellent alike in its subject-matter and its treatment of fundamental Christian doctrine—the subtitle " A Study of Justification by Faith and its Relation to the concept of Individuation " indicates its scope.

Unlike many writers who mix their ingredients too early in their enterprise, Mr. Cox avoids such a tendency, and remarks that " to relate psychology and theology it is necessary to keep in mind the fact that ' ultimate explanations ' are different in the two disciplines. One of the things which I have tried to do in this book is to show how the ' explanations ' of theology and psychology differ, and how they may be related." The author has largely succeeded in his undertaking. The book derives its impulse from a remark in *Two Essays on Analytical Psychology*, where Jung says that " Unfortunately our Western mind, lacking all culture in this respect, has never yet devised a concept nor even a name for the *union of opposites through the middle path*, that most fundamental item of inward experience, which could respectably be set against the Chinese concept of Tao . . ." Mr. Cox says that when he came across this sentence it occurred to him that the doctrine of Justification by Faith involves and indeed cannot be properly understood without some such union of opposites through the middle path; his attempt to set out this Christian doctrine in the light of Analytical Psychology is all the more important when it is remembered what an important part this doctrine has played in the history of the Western world; it contributed to the Augustinian synthesis which enabled the Church to stand when imperial Rome fell; it was the war-cry of the Protestant Reformation and is a cardinal doctrine of Anglican theology. We are coming slowly to see that our modern rejection of many Christian doctrines has left us intellectually as well as spiritually impoverished, which is, perhaps, one of the reasons why Jungian psychology has made so wide an appeal in the West. " The goals for living in this world [as] set before us by Christians, on the one hand, and Jung, on the other, are so alike that they might almost be one and the same." We might even go further and say that unless such similarities can be set out clearly it is difficult to see at what point the ' unattached man ' can be brought vitally into contact with Christian doctrine. This does not mean that theology has to be given a

'new look', but its relevance to human life has to be set out in ways that will show convincingly that it is dealing with the same issues as a man sees when he seats himself in front of his TV set to view a consultant psychiatrist discussing man and his problems.

The Psychology of Religion has nothing to tell us about the objective existence of God, but it has a lot to contribute when it shows us that doctrines which earlier generations fashioned in a Christian shape were *real* explanations. To-day Individuation as a concept is more familiar to many serious readers than is such a doctrine as Justification by Faith. Because this is so, the author, after indicating their common relevance, devotes a long chapter to Individuation and follows it by an equally long chapter on the theology of Justification. This pattern of explanation prevails throughout the book. The author makes no attempt to show similarities until he has made it reasonably clear what it is that is being compared. It is important to be aware of differences before rejoicing over the usefulness of similarities. Nonetheless it can be argued, as the author has argued, that St. Paul and Jung both agree (1) that 'natural man' follows his own conscious desires; both of them demand (2) that man should cease to rely upon his own will; and both suggest (3) that when he does so, something of vital importance happens to him. What happens is what Jung means by Individuation—by accepting his 'unconscious' a man achieves a new centre, the Self, an experience parallel to that of the man who accepts Christ as his 'new centre.' It is significant that the acceptance of a new centre, whether described psychologically as the Jungian 'Self' or as with St. Paul as being 'in Christ', leads to results almost indistinguishable in their outward likeness. But this is no easy process. The Christian faith sees man 'in bondage to sin'; his failure to live to his ideals is due as much to his failure to will what is right in the sight of God, as to the presence of opposed tendencies within him which weaken the will. Without obscuring the differences between them, the author says that Christianity and Analytical Psychology have this in common (among other things), they both set before mankind the *unity of man's nature*. "Jung exhorts natural man to realize that the unconscious is not, as he imagines, evil. St. Paul exhorts natural man to realize that his good will is not, as he imagines, good."

The book ends with a clear warning; Jung's psychology is not Christianity (Jung himself would be the first to agree), but the Christian while he cannot offer Jung's system as an alternative to that of the Church should not ignore the possibility that Jungian psychology may be used by God. With St. John of the Cross "we need not worry as to the use to which God's gifts should be put because God who gives them will see, if we will let him, that they are rightly used." Which is an eirenic conclusion.

Science, Medicine and Morals. By Charles E. Raven. London: Hodder and Stoughton. Pp. 189. 15*s*.

Reviewed by John Rowland (*Brighton*)

THERE are countless books on the tangled skeins of science and religion, but there are very few which have looked at science in its relationships with religion largely from the point of view of the biological sciences. From some

obscure cause it is the physicist rather than the biologist who has tried to build a bridge between the scientific and the theological point of view. For that reason, among a number, Dr. Raven's book deserves a warm welcome.

The book is an enlarged version of a course of lectures delivered in 1958 at the College of Medicine of the University of Cincinatti, under the auspices of the Markle Foundation. Hence, presumably, the title, which is in one small sense somewhat of a misnomer, since Dr. Raven is concerned really with the relationship between theology and biology, rather than with merely that between theology and medicine. He describes himself as having always been interested in the connection between religion and science, and adds the comment that in his young days " the double interest in science and religion meant that you were in the position of a circus-rider trying to ride two horses at the same time; and I very speedily discovered that early in the present century those animals were proceeding at top speed in different directions."

Nowadays, he adds, the two horses are moving at any rate in the same direction! It is noteworthy, indeed, that since the now distant time of Jeans and Eddington there are more and more people on both sides of the once iron curtain dividing science and religion who are concerned in the main to break that curtain down.

Dr. Raven's main point is not unlike that made by Mr. Koestler in *The Sleepwalkers* (see my review in *The Hibbert Journal* for April, 1959), in that he is concerned to make clear the calamitous results for the human race of a divergence in interest between the religious and the scientific point of view.

He emphasizes, indeed, the fact that it is only by resolving the supposed conflict between religion and philosophy on the one hand and science on the other that it is possible to make the human race a happy and integrated body. He faces quite boldly the greatest problem of all—the problem of evil—and admits, as Bishop Gore admitted long ago, that the real problem is not *human* suffering, but *animal* suffering. It is possible to make out a case for the suffering of human beings, saying that even apparently pointless pain may have its value in the development of human character and the human spirit; but it is very difficult to see anything of the sort as being applicable to the sufferings of the animal creation. Dr. Raven points out that we may overestimate the sufferings of at any rate some animals; and he adds that the person who sees that cats or dogs have individual characters may be not so very far removed from the person who sees that the shape of Cleopatra's nose may have had its effect on the slow and steady development of human history.

This volume is very closely-argued; it is not at all easy to summarize it in the course of a short review. Indeed, if we accept the old slogan that, where books are concerned, hard writing makes easy reading, it must be assumed that this book was very difficult indeed to write. Its argument, as has been suggested, is tight; yet it can be read almost, if not quite, with the ease of a novel. That may appear to the religious or the scientific expert to be extreme praise; yet the book merits such a compliment. Most reviewers will take it at a sitting; and even those who are not accustomed to digesting philosophical argument will be forced to admit that it is a work which is easily understood and not at all easily forgotten.

It is, too, not as aloof from the events of everyday life as are so many works of its kind. " We cannot," says Dr. Raven at one point, " afford to leave the

' new look ', but its relevance to human life has to be set out in ways that will show convincingly that it is dealing with the same issues as a man sees when he seats himself in front of his TV set to view a consultant psychiatrist discussing man and his problems.

The Psychology of Religion has nothing to tell us about the objective existence of God, but it has a lot to contribute when it shows us that doctrines which earlier generations fashioned in a Christian shape were *real* explanations. To-day Individuation as a concept is more familiar to many serious readers than is such a doctrine as Justification by Faith. Because this is so, the author, after indicating their common relevance, devotes a long chapter to Individuation and follows it by an equally long chapter on the theology of Justification. This pattern of explanation prevails throughout the book. The author makes no attempt to show similarities until he has made it reasonably clear what it is that is being compared. It is important to be aware of differences before rejoicing over the usefulness of similarities. Nonetheless it can be argued, as the author has argued, that St. Paul and Jung both agree (1) that ' natural man ' follows his own conscious desires; both of them demand (2) that man should cease to rely upon his own will; and both suggest (3) that when he does so, something of vital importance happens to him. What happens is what Jung means by Individuation—by accepting his ' unconscious ' a man achieves a new centre, the Self, an experience parallel to that of the man who accepts Christ as his ' new centre.' It is significant that the acceptance of a new centre, whether described psychologically as the Jungian ' Self ' or as with St. Paul as being ' in Christ ', leads to results almost indistinguishable in their outward likeness. But this is no easy process. The Christian faith sees man ' in bondage to sin '; his failure to live to his ideals is due as much to his failure to will what is right in the sight of God, as to the presence of opposed tendencies within him which weaken the will. Without obscuring the differences between them, the author says that Christianity and Analytical Psychology have this in common (among other things), they both set before mankind the *unity of man's nature*. " Jung exhorts natural man to realize that the unconscious is not, as he imagines, evil. St. Paul exhorts natural man to realize that his good will is not, as he imagines, good."

The book ends with a clear warning; Jung's psychology is not Christianity (Jung himself would be the first to agree), but the Christian while he cannot offer Jung's system as an alternative to that of the Church should not ignore the possibility that Jungian psychology may be used by God. With St. John of the Cross " we need not worry as to the use to which God's gifts should be put because God who gives them will see, if we will let him, that they are rightly used." Which is an eirenic conclusion.

Science, Medicine and Morals. By Charles E. Raven. London: Hodder and Stoughton. Pp. 189. 15*s*.

Reviewed by John Rowland (*Brighton*)

THERE are countless books on the tangled skeins of science and religion, but there are very few which have looked at science in its relationships with religion largely from the point of view of the biological sciences. From some

obscure cause it is the physicist rather than the biologist who has tried to build a bridge between the scientific and the theological point of view. For that reason, among a number, Dr. Raven's book deserves a warm welcome.

The book is an enlarged version of a course of lectures delivered in 1958 at the College of Medicine of the University of Cincinatti, under the auspices of the Markle Foundation. Hence, presumably, the title, which is in one small sense somewhat of a misnomer, since Dr. Raven is concerned really with the relationship between theology and biology, rather than with merely that between theology and medicine. He describes himself as having always been interested in the connection between religion and science, and adds the comment that in his young days " the double interest in science and religion meant that you were in the position of a circus-rider trying to ride two horses at the same time; and I very speedily discovered that early in the present century those animals were proceeding at top speed in different directions."

Nowadays, he adds, the two horses are moving at any rate in the same direction! It is noteworthy, indeed, that since the now distant time of Jeans and Eddington there are more and more people on both sides of the once iron curtain dividing science and religion who are concerned in the main to break that curtain down.

Dr. Raven's main point is not unlike that made by Mr. Koestler in *The Sleepwalkers* (see my review in *The Hibbert Journal* for April, 1959), in that he is concerned to make clear the calamitous results for the human race of a divergence in interest between the religious and the scientific point of view.

He emphasizes, indeed, the fact that it is only by resolving the supposed conflict between religion and philosophy on the one hand and science on the other that it is possible to make the human race a happy and integrated body. He faces quite boldly the greatest problem of all—the problem of evil—and admits, as Bishop Gore admitted long ago, that the real problem is not *human* suffering, but *animal* suffering. It is possible to make out a case for the suffering of human beings, saying that even apparently pointless pain may have its value in the development of human character and the human spirit; but it is very difficult to see anything of the sort as being applicable to the sufferings of the animal creation. Dr. Raven points out that we may overestimate the sufferings of at any rate some animals; and he adds that the person who sees that cats or dogs have individual characters may be not so very far removed from the person who sees that the shape of Cleopatra's nose may have had its effect on the slow and steady development of human history.

This volume is very closely-argued; it is not at all easy to summarize it in the course of a short review. Indeed, if we accept the old slogan that, where books are concerned, hard writing makes easy reading, it must be assumed that this book was very difficult indeed to write. Its argument, as has been suggested, is tight; yet it can be read almost, if not quite, with the ease of a novel. That may appear to the religious or the scientific expert to be extreme praise; yet the book merits such a compliment. Most reviewers will take it at a sitting; and even those who are not accustomed to digesting philosophical argument will be forced to admit that it is a work which is easily understood and not at all easily forgotten.

It is, too, not as aloof from the events of everyday life as are so many works of its kind. " We cannot," says Dr. Raven at one point, " afford to leave the

study and direction of the mass-mind to be explored and exploited only by the psychologists and statisticians of the advertising agencies "—a comment to which the Rev. C. O. Rhodes's recent Essex Hall lecture may be regarded as an extended footnote.

Elsewhere Dr. Raven comments on the sense of urgency which has afflicted our generation, the feeling that nuclear warfare may bring the world down in ruins, and adds that the cause of our bewilderment is not primarily " the ineptitude of our politicians or the selfishness of our people, still less the wickedness of the Russians or the Americans—according to which side of the Curtain you live on." In other words, Dr. Raven, like Mr. Koestler and many another commentator of our day, is mainly concerned with breaking down a barrier between human minds. And, unless that barrier is broken down speedily and effectively, dreadful calamity may follow. To prevent that calamity a split in the outlook of humanity must be healed—the split between the religious and the scientific attitude. It may be, as Dr. Raven suggests, that such a split can be healed more readily from the side of biology than from the side of chemistry and physics; and to provide at least a clue to the union of biology and theology is his aim in this very valuable book.

The Problems of Perception. By R. J. Hirst in the Muirhead Library of Philosophy. London: George Allen & Unwin. Pp. 330. 30*s*.

Reviewed by J. R. Smythies (*Shrewsbury, Massachusetts*)

THIS is certainly amongst the most important books on perception written by a philosopher since Price's *Perception*. It represents an invigorating departure from the Wittgensteinian obscurities and the obsession with language that have turned large tracts of modern philosophy into such arid, dull and unprofitable wastes. Hirst goes straight back to the true tradition of English philosophy—writing clearly and simply in good English about important issues. He also makes the first attempt by a contemporary philosopher to come to grips with *modern* neurological theories of perception. He admits that " . . . the problems of perception are problems largely because a study of the psychology and physiology of perception and of the characteristics of illusions and hallucinations seems to call for a radical revision of the plain man's assumptions." (p. 16) His aim in this book is to construct a comprehensive theory of perception that will cover all the facts systematically, will " answer the questions traditionally and justifiably raised, and which will reconcile customary belief, psychological analysis and scientific findings." (p. 16) He starts off with the sense-datum theory and particularly with Price's version of it which he examines in great detail. He finds a number of faults in it serious enough to cause him to reject it. However, these faults arise from the vulnerable epistemological definition of sense-data used by Price, and they do not arise if we use instead the phenomenological definitions given by Moore and myself. Chapters IV and V deal with phenomenalism and the use of linguistic methods in this field in a most excellently critical manner. The reasons he gives for rejecting them are quite convincing. He then goes on to discuss the representative theory in the versions given recently by Eccles, Brain and myself. His analysis of the epistemological justification of the account that the theory gives of

our knowledge of the external world—as the 'best hypothesis' for explaining the world—is quite correct. However, the reasons he gives for rejecting the theory are invalid. In the first place he misrepresents the theory by claiming that it states that we see or perceive percepts or sense-data, and that sensing requires (or should require if it took place at all) a causal chain within itself (for if external seeing requires eyes and brains this internal 'seeing' should require them too), and this leads to ridiculous notions like "little men in our heads" and to a vicious infinite regress. However, the latest forms of the theory specifically state that we *see* or *perceive* physical objects and that we *sense* sense-data (percepts) and that the relation between sensing and perceiving is part to whole. Also there is no reason why explanations used to account for the relations between our sense-fields and the external world *must* also be applied to explain sensing. Sensing relates an 'I' to a sensory field and the only evidence of this is introspective. All his objections to the representative theory turn out to be based on an inadequate statement of it, on the fact that his conclusions (about "little men in the head") do not follow from his premises, because he confuses the logic of representation with the logic of symbolism (sense-data are not *symbols* of objects [see p. 279] but are *representatives* of them), and because he does not know when to stop applying an analogy (the T.V. analogy of *perception*).

Hirst then constructs his own theory of perception, which is an adaptation of the old 'double-aspect' theory of mind-brain relations to perception. The fundamental notion is that different aspects of, or different approaches to, an object or situation reveal different characteristics about that object or situation. Thus the contents of my consciousness seem to be so different from the states of my brain because of the very different modes of access in each case—my private access to my own brain states and the public mode of access of the physiologist to brain events. The theory is worked out with great care, but from these simple beginnings it becomes more and more complex. A third mode of access to my perceptions—the philosopher's—is brought in. Then perceptual consciousness has to be distinguished from perception. Close analysis of his arguments reveals that this simple concept of 'access' or 'aspect' contains two separate components—the use of 'aspect' in a phenomenological sense and its use to set limits of discourse. Furthermore his crucial concept of 'identity' also contains two components—strict identity and a "very general" sense of identity in the sense that aspects are identical. Hirst does not distinguish sufficiently clearly between these various components, and in fact much of his argument depends on the use of one component in contexts suitable only for the other. The logical confusion resulting does much to prevent an acceptance of his theory. He also has to rely heavily upon the most implausible idea of a purely adverbial visual experience. But I do not think that he really convinces even himself on this (see his struggles [pp. 33, 299] to accept the idea against his better judgement). The whole idea (and his fundamental analysis of the inner aspect of perception) rests, however, on a mistaken use of 'like.' He states that the inner aspect of perception is *what it is like* to perceive an object (p. 286) whereas in fact it is not *like* perceiving an object, it *is* perceiving an object. Having an hallucination is *like* perceiving an object. Eating an egg is not *like* eating an egg: it *is* eating an egg. The adverbs that creep in through this crack cause havoc with his theory. He has also to rely on the dubious

doctrine of 'emergent' properties, which is usually the last defence of a bankrupt theory.

There is no space here to do more than present a general sketch of the arguments in this important book and of what can be said in reply. The best part is his account of phenomenalism and of linguistic methods in philosophy. His account of the representative theory gives evidence of a sophisticated acquaintance with modern neurology and psychology. However, his arguments against the theory are invalid for the reasons outlined above, and his own theory—ingenious and carefully worked out though it is—is too complex and too faulty to persuade us to reject the traditional neurological theory in its favour. This is, of course, no reflection on Hirst's powers as a philosopher, as the more indefensible the position the greater is the dialectical skill needed to defend it. But, as I say, it is a refreshing sign of changing times that a philosopher is prepared to discuss the representative theory at all.

The Ramayana of Valmiki. Translated by Hari Shastri, Vol III. London: Shanti Sadan. Pp. 720. 30*s.*

Reviewed by Betty Heimann (*London*)

THIS last volume of the translation of the Ramayana contains the sixth book of the original, the so-called *Yuddha Kānda*, the book of the Great Struggle, and the *Uttara Kānda*, the last book which frames the Epos in the end. As such the last book is related to book I which served as a frame of introduction. The *Yuddha Kānda* is more voluminous than all the other books of the Rāmāyana—true to the ancient Indian axiom that quantity indicates quality (importance). It contains the final struggle between the good and evil forces and the ultimate victory of the Good. The hero Rāma and his sub-and supra-human followers finally conquer the demons and their extra-human allies. The whole forces of Nature take part in this gigantic struggle of nearly equal opponents. The true hero is only a hero when he is able to overcome adversaries of his own standing. The Western reader naturally compares this classical Indian Epic of *gigantomachia* with that of the Western world, the *Iliad*. However, here lies their decisive and symptomatic difference: the innate historical sense of the West asserts itself already as early as in Homer. True, in the *Iliad* even gods take part in the struggle around the walls of Troy. But this divine interference is here a quasi artistic-theistic embellishment. A historical basis underlies Homer's imagination; the ruins of Troy serve as proof. The Indian *Yuddha Kānda*, on the other hand, goes beyond human historical experience. Not only are the sub-human beings on earth also here included in the grand struggle; not only are magical portents much more abundantly employed before and during the fight, but even the weapons used by the opposing armies are not mere instruments, tools so to speak, but, like the sacrificial utensils in the Rgveda, they are endowed with magical powers of their own and act on their own as personified helpers. No historical documents, but in a way those of Nature, are extant which may have inspired the phantasy of the ancient Indian poet. In the sea between India and Ceylon are still to be seen huge rocks emerging from the bottom of the ocean—certainly not to be

crossed by ordinary human beings. But the supra-human magical forces of Rāma's army could traverse these boulders. Powerful monkeys joined their tails, thus forming a living bridge on which to cross over to the residence of the demons in order to free Sitā, Rāma's wife, from their clutches. Though the home of the demons, Ceylon was considered the Beautiful Island, the so-called Paradise. This natural feeling for Ceylon's beauty is already alive in the Rāmāyana—see the loving description of Ceylon (Lanka) in the *Sundara Kānda* (Book III). Again, in the Book of the dramatic battle, the poet cannot resist interrupting the course of the events with a further description of Lanka's alluring beauty. In short, it is not history, but the feeling for Nature in all its implications, which inspires the Indian poet.

The *Uttara Kanda* is a shorter book. It supplements the main story with further details not previously related. Here the later interpolators have their chance of adding elaborations and further adornments and tales of heuristic explanations of the names and persons of the heroes of the main Epos.

The present translation, supplied by a Pandit imbued with his native tradition, provides a readable English version without effacing the Indian flavour in contents and diction. The awe-inspiring ambiguous ethics of ancient India are here still felt; the picturesque expressions and the strange Indian onomatopoeia are retained. Thus the present version of the Rāmāyana, the living document of India's past, is true to the original. It may well be enjoyed by a patient reader in the West.

Early Christian Doctrines. By J. N. D. Kelly. London: Adam & Charles Black. Pp. xi + 501. 30*s*.

Reviewed by D. E. Jenkins (*The Queen's College, Oxford*)

DR. KELLY informs us that his object in this book is the "modest one of providing students and others who may be interested with an outline account of theological development in the Church of the Fathers." This he proceeds to do with commendable clarity and enviable comprehensiveness for the period from the Apostolic Fathers to the Council of Chalcedon. A particularly admirable feature is the extensive quotations and references with which the text abounds. These form an excellent guide for anyone who wishes to form some idea of what the Fathers actually said on some major doctrinal topic but who has not, perhaps, the time or the equipment to make an extensive investigation of his own. If he 'dips' into a Father or a topic with the help of Dr. Kelly's references he will always be likely to get a fair sample. In fact it would seem that the work is best viewed and used as a real introduction to the study of the development of Christian doctrine in the vitally important period under review; *i.e.* the author's excellent summaries should be used to show the student where to start looking and what to start looking for as he enters upon his own investigations. He should then go on, as urged by Dr. Kelly himself in his preface, to see further for himself what the Fathers say and to form his own opinion of what they mean by it.

However, as a descriptive outline in itself and as a self-contained entity the book is not so satisfactory. This is, perhaps, not an entirely fair criticism as the author himself makes it quite clear that he has of set purpose avoided "investigating some of the wider problems which the evolution of dogma

doctrine of 'emergent' properties, which is usually the last defence of a bankrupt theory.

There is no space here to do more than present a general sketch of the arguments in this important book and of what can be said in reply. The best part is his account of phenomenalism and of linguistic methods in philosophy. His account of the representative theory gives evidence of a sophisticated acquaintance with modern neurology and psychology. However, his arguments against the theory are invalid for the reasons outlined above, and his own theory—ingenious and carefully worked out though it is—is too complex and too faulty to persuade us to reject the traditional neurological theory in its favour. This is, of course, no reflection on Hirst's powers as a philosopher, as the more indefensible the position the greater is the dialectical skill needed to defend it. But, as I say, it is a refreshing sign of changing times that a philosopher is prepared to discuss the representative theory at all.

The Ramayana of Valmiki. Translated by Hari Shastri, Vol III. London: Shanti Sadan. Pp. 720. 30*s*.

Reviewed by Betty Heimann (*London*)

THIS last volume of the translation of the Ramayana contains the sixth book of the original, the so-called *Yuddha Kānda*, the book of the Great Struggle, and the *Uttara Kānda*, the last book which frames the Epos in the end. As such the last book is related to book I which served as a frame of introduction. The *Yuddha Kānda* is more voluminous than all the other books of the Rāmāyana—true to the ancient Indian axiom that quantity indicates quality (importance). It contains the final struggle between the good and evil forces and the ultimate victory of the Good. The hero Rāma and his sub-and supra-human followers finally conquer the demons and their extra-human allies. The whole forces of Nature take part in this gigantic struggle of nearly equal opponents. The true hero is only a hero when he is able to overcome adversaries of his own standing. The Western reader naturally compares this classical Indian Epic of *gigantomachia* with that of the Western world, the *Iliad*. However, here lies their decisive and symptomatic difference: the innate historical sense of the West asserts itself already as early as in Homer. True, in the *Iliad* even gods take part in the struggle around the walls of Troy. But this divine interference is here a quasi artistic-theistic embellishment. A historical basis underlies Homer's imagination; the ruins of Troy serve as proof. The Indian *Yuddha Kānda*, on the other hand, goes beyond human historical experience. Not only are the sub-human beings on earth also here included in the grand struggle; not only are magical portents much more abundantly employed before and during the fight, but even the weapons used by the opposing armies are not mere instruments, tools so to speak, but, like the sacrificial utensils in the Rgveda, they are endowed with magical powers of their own and act on their own as personified helpers. No historical documents, but in a way those of Nature, are extant which may have inspired the phantasy of the ancient Indian poet. In the sea between India and Ceylon are still to be seen huge rocks emerging from the bottom of the ocean—certainly not to be

crossed by ordinary human beings. But the supra-human magical forces of Rāma's army could traverse these boulders. Powerful monkeys joined their tails, thus forming a living bridge on which to cross over to the residence of the demons in order to free Sitā, Rāma's wife, from their clutches. Though the home of the demons, Ceylon was considered the Beautiful Island, the so-called Paradise. This natural feeling for Ceylon's beauty is already alive in the Rāmāyana—see the loving description of Ceylon (Lanka) in the *Sundara Kānda* (Book III). Again, in the Book of the dramatic battle, the poet cannot resist interrupting the course of the events with a further description of Lanka's alluring beauty. In short, it is not history, but the feeling for Nature in all its implications, which inspires the Indian poet.

The *Uttara Kanda* is a shorter book. It supplements the main story with further details not previously related. Here the later interpolators have their chance of adding elaborations and further adornments and tales of heuristic explanations of the names and persons of the heroes of the main Epos.

The present translation, supplied by a Pandit imbued with his native tradition, provides a readable English version without effacing the Indian flavour in contents and diction. The awe-inspiring ambiguous ethics of ancient India are here still felt; the picturesque expressions and the strange Indian onomatopoeia are retained. Thus the present version of the Rāmāyana, the living document of India's past, is true to the original. It may well be enjoyed by a patient reader in the West.

Early Christian Doctrines. By J. N. D. Kelly. London: Adam & Charles Black. Pp. xi + 501. 30*s*.

Reviewed by D. E. Jenkins (*The Queen's College, Oxford*)

Dr. Kelly informs us that his object in this book is the "modest one of providing students and others who may be interested with an outline account of theological development in the Church of the Fathers." This he proceeds to do with commendable clarity and enviable comprehensiveness for the period from the Apostolic Fathers to the Council of Chalcedon. A particularly admirable feature is the extensive quotations and references with which the text abounds. These form an excellent guide for anyone who wishes to form some idea of what the Fathers actually said on some major doctrinal topic but who has not, perhaps, the time or the equipment to make an extensive investigation of his own. If he 'dips' into a Father or a topic with the help of Dr. Kelly's references he will always be likely to get a fair sample. In fact it would seem that the work is best viewed and used as a real introduction to the study of the development of Christian doctrine in the vitally important period under review; *i.e.* the author's excellent summaries should be used to show the student where to start looking and what to start looking for as he enters upon his own investigations. He should then go on, as urged by Dr. Kelly himself in his preface, to see further for himself what the Fathers say and to form his own opinion of what they mean by it.

However, as a descriptive outline in itself and as a self-contained entity the book is not so satisfactory. This is, perhaps, not an entirely fair criticism as the author himself makes it quite clear that he has of set purpose avoided "investigating some of the wider problems which the evolution of dogma

inevitably raises" and has "been content with trying to expound the doctrines themselves as understandingly and impartially as possible." He is, therefore, not, strictly speaking, giving an account of the development of theological thought in the Church up to the Council of Chalcedon, but is rather giving the best summary report he can on the materials on which such an account would be based. None the less from time to time, as Canon Kelly introduces *e.g.* a Father's "blend of Platonizing metaphysics and Genesis" and continues on his judiciously reporting way rigorously refusing to comment or evaluate, one is almost driven to ask "What is the *use* of this book?"—but the answer is clear. It is of the greatest use (1) to all who have to do any sort of paper on the *history* of Christian Doctrine and (2) as an introduction . . . etc. (see the first paragraph above.)

But even here certain caveats must be recorded. Firstly, as the author himself warns the reader, he has no room for outlining historical background in Church or State, and his comment (apropos of the Nestorian controversy) "if [the reader] desires to appreciate the doctrinal evolution, he should equip himself with at least an outline account of the historical situation" is clearly of wider application. But it is the write-up on the cover which states that " he gives the student an invaluable outline of *Church History* and patrology against which to place the evolving theological doctrines which he summarizes and expounds," and the author himself who denies this in at least one particular.

Secondly, Dr. Kelly does sometimes seem to be in danger of straying from his reporting to stress that an early Father is to be interpreted in the sense of a later orthodoxy. Thus in discussing the pre-existence of the Son in Ignatius (cf. p. 93) and in the Apologists (cf. pp. 100-101) he, I think, conveys the impression that there was much greater clarity about the Son's eternal distinction from as well as oneness with the Father than the texts show. Similarly on p. 115 he is surely much too confident that Tertullian was clear about the "one identical being" of the Father and the Son. It does not seem good reporting or helpful to the understanding of later doctrinal discussions to give the impression that writers were clear on points which had not yet been raised or whose implications had not yet been seen. In particular, Dr. Kelly thus obscures how necessary and yet how dangerous the Logos doctrine was as a means of doctrinal advance and a producer of doctrinal distortion.

Thirdly, it seems proper to ask whether an account that is more interpretative and evaluating than Dr. Kelly's summary reporting would not sometimes have better conveyed the 'feel' of the writer being dealt with. For example, it is doubtful if the pages on Augustine in the chapter entitled " Fallen Man and God's Grace " really convey what Augustine was 'getting at' at all. In the introductory first chapter on background the failure to convey any 'feel' in the sections on the philosophers and the Gnostics is particularly disastrous, and I doubt if they convey anything of value to anyone who does not know a good deal more on the subjects touched on than is contained in the sections concerned. But perhaps this is simply to play the old trick of complaining that this book and not another one was written. But it does raise the question " When is an account not an account?" and permit one also to express the hope that now Dr. Kelly has done the reporting he will go on and give us his exposition and evaluation of this material with which he is so clearly and competently familiar.

The Cloud of Unknowing

trans. IRA PROGOFF

'This is an excellent and much needed translation into modern English of one of our greatest mystical treatises'.—*Catholic Herald.*

'A valuable contribution to the documentation of religious experience . . . the language is clear, unambiguous, and forceful, retaining much of the pithy effect of the original'.—*Glasgow Herald.*
21*s.*

The Jewel Ornament of Liberation

trans. Dr. HERBERT GUENTHER

Translation of a hitherto overlooked 11th-century work, which is a penetrating study of Tibetan Buddhism, by sGam. po. pa, favourite pupil of Mi. la. ras. pa. 'It is indeed a masterly survey of the Mahayana'. Dr. EDWARD CONZE, *Vice-President of the Buddhist Society, London.* 42*s.*

The Wheel of Life

JOHN BLOFELD

The autobiography of a Western Buddhist. 'He is an excellent writer and obviously a man remarkable for character as well as intelligence . . . his experiences are recounted vividly and persuasively: devotion to the Orient never softens into gush'.—RAYMOND MORTIMER, *Sunday Times.*

'It is an absorbing book . . . To a remarkable degree he conveys the happiness he has got from his beliefs'. PETER DUVAL SMITH, *The Observer.* *Illus.* 25*s.*

Buddhism and Christianity in the Light of Hinduism

ARTHUR OSBORNE

Advances the bold and interesting thesis that Buddhism and Christianity are complementary aspects of one supreme truth, the essence of which is exemplified in Hinduism. The author writes with deep understanding and from a wide background of reading in Buddhist, Christian, Hindu and Islamic sources.
12*s.* 6*d.*

Foundations of Tibetan Mysticism

Lama ANAGARIKA GOVINDA

The most valuable book yet written on the subject of Tibetan Mysticism. The author, a member of the *Kargyutpa* Order, has spent more than 20 years of his life at the feet of masters in Tibetan monasteries and his direct experience has given him a clear insight into much that has hitherto remained obscure.
Autumn. Illus. 30*s.*

RIDER *178-202 Great Portland Street, London, W.1*

SOME BOOKS RECEIVED

The inclusion of a book in this list does not preclude a subsequent notice.

The Sacrifice of Isaac by Ignaz Maybaum. London: Vallentine, Mitchell. pp. vi + 24. 3*s*. 6*d*.

Pierre Bayle: le Philosophe de Rotterdam ed. by Paul Dibon. London: D. Van Nostrand Co. Ltd. pp. xix + 253. 47*s*. 6*d*.

Dreaming and Some of its Implications by Professor C. D. Broad. London: Society for Psychical Research. pp. 24. 2*s*. 6*d*.

Eternal Values for a Changing Society by Swami Ranganathananda. London: Ramakrishna Vedanta Centre. pp. 244. Rs. 3.

The Voice of a Disciple by T. L. Vaswani. Poona: Gita Publishing House. pp. 32. 1*s*.

Ideas of Revelation by H. D. McDonald. London: Macmillan. pp. xi + 300. 30*s*.

The Science of Society by Mary Burt Messer. New York: Philosophical Library. pp. 239. $3.

Tolerance and Religion by the Rev. Charles E. Raven. London: The Council of Christians and Jews. pp. 16. 2*s*.

Histoire et Historiens dans l'Antiquité by Kurt Latte and others. Geneva: Vandoeuvres. pp. 300. Fr. S. 29.

Westcott as Commentator by the Rev. C. K. Barrett. London: CUP. pp. 26. 3*s*. 6*d*.

Three Journeys by A. E. Dodd. London: Fortune Press Ltd., pp. 43. 7*s*. 6*d*.

The Voice of Vivekananda by T. L. Vaswani. Poona: Gita Publishing House. pp. 64. Rs. 1.

The Cult of the Mother Goddess by E. O. James. London: Thames and Hudson. pp. 300. 35*s*.

The Business of Criticism by Helen Gardner. Clarendon Press: OUP. pp. viii + 157. 15*s*.

La Libertà by Giancarlo Lunati. Naples: Francesco Giannini & Son. pp. 156 $3. 1500 lire.

Flight and Pursuit by Stuart Holroyd. London: Gollancz. pp. 237. 21*s*.

True from the Beginning by Charles H. Welch. Banstead: The Berean Publishing Trust. pp. 48. 1*s*. 6*d*.

The Way Things Are by P. W. Bridgman. Harvard U.P. London: OUP. pp. x + 333. 45*s*.

An Essay on the Development of Luther's Thought on Justice, Law and Society by F. Edward Cranz. Harvard U.P. London: OUP. pp. xviii + 197. $2.50.

From Ape to Angel by H. R. Hays. London: Methuen. pp. 461. 36*s*.

The Wheel of Life by John Blofeld. London: Rider and Co. pp. 263. 25*s*.

Aion—Researches into the Phenomenology of the Self by C. G. Jung, trans. by R. F. C. Hull. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. pp. xi + 344. 32*s*.

A History of Philosophy, Vols. I & II by Wilhelm Windelband. London: Hamish Hamilton. pp. xx 690. + 12*s*. 6*d*. each.

Man and Crisis by José Ortega y Gasset. London: Allen & Unwin. pp. 217. 16*s*.

Thought and Being by André Mercier. Basel: Verlag Für Recht und Gesellschaft. pp. ix + 156. n.p.

Studia Philosophica, eds. Daniel Christoff & Hans Kunz. Basel: Verlag Für Recht und Gesellschaft. pp. vii + 248. n.p.

OUT OF PRINT FOR YEARS AND NOW
REPRINTED IN A NEW REVISED AND ENLARGED SECOND EDITION

ARTHUR R. HOWELL'S
IMPORTANT BOOK ON AESTHETIC PHILOSOPHY

THE MEANING AND PURPOSE OF ART
or
THE MAKING OF LIFE
(*Three reprints since publication*)

From 'The Times Literary Supplement':
'. . . Mr. Howell has had the best sort of experience for writing on art . . . what he has to say is valuable and penetrating.'

From 'English', Margaret Willy:
'. . . The Author's exploration of such aspects as man's responses to his environment . . . the distinction between natural form and art form . . . the artist's outlook and the trend of modern art, is illuminating and profound. . . .'

From 'Apollo', Victor Rienaecker:
'. . . Only through the perfect integration of aesthetic ideals with the problems of the economic order does Mr. Howell see a solution of the overall problem of man's real freedom and happiness . . . fully repaid by a second immersion in the thought of a very significant social philosopher. . . .'

From Sir John Squire, 'The Illustrated London News'
'. . . And I find that most of the solemn modern critics of painting . . . do not know creation from the inside . . . I must say that Mr. Howell is an exception . . . he can produce explanations . . . for even the most recent developments. . . . But he remains a human being, with an eye for our mysterious destiny, and an eye for every lovely thing, from the lighted window of the distant inn to a primrose in the shade. . . . He is a humanist in the sense of the Latin poet who wrote "Homo Sum." . . .'

A. ZWEMMER LTD. (21/-)
76/80 Charing Cross Road, London, W.C.2

Book buyers who need good service
usually write to

W. J. BRYCE LTD

Booksellers

41 Museum Street
London, W.C.1

who for forty years have served
a discriminating public
quietly and well

THE MUIRHEAD LIBRARY OF PHILOSOPHY

The Problems of Perception

By **R. J. HIRST**, M.A. *Lecturer in Logic at the University of Glasgow*

This book offers a comprehensive survey of the problems of perception, paying special attention to those set by the causal processes involved in perceiving, by the subjective conditioning of what is perceived, and by the occurrence of hallucinations. After a critical examination of the main current attempts at a solution, including those made by recent 'linguistic' or 'analytical' philosophy, there is developed an original explanatory theory based on a restatement of the Double Aspect Theory of the relation of mind and body. 30*s.*

The Philosophy of Whitehead

By **W. MAYS**, PH.D.

On the one hand, this book gives a critical exposition of the main concepts of Whitehead's philosophy as seen in their scientific perspective. On the other, it clarifies his treatment of specific philosophical problems, such as the nature of sense-perception, causality, free-will and the body-mind problem. In this way the author throws a new light on those features of Whitehead's system which have puzzled philosophers for three decades. 25*s.*

Our Experience of God

By **H. D. LEWIS**, B.LITT., M.A. *Professor of the History and Philosophy of Religion at the University of London.*

How do we know that religious assertions are true? There can hardly be a question of greater importance than this for religious studies. It is the question with which this book is mainly concerned; and in dealing with it, on the basis of his account of certain religious experiences and the patterns these form in history, the author also discusses other topics of much current interest such as the place of imagination in art and religion, the preternatural and religion, the credibility of miracles and the status of dogma. 30*s.*

Philosophical Papers

By **G. E. MOORE**, O.M.

In this book are brought together for the first time some of the most important shorter writings of one of the most eminent and influential of modern philosophers. They have long deserved this more prominent place in philosophical literature. Some of the papers, for example "A Defence of Common Sense" and "Proof of an External World" have had much prominence in recent controversy and the others rank little, if at all, below them in general interest. There are also notes and impressions by Moore of lectures by Wittgenstein (who was for some years contemporary with him at Cambridge), which throw much light on the thought of both men. In addition there is new work by Moore which has not been published anywhere before. *About* 35*s.*

GEORGE ALLEN AND UNWIN LTD

PRINTED IN GREAT BRITAIN BY EATON PRESS LTD., LIVERPOOL